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TAKING APPROPRIATIONS SERIOUSLY
Gillian E. Metzger*
Appropriations lie at the core of the administrative state and are becoming increasingly important as deep partisan divides have stymied substantive legislation. Both Congress and the President exploit appropriations to
control government and advance their policy agendas, with the border wall
battle being just one of several recent high-profile examples. Yet in public law
doctrine, appropriations are ignored, pulled out for special legal treatment,
or subjected to legal frameworks ill-suited for appropriations realities. This
Article documents how appropriations are marginalized in a variety of public
law contexts and assesses the reasons for this unjustified treatment. Appropriations’ doctrinal marginalization does not affect the political branches
equally, but instead enhances executive branch and presidential power over
appropriations at the expense of Congress. Yet legal doctrines governing appropriations should have the opposite effect because constitutional text, structure, and history make clear the central importance of Congress’s appropriations power. Appropriations’ doctrinal marginalization undermines the separation of powers even further by undercutting political accountability
through Congress and creating de facto presidential spending authority, with
the executive branch able to violate governing statutes on appropriations
with minimal legal consequences. This Article then turns to the question of
what taking appropriations seriously might mean for public law doctrine. It
concludes that appropriations exceptionalism is not problematic if it reflects
the realities of the appropriations process and does not downplay appropriations’ significance. Doctrines should attend to the separation of powers
dynamics raised by appropriations and reinforce Congress’s power of the
purse. Among other consequences, this leads to jurisdictional doctrines that
put primacy on congressional enforcement of appropriations limits in court.
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INTRODUCTION
Appropriations lie at the core of the administrative state. Without
appropriations, the executive branch cannot act, and thus choices about
agency funding have a fundamental impact on how the government
operates. Long recognized as important, appropriations’ centrality to
government is even more true today. Deepening partisan divides,
competitive politics, and divided government have stymied substantive
legislation in Congress and caused greater exploitation of must-pass
funding measures to advance political agendas. Policy battles between
Congress and the President increasingly are fought on the terrain of the
budget, leading to longer and more frequent government shutdowns,
ongoing contestation over the use of appropriated funds, unfulﬁlled
statutory promises, and little long-term policy resolution. Rather than
amending or repealing substantive authorizations, Congress resorts to
appropriations riders and funding denials as its tools of choice to control
government policy.1 The President, in turn, creatively interprets appropriations statutes, imposes new grant conditions, repurposes and withholds
funds, and invokes inadequate funding as a basis for broad assertions of
presidential discretion.2 Meanwhile, dedicated funding streams and
agency-generated funds are used to protect new regulatory initiatives
against both congressional and presidential appropriations control.3
A high-proﬁle example of appropriations’ importance was the battle
between President Trump and the Democratic-controlled House of
Representatives over money to build a wall at the country’s southern border that marked the second half of Trump’s term in office. Disagreements
over the border wall led to a record-setting thirty-ﬁve-day partial government shutdown from December 2018 to January 2019.4 Immediately after
signing an appropriations bill that included far less money for building a
wall than he had sought, President Trump declared a national emergency

1. See infra section I.B.1.
2. See infra section I.B.2.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 104, 121–122.
4. See Glenn Thrush, In a Divided Washington, Congress Averted a Shutdown—But
at a Price, N.Y. Times (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/15/us/politics/
border-wall-deal.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
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and stated that his administration would transfer billions of dollars appropriated for other purposes to wall construction—sparking Democratic
outrage and multiple lawsuits.5 A California district court quickly granted
a preliminary injunction that the Supreme Court ultimately stayed.6 In
June 2020, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s subsequent
permanent injunction, and the case is currently before the Supreme
Court.7 Meanwhile, the D.C. Circuit recently held that the House of
Representatives has standing to challenge the fund transfer as violating the
Appropriations Clause.8
President Trump is hardly alone in his creative use of appropriations
to push his policy priorities. Consider President Obama’s efforts to fund
key cost-sharing components of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), his
signature political achievement. After no annual appropriation was
enacted to cover the cost-sharing obligations the ACA imposes on insurers,
the Obama Administration sought to use a permanent appropriation
instead, an effort that was enjoined as a result of a lawsuit brought by the
Republican-controlled House of Representatives.9 Congress also adopted
an appropriations rider preventing the use of annual appropriations to
fund the ACA’s risk-sharing program, leading insurers to ﬁle suit in the
Court of Federal Claims. In Maine Community Health Options v. United States,
the Supreme Court held that the government was liable for the unpaid
risk corridor payments, which amounted to around $12 billion.10
Yet another recent instance of appropriations dominating the national political landscape involved the Trump Administration’s withholding of
military aid for Ukraine. It was this action that sparked President Trump’s
ﬁrst impeachment; the House of Representatives determined that the
withholding was part of an effort by Trump to encourage a foreign
5. See infra text accompanying notes 113–118.
6. Trump v. Sierra Club, 140 S. Ct. 1 (2019) (mem.).
7. See California v. Trump, 963 F.3d 926, 932 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. granted sub nom.
Trump v. Sierra Club, 141 S. Ct. 618 (2020); Sierra Club v. Trump, 963 F.3d 874, 880 (9th
Cir. 2020), cert. granted, 141 S. Ct. 618 (2020). The Court had scheduled Sierra Club for
oral argument in February but removed the case from its calendar in response to a request
from the Biden Administration, which is reviewing the border wall transfers. See Motion of
the Petitioners to Hold the Brieﬁng Schedule in Abeyance and to Remove the Case from
the February 2021 Argument Calendar at 1–2, Biden v. Sierra Club, No. 20-138 (U.S. Feb.
3, 2021); Amy Howe, Justices Take Immigration Cases Off February Calendar, SCOTUSBlog
(Feb. 3, 2021), https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/02/justices-take-immigration-cases-offfebruary-calendar [https://perma.cc/M8B5-W36F]. For further discussion of this case, see
infra text accompanying notes 114–117, 246–255, and section IV.C. The Ninth Circuit also
invalidated a separate transfer of funds for the border wall in Sierra Club v. Trump, 977 F.3d
853, 861 (9th Cir. 2020), petition for cert. ﬁled, No. 20-685 (U.S. Nov. 17, 2020).
8. U.S. House of Representatives v. Mnuchin, 976 F.3d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
9. See U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 185 F. Supp. 3d 165, 168 (D.D.C.
2016), vacated in part sub nom. U.S. House of Representatives v. Azar, No. 14-1967 (RMC),
2018 WL 8576647 (D.D.C. May 18, 2018).
10. 140 S. Ct. 1308, 1315, 1318 (2020).
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government’s interference in the U.S. presidential election by pressuring
Ukraine to investigate his presidential rival, now-President Joe Biden.11
Also in the news in 2020 was the Trump Administration’s withholding of
appropriated funds from Puerto Rico, Native American tribes, and the
World Health Organization, as well as President Trump’s threat to deny
funds to states expanding absentee voting.12 Trump additionally directed
high-level officials in his administration to identify a list of “anarchist
jurisdictions” that would be ineligible to receive discretionary federal
funds, promised $200 drug-discount cards to seniors, and threatened to
deny funds to schools that did not reopen in the fall of 2020.13 Meanwhile
any doubt about the policy and separation of powers signiﬁcance of
appropriations should be erased by the COVID-19 pandemic. Massive
appropriations lie at the heart of the federal government’s response, with
partisan ﬁghts over new funding and interbranch battles over oversight
and allocation of the funds.14
Of particular note, these recent appropriations disputes are often
taking a legal as well as political guise. Federal courts are seeing a broad
array of litigation involving appropriations and funding, including not just
11. Nicholas Fandos & Michael D. Shear, Trump Impeached for Abuse of Power and
Obstruction of Congress, N.Y. Times (Dec. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/
18/us/politics/trump-impeached.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (last updated
Feb. 10, 2021).
12. Berkeley Lovelace Jr. & Noah Higgins-Dunn, Trump Halts U.S. Funding for World
Health Organization as It Conducts Coronavirus Review, CNBC (Apr. 14, 2020), https://
www.cnbc.com/2020/04/14/trump-calls-for-halt-to-us-funding-for-world-health-organizationamid-coronavirus-outbreak.html [https://perma.cc/4KHT-JQDD]; Brett Neely, Trump
Repeats Unfounded Claims About Mail-In Voting, Threatens Funding to 2 States, NPR (May
20, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/05/20/859333693/trump-repeats-unfounded-claimsabout-mail-in-voting-threatens-funding-to-some-st [https://perma.cc/9DLZ-MDBU]; Mark
Walker & Emily Cochrane, Native American Tribes Sue Treasury over Stimulus Aid as They
Feud over Funding, N.Y. Times (May 1, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/01/
us/politics/coronavirus-native-american-tribes-treasury-stimulus.html (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review); Justin Wise, Trump Administration Ending Delay for over $8 billion
in Puerto Rico Disaster Aid, Hill (Jan. 15, 2020), https://thehill.com/homenews/
administration/478332-trump-admin-ending-delay-for-over-8-billion-in-puerto-rico-disaster
[https://perma.cc/5VPB-7PPV].
13. See Memorandum on Reviewing Funding to State and Local Government
Recipients that are Permitting Anarchy, Violence, and Destruction in American Cities, 2020
Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. § 3 (Sept. 2, 2020); Peter Baker, Erica L. Green & Noah Weiland,
Trump Threatens to Cut Funding if Schools Do Not Fully Reopen, N.Y. Times (July 8, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/08/us/politics/trump-schools-reopening.html (on ﬁle
with the Columbia Law Review) (last updated July 24, 2020); Margot Sanger-Katz & Noah
Weiland, Trump Promised Seniors Drug Discount Cards. They May Be Illegal., N.Y. Times
(Oct. 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/22/us/politics/trump-prescriptiondrugs.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
14. See Charlie Savage & Peter Baker, Trump Ousts Pandemic Spending Watchdog
Known for Independence, N.Y. Times (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/
07/us/politics/trump-coronavirus-watchdog-glenn-ﬁne.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review).
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the border wall and ACA-related lawsuits but also states’ challenges to the
Trump Administration’s efforts to deny funds to sanctuary jurisdictions,15
criminal defendants’ challenges to prosecution for marijuana offenses in
violation of an appropriations rider,16 and challenges involving the
government’s failure to meet statutory obligations due to inadequate funding.17 This increasing legal dimension is a relatively new phenomenon. To
be sure, prior political clashes over spending have sometimes resulted in
litigation, but the number of high-proﬁle cases today in which courts are
grappling with appropriations matters is unusual.18
This increase in appropriations lawsuits is part of a broader trend in
which courts are stepping into political battles in our polarized age, resulting in a marked expansion in separation of powers–infused litigation.19 Yet
legal challenges to appropriations actions raise unique problems and
concerns for two reasons. The ﬁrst is that, despite their centrality to
government operations, appropriations are marginalized in public law
doctrine. The second is that the resultant rules courts apply to appropriations disputes serve to enhance executive branch and presidential power
over appropriations at the expense of Congress.
The marginalization of appropriations in public law doctrine takes
several forms. Many public law doctrines apply appropriations exceptionalism, pulling appropriations out from governing legal frameworks
and employing sometimes arcane appropriations-speciﬁc rules. Others engage in appropriations silence, either ignoring appropriations altogether
or simply assimilating appropriations to existing frameworks without
acknowledging that those frameworks ill-ﬁt appropriations realities. And
often marginalization takes the form of jurisdictional exclusion of appropriations disputes, whether as the result of appropriation-speciﬁc jurisdictional rules or application of existing jurisdictional requirements that
appropriations disputes cannot easily satisfy.
For instance, constitutional jurisprudence on congressional delegation rarely engages with the implications of appropriations, and the same
is true of separation of powers cases more broadly.20 Expand from
separation of powers to cases involving the spending of government funds
15. E.g., City & County of San Francisco v. Barr, 965 F.3d 753 (9th Cir. 2020), cert.
dismissed per stipulation sub nom. Wilkinson v. City & County of San Francisco, No. 20-666,
2021 WL 1081230 (mem.) (U.S. Mar. 4, 2021).
16. E.g., United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2016).
17. E.g., In re Aiken County, 725 F.3d 255 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
18. The numerous lawsuits triggered by President Nixon’s impoundments serve as an
earlier example of a burst of appropriations-related litigation. See generally Ralph S. Abascal
& John R. Kramer, Presidential Impoundment Part II: Judicial and Legislative Responses,
63 Geo. L.J. 149 (1974) (describing impoundment cases).
19. See Trump v. Mazars, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2031 (2020); Gillian E. Metzger, The Roberts
Court and Administrative Law, 2019 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 2.
20. See infra sections II.A.1, II.A.3.
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and this exclusion might seem less severe. Courts regularly consider
constitutional limits on government funds in individual rights and
federalism contexts.21 Yet even here, special rules often govern when
government funds are involved. As just one example, the Supreme Court
has indicated that the involvement of government funds may pull agency
action outside of otherwise applicable structural constitutional
constraints, such as Article III or the commandeering doctrine.22
The marginalization of appropriations is even clearer in administrative law and statutory interpretation. Appropriations actions are often
exempt from standard procedural requirements, and barriers to judicial
review of appropriations decisions are common.23 Even the personnel and
offices involved in appropriations and budget matters differ from the
administrative law norm. Within the executive branch, budget and
accounting offices rather than substantive program divisions are the
appropriations frontline, and appropriations also involve different centralized executive branch overseers.24 A number of other less familiar entities
play starring roles as well, such as the Government Accountability Office
(GAO), the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and the Court of Federal
Claims. When appropriations questions do surface in court, it is often in a
statutory interpretation guise, resulting in a number of appropriationsspeciﬁc doctrines that minimize the impact of appropriations measures on
substantive law.25
Appropriations’ marginalization in doctrine does not necessarily entail marginalization in practice. Sometimes doctrinal marginalization
actually serves to make appropriations a more potent tool for the political
branches by freeing appropriations from legally enforceable constraints.26
Indeed, appropriations play a much more starring role in nondoctrinal
public law. A well-established statutory and regulatory framework—replete
with a substantial body of guidance, internal executive and legislative
branch decisions, and longstanding norms—governs agency budgeting
21. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 567 U.S. 519, 575–86 (2012)
(holding that Congress could not withhold existing funds from states that declined to
expand Medicaid eligibility under the ACA).
22. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161, 167–68 (1992); infra section II.B.2.
23. See infra section II.B.
24. See Christopher J. Walker, Federal Agencies in the Legislative Process: Technical
Assistance in Statutory Drafting: Final Report to the Administrative Conference of the
United States 10, 14–16, 30–31, 37–38 (2015), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/technical-assistance-final-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/CKM2-3L9E] (concluding that agency budget offices “often provide technical drafting assistance on legislation that
directly affects those agencies”); Eloise Pasachoff, The President’s Budget as a Source of
Agency Policy Control, 125 Yale L.J. 2182, 2199–201 (2016) [hereinafter Pasachoff, The
President’s Budget] (describing resource management offices in OMB as centralized
budget overseers).
25. See infra section II.C.
26. See infra section II.E.
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and spending. This framework is primarily enforced by legislative and
executive branch entities, making only rare appearances in court. Yet even
this political branch public law of appropriations is increasingly marginalized, with appropriations norms and practices being undermined by partisan disagreements and policy disputes between the legislative and
executive branches.27
Importantly, moreover, appropriations’ doctrinal marginalization
does not affect the political branches equally. Especially combined with
the erosion of appropriations norms and practices that reinforce congressional control, such doctrinal marginalization redounds to the executive
branch’s beneﬁt. This is especially true of doctrines that exclude appropriations challenges from the jurisdiction of the federal courts. The cumulative effect is the creation of a de facto presidential spending authority and
a corresponding weakening of congressional control of the purse.
Appropriations have long received substantial attention from political
scientists and congressional scholars, who have examined among other
things the political dynamics of the appropriations process and how
Presidents wield inﬂuence over federal spending.28 But the
marginalization of appropriations also exists in public law scholarship,
which has largely ignored issues of agency funding.29 This blindness to
appropriations is beginning to change, with a growing body of scholarship
documenting the importance of appropriations to the administrative state.
This work has opened a window on appropriations, offering rich accounts
of how Congress,30 the President,31 and agencies32 use funding measures
27. See infra section II.E.
28. See, e.g., Richard F. Fenno, Jr., The Power of the Purse: Appropriations Politics in
Congress, at xiii (1966) (providing an “empirical description of the contemporary appropriations process”); John Hudak, Presidential Pork: White House Inﬂuence over the
Distribution of Federal Grants 3 (2014) (discussing whether and how presidents engage in
“pork barrel politics”); D. Roderick Kiewet & Mathew D. McCubbins, The Logic of
Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process 3–4 (1991) (analyzing
“key issues involving congressional parties and the delegation of policy-making authority in
the context of the annual appropriations process”).
29. See, e.g., Pasachoff, The President’s Budget, supra note 24, at 2186 (“The budget
itself . . . is a key tool for controlling agencies. Yet the mechanisms of control through the
executive budget process remain little discussed and insufficiently understood.”).
30. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 San Diego L. Rev.
61, 84–90 (2006) (describing how “Congress has supervised agencies with great particularity . . . through the appropriations process”); Matthew B. Lawrence, Disappropriation, 120
Colum. L. Rev. 1, 26–44 (2020) [hereinafter Lawrence, Disappropriation] (discussing
examples of how Congress has increasingly failed to fund mandatory obligations).
31. See, e.g., Pasachoff, The President’s Budget, supra note 24, at 2207–08; Note,
Independence, Congressional Weakness, and the Importance of Appointment: The Impact
of Combining Budgetary Autonomy with Removal Protection, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1822, 1827–
29 (2012) (describing methods of presidential control over policy through appropriations).
32. See, e.g., Christopher C. DeMuth, Sr. & Michael S. Greve, Agency Finance in the
Age of Executive Government, 24 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 555, 583–87 (2017) (discussing the
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to advance their policy priorities. Scholars are also developing nuanced
analyses of how appropriations ﬁt into the constitutional separation of
powers framework,33 a subject that has received little sustained engagement since the 1980s in the aftermath of Iran–Contra.34 Still, the marginalization of appropriations in public law doctrine has gone mostly
unremarked, and a comprehensive analysis of how courts do and should
approach appropriations remains lacking.
This Article aims to provide that analysis and explore the implications
of taking appropriations seriously in public law doctrine. The disconnect
between the lived appropriations-centric reality of administrative governance and the appropriations-excluded doctrinal rubrics of public law
raises several questions: What explains the marginalization of appropriations in public law doctrine? Is this marginalization constitutionally
justiﬁed? And what would happen if we rethink public law by putting
government funding at the core of the doctrinal analysis rather than
pushing it to the periphery?
Appropriations marginalization has several sources. One is the courts’
traditional reluctance to impose ﬁnancial penalties or funding obligations
on governments, which is connected to a belief that resource allocations
are core policy and sovereign determinations that belong in the political
branches. Put differently, the marginalization of appropriations in public
law doctrine is closely linked to the centrality of appropriations in the
political arena. At the same time, however, the doctrinal marginalization
of appropriations also embodies normative judgments made by courts
about how Congress should operate. In particular, a central basis is judicial
prioritization of substantive legislative enactments over appropriations
and skepticism of appropriations as a policymaking tool.
These rationales fail to justify the current doctrinal marginalization
of appropriations. For starters, this marginalization creates a disconnect
between contemporary governance reality and governing legal frameworks. More importantly, the downplaying of appropriations and corresponding elevation of substantive legislative enactments is at odds with the
Constitution. Constitutional text, structure, and history make clear the
central importance of Congress’s appropriations power. Legal doctrines
consequences of agency self-funding); Mila Sohoni, On Dollars and Deference: Agencies,
Spending, and Economic Rights, 66 Duke L.J. 1677, 1701–05 (2017) (describing how
agencies use spending to advance policy goals).
33. See, e.g., Zachary S. Price, Funding Restrictions and Separation of Powers, 71
Vand. L. Rev. 357, 361 (2018) (theorizing the extent of the President’s independent
spending authority).
34. See J. Gregory Sidak, The President’s Power of the Purse, 1989 Duke L.J. 1162,
1183–202 (arguing that the Constitution grants the President power to spend the minimum
necessary to perform constitutional functions); Kate Stith, Congress’s Power of the Purse,
97 Yale L.J. 1343, 1381–86 (1988) (articulating constitutional limits on congressional and
presidential spending authority). Louis Fisher is an exception here. See generally Louis
Fisher, Presidential Fiscal Accountability Following the Budget Act of 1974, 67 Me. L. Rev.
286, 302–09 (2015) (describing spending disputes from the 1990s to the early 2010s).
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governing appropriations therefore should seek to empower congressional control of appropriations. Yet as noted above, doctrines that
marginalize appropriations often have the opposite effect. They also serve
to undercut political accountability through Congress, because appropriations are one of the most available means by which Congress can shape
policy today. The doctrinal marginalization of appropriations additionally
threatens the rule of law by freeing government from legally enforceable
checks with respect to appropriations. And appropriations’ doctrinal
marginalization undermines the separation of powers even further by
creating de facto presidential spending authority, enabling the executive
branch to violate governing statutes on appropriations without legal
consequences.
This is not to deny that increased judicial involvement in
appropriations carries separation of powers risks of its own. The concern
that bringing appropriations into the public law mainstream will expand
judicial power at the political branches’ expense is real and legitimate. But
this fear must be balanced against the very serious separation of powers
harms caused by appropriations’ exclusion in our current polarized era.
The erosion of longstanding norms and practices in the wake of
polarization means that political branch public law is increasingly unable
to enforce congressional control over appropriations on its own.
Moreover, courts are being dragged into appropriations disputes already,
suggesting that the issue is not one of whether courts should play a role in
such matters but rather what rules should govern the role they play.
That leaves the question of what taking appropriations seriously might
mean for public law doctrine. Here it is helpful to differentiate among the
different forms that appropriations’ doctrinal marginalization takes.
Appropriations silence is the most difficult to justify; at a minimum, taking
appropriations seriously should mean that courts engage expressly with
the import of appropriations and incorporate appropriations into their
analysis. But rules that pull appropriations out for special treatment are
not necessarily problematic, provided such appropriations exceptionalism
reﬂects the realities of the appropriations process and is not an effort to
downplay appropriations. Indeed, appropriations-speciﬁc rules can provide an important means of balancing different imperatives, such as
enforcing congressionally imposed limits while also preserving needed
budget ﬂexibility. Taking appropriations seriously also entails paying
special attention to the separation of powers dynamics raised by appropriations, with interpretive doctrines structured so as to reinforce Congress’s
power of the purse over the executive branch. It further requires including
assessment of appropriations measures in separation of powers analysis.
More radically yet, taking appropriations seriously—and also acknowledging the risks posed by expanding the judicial role in appropriations
disputes—suggests rethinking jurisdictional doctrines to put primacy on
congressional enforcement of appropriations limits in court.
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In what follows, Part I begins by outlining the traditional frameworks
and institutional arrangements that govern appropriations. It then
describes appropriations’ current centrality to administrative government
and contemporary separation of powers disputes. Part II turns to documenting how, despite this importance, appropriations are marginalized in
public law. It begins by identifying the different analytic mechanisms by
which this sidelining of appropriations occurs and then looks in detail at
how these mechanisms surface in constitutional and administrative law,
statutory interpretation, and political branch public law. Part III takes a
step back to assess appropriations marginalization in public law, ﬁrst identifying the rationales on which such marginalization rests and then arguing that these rationales fail to justify the sidelining of appropriations. It
contends that the current marginalization is at odds with the constitutional
importance of Congress’s appropriations power and undermines political
accountability, the rule of law, and the separation of powers. Part IV turns
to the reconstructive project, exploring what taking appropriations
seriously might mean in practice and examining the implications of such
a new approach to appropriations for the border wall funding dispute.
A note on terminology is warranted. This Article uses the term
“appropriations” expansively, including under its embrace not simply legislation allocating budget authority to different government functions—
the traditional deﬁnition of appropriations—but also administrative
actions implementing those allocations and making expenditures that
more often are classiﬁed as involving government spending. Both appropriations and spending involve provision of government funds and are
manifestations of the same congressional power of the purse. But spending
is the term generally applied to grants of funds outside of the federal
government, especially to state and local governments or private actors,
whereas appropriations is used to refer to funding the federal government.
The term appropriations is thus particularly tied to the separation of
powers issues that dominate the analysis here. However, spending disputes
often carry separation of powers dimensions, especially today, and thus
merit inclusion in the discussion as well.35
35. One could expand the lens even further to include other closely associated forms
of government action, such as government contracting or revenue-raising activities. Indeed,
government contracting and revenue-raising are in many ways similarly marginalized in existing public law doctrine. See Jody Freeman & Martha Minow, Reframing the Outsourcing
Debate, in Government by Contract: Outsourcing and American Democracy 1, 4–5 (Jody
Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009) (describing concerns that private contractors fall
outside of existing government accountability regimes); Lawrence Zelenak, Maybe Just a
Little Bit Special, After All?, 63 Duke L.J. 1897, 1898–900 (2014) (describing tax exceptionalism). Yet each of these modes of government functioning has distinct features not present
in the case of appropriations and spending—in the case of government contracting, the
frequent transfer of government power to private hands; in the case of revenue-raising, the
governmental power to obtain an exaction from private actors. Intragovernmental contracting may come closest—and, like appropriations, it is an area governed by arcane legal
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I. THE CONTEMPORARY IMPORTANCE OF APPROPRIATIONS
Appropriations have always been a central site of political contestation
in the United States and pivotal for the functioning of administrative
government.36 In today’s polarized world, the critical importance of appropriations is only greater. Both Congress and the President are increasingly
resorting to appropriations to advance their policy agendas and exert control over the administrative state. To place these developments in context,
this Part begins with a brief overview and history of the appropriations and
budget process. It then turns to depicting appropriations’ changing role
and contemporary signiﬁcance.
A.

The Appropriations and Budget Process Over Time

Struggles over appropriations have a very long history, with appropriations representing a central means by which Parliament established its
dominance over the British king.37 Concern over the corrupting power of
government spending, as well as the danger that proﬂigate spending
would necessitate higher taxes, led the Framers to ﬁrmly vest control over
appropriations in Congress.38 The Appropriations Clause provides, “No
Money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.”39 This requirement of legislative authorization for
appropriations is accompanied by other constitutional provisions reinforcing Congress’s control of the federal ﬁsc, including Congress’s authority
to “lay and collect Taxes,” “pay the Debts,” “provide for the common
Defence and general Welfare,” and “borrow Money on the credit of the

requirements overwhelmingly enforced by the political branches. See Eloise Pasachoff,
Federal Grant Rules and Realities in the Intergovernmental Administrative State:
Compliance, Performance, and Politics, 37 Yale J. on Regul. 573, 577, 582–92 (2020); see
also Bridget A. Fahey, Federalism by Contract, 129 Yale L.J. 2326, 2329 (2020) (emphasizing
the “thousands of written agreements that facilitate shared governance among levels of
government”). On the other hand, substantial overlap exists between intragovernmental
contracting and federal spending programs in practice, as federal grants are frequently
implemented through intragovernmental contracts. Fahey, supra, at 2339–43. In any event,
the limited inclusion of spending within the appropriations umbrella here is not meant to
preclude the possibility that other federal government ﬁscal activities could also be
proﬁtably linked.
36. See generally Lucius Wilmerding, Jr., The Spending Power: A History of the Efforts
of Congress to Control Expenditures (1971) (providing a history of disputes over federal
expenditures from the Framing to the early decades of the twentieth century).
37. William C. Banks & Peter Raven-Hansen, National Security Law and the Power of
the Purse 11–18 (1994); Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution: Legislative Authority and
the Separation of Powers 45–52 (2017) [hereinafter Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution].
38. Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, supra note 37, at 54–57.
39. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
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United States,” as well as the Constitution’s stipulation that “All Bills for
raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives.”40
Besides specifying that no appropriation for the army shall last longer
than two years,41 however, the Constitution is silent on how the principle
of congressional control of the purse should be implemented. A few
appropriations practices have existed since the Founding—such as annual
appropriations,42 appropriations being separate from legislation,43 and
origination of appropriations measures in the House44—although all of
these practices have experienced some erosion over time. Other aspects of
the process for appropriating and spending federal funds have changed
more dramatically, in response to new national needs, wars, political
developments, and institutional rivalries.45
One particularly important institutional rivalry is the enduring battle
between Congress and the President for control of appropriations. The
constitutional principle of congressional control of the purse has always
coexisted with substantial executive branch inﬂuence on appropriations.46
After initially deferring broadly to estimates provided by Treasury
Secretary Alexander Hamilton in the early years of the Washington
Administration, Congress soon pushed for more control, with Representative Albert Gallatin prevailing in his quest for line-item appropriations over
Hamilton’s resistance.47 Appropriations bills continued to include substantial detail until the growing complexity and size of the federal government

40. Id. §§ 7–8; see also Lawrence, Disappropriation, supra note 30, at 11–14 (adopting
a more capacious deﬁnition of Congress’s power of the purse that includes all “means of
economic inducement potentially wielded by the government”); Price, supra note 33, at 366
(“The Constitution thus ensures that Congress, with its distributed representation and
resulting capacity for bargained trade-offs, holds ultimate authority over both collection and
distribution of public resources.”).
41. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
42. Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, supra note 37, at 58–61.
43. James V. Saturno & Brian T. Yeh, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R42098, Authorization of
Appropriations: Procedural and Legal Issues 1–2 (2016); Allen Schick, Cong. Rsch. Serv.,
Rep. No. 84-106 GOV, Legislation, Appropriations, and Budgets: The Development of
Spending Decision-Making in Congress 8–17 (1984).
44. Allen Schick, The Federal Budget: Politics, Policy, Process 217, 232 (3d ed. 2007)
[hereinafter Schick, Federal Budget].
45. See id. at 13–14. For a detailed account of the changes in the appropriations
process over the period 1865–1921, see Charles H. Stewart III, Budget Reform Politics: The
Design of the Appropriations Process in the House of Representatives 1865–1921, at 79–132
(1989).
46. See Louis Fisher, Presidential Spending Power 10–19, 21–58 (1975) [hereinafter
Fisher, Presidential Spending Power] (discussing the President’s role in federal spending
decisions from 1789 to 1974).
47. Gerhard Casper, Appropriations of Power, 13 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 1, 9–22
(1990); Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, supra note 37, at 58–59.

1088

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 121:4

that developed over the twentieth century—and concomitant need for
ﬂexibility—led to broader lump-sum appropriations.48
Over time, Congress enacted a variety of framework measures to
control executive branch spending, even as it also granted the presidency
a central role in the budgeting process. A critical statute is the
Antideﬁciency Act, ﬁrst enacted in 1870 as a response to executive officials’
practices of “coercing” Congress to make additional appropriations, for
example by spending their entire annual appropriations quickly or
entering into contracts they lacked funds to cover.49 Subsequently
amended several times, the Antideﬁciency Act prohibits federal officers or
employees from spending or obligating federal funds in excess of the
amount currently available in an appropriation.50 The Act also bars receipt
of voluntary services, except when “authorized by law” or for “emergencies
involving the safety of human life or the protection of property.”51 It is
reinforced by the Miscellaneous Receipts Act, which requires that a
government official “receiving money for the Government from any
source shall deposit the money in the Treasury as soon as practicable.”52
Agencies thus need congressional authorization to retain and spend funds
they independently collect.53 The “purpose statute,” another cornerstone
measure initially adopted in 1809, provides that “[a]ppropriations shall be
applied only to the objects for which [they] . . . were made . . . .”54 Congress
also has sought to prevent the President and executive branch from
refusing to spend appropriated funds through the Impoundment Control
Act of 1974 (ICA). The ICA requires congressional approval for any
permanent impoundment—termed a rescission—of appropriated funds
and otherwise limits Presidents to within-ﬁscal-year deferrals that cannot
be based on policy disagreement absent congressional approval.55 Despite
these multiple enactments, the nature and size of the federal budget leaves
agencies and the President with substantial legal discretion over federal
48. Fisher, Presidential Spending Power, supra note 46, at 59–76. Lump-sum
appropriations “cover a number of speciﬁc programs, projects, or items” and allow the
executive branch to determine their speciﬁc use, whereas line-item appropriations are
“available only for the speciﬁc object described.” 2 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-06382SP, Principles of Federal Appropriations Law ch. 6, at 5–7 (3d ed. 2006).
49. Gary L. Hopkins & Robert M. Nutt, The Anti-Deﬁciency Act (Revised Statutes
3679): and Funding Federal Contracts: An Analysis, 80 Mil. L. Rev. 51, 56–60 (1978); Stith,
supra note 34, at 1370–77.
50. 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (2018).
51. Id. § 1342.
52. Id. § 3302(b); Stith, supra note 34, at 1364–70.
53. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-16-464SP, Principles of Federal
Appropriations Law ch. 2, at 5–6 (4th ed. 2016) [hereinafter GAO Red Book, GAO-16464SP].
54. 31 U.S.C. § 1301(a); see also U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-17-797SP,
Principles of Federal Appropriations Law ch. 3, at 9–10 (4th ed. 2017).
55. 2 U.S.C. §§ 683–684, 688 (2018).
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spending, even if subject to political and informal constraints from
Congress.56 This institutional rivalry is also reﬂected in the presence of two
simultaneously created government agencies with appropriations
enforcement responsibilities: GAO, understood to be affiliated with
Congress, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the
executive branch’s central appropriations and budget actor.57
A second set of institutional rivalries has existed within Congress. Ever
since appropriations committees were created after the Civil War, they
have fought subject-area “authorizing committees” for control over spending.58 The longstanding principle that appropriations are distinct from
legislation translates into a requirement that appropriations be separately
authorized, a responsibility that falls to authorizing committees.59 The
result is a two-step appropriations process with enactment of legislation
authorizing activities and expenditures up to a certain level occurring ﬁrst,
followed by enactment of appropriations legislation specifying the actual
amount to be spent on authorized activities in a given year.60 This division
is enforced by House and Senate Rules that allow a member of each
chamber to raise a point of order against nonconforming measures.61 Yet
departures from this model have been frequent.62 In particular, the
development of the twentieth-century welfare state led to enactment of
substantive statutes that directly mandated spending and sometimes
provided permanent appropriations, with mandatory spending now

56. See Pasachoff, The President’s Budget, supra note 24, at 2188, 2207–43; David E.
Lewis, Political Control and the Presidential Spending Power 9, 24–28 (Vanderbilt Univ.
Ctr. for the Study of Democratic Insts., Working Paper No. 1-2017, 2017), https://www.
vanderbilt.edu/csdi/includes/WP_1_2017_ﬁnal.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ZEY-3U85].
57. Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State: The Expansion of National
Administrative Capacities, 1877–1920, at 207 (1982); Jesse M. Cross & Abbe R. Gluck, The
Congressional Bureaucracy, 168 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1541, 1587–94 (2020). CBO is another latercreated congressional budget agency. Id. at 1573–78.
58. Schick, Federal Budget, supra note 44, at 203. These ﬁghts were not just
institutional turf wars but reﬂected broader factors such as partisanship, economic policy
disagreements, interparty dynamics, and coordination needs. See Fenno, supra note 28, at
43–46; Kiewet & McCubbins, supra note 28, at 63–72; Stewart, supra note 45, at 79–80, 85–
87, 128–30.
59. See Schick, Federal Budget, supra note 44, at 194–99; Amanda Chuzi, Note,
Defense Lawmaking, 120 Colum. L. Rev. 995, 1002–04 (2020).
60. Bill Heniff Jr., Cong. Rsch. Serv., RS20371, Overview of the AuthorizationAppropriations Process 1 (2012).
61. Schick, Federal Budget, supra note 44, at 250–57; see also Karen L. Haas, H.
Comm. on Rules, 116th Cong., Rules of the House of Representatives 35 (2019); Standing
Rules of the Senate, S. Doc. No. 113-18, r. XXV, at 20 (2013).
62. Louis Fisher, The Authorization-Appropriation Process in Congress: Formal Rules
and Informal Practices, 29 Cath. U. L. Rev. 51, 53 (1979) (“The real world of the legislative
process differs considerably from the idealized model of the two-step authorizationappropriation procedure.”).

1090

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 121:4

representing sixty-one percent of the annual budget.63 Appropriations
committees have encroached on authorizing committees’ domains as well,
with substantive riders and legislative provisions regularly appearing in
annual appropriations bills.64 Over the twentieth century, appropriators
have also vied with congressional and party leaders for control of the
appropriations process, with leadership becoming dominant in the 1980s
and 1990s.65
Today, the official contours of the budget and appropriations process
remain largely those set by the 1974 Congressional Budget Act (CBA).66
Under the CBA, the President submits an annual budget to Congress in
early February, and the House and Senate Budget Committees are supposed to adopt a concurrent resolution specifying an overall budget
amount by mid-April.67 Then the Appropriations Committees divide the
total amount listed for annual appropriations among their twelve subcommittees, and each subcommittee drafts an appropriations bill that allocates
its amount among the different agencies and programs within its jurisdiction.68 Although appropriations bills may provide set amounts for particular activities, more often that detailed allocation is provided in the committee report and the bill lists the amount of budget authority by budget
account, with each account often spanning multiple activities.69 The subcommittee bills then must pass the full Appropriations Committees, the
House and Senate, and be signed by the President by the start of the ﬁscal
year on the ﬁrst of October.70 This legislation constitutes the basic annual
appropriations for the ﬁscal year, but it represents only part of the federal

63. See Schick, Federal Budget, supra note 44, at 209–12; The Federal Budget in 2019:
An Infographic, CBO (Apr. 15, 2020), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/56324 [https://
perma.cc/9PKS-AYW7] (noting that mandatory spending made up $2.7 trillion out of $4.4
trillion in federal outlays in FY2019).
64. Walter J. Oleszek, Mark J. Oleszek, Elizabeth Rybicki & Bill Heniff Jr., Congressional
Procedures and the Policy Process 59–63 (11th ed. 2020); Schick, Federal Budget, supra
note 44, at 268.
65. See Geoffrey W. Buhl, Scott A. Frisch & Sean Q. Kelly, Appropriations to the
Extreme: Partisanship and the Power of the Purse, in Politics to the Extreme 3, 9–10 (Scott
A. Frisch & Sean Q. Kelly eds., 2013); Schick, Federal Budget, supra note 44, at 219–23.
66. 2 U.S.C. §§ 631–645(a) (2018). Congress has occasionally adopted measures that
impose budget caps or sequesters. See, e.g., Balanced Budget and Emergency Deﬁcit
Control (Gramm–Rudman–Hollings) Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, § 251, 99 Stat. 1038,
1063–72 (codiﬁed as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 901 (2018)); Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub.
L. No. 112-25, § 101, 125 Stat. 240, 241–45 (codiﬁed as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 901 (2018)).
67. 2 U.S.C. § 632.
68. Schick, Federal Budget, supra note 44, at 230, 234 tbl.9-6.
69. 2 U.S.C. § 632(d); U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-05-734SP, A Glossary of
Terms Used in the Federal Budget Process app. I, at 107 (2005), https://www.gao.gov/
assets/80/76911.pdf [https://perma.cc/9DHR-ECG6]; Schick, Federal Budget, supra note
44, at 263.
70. Schick, Federal Budget, supra note 44, at 234 tbl.9-6.
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government’s actual annual spending.71 Substantial sums are also provided
by permanent appropriations and supplemental appropriations, the latter
intended for unexpected or unusual demands during the year.72 The CBA
also provides for a reconciliation process that was originally intended as a
streamlined means for aligning the enacted budget with ﬁscal items such
as revenue, direct spending, and the debt ceiling.73 Increasingly, however,
reconciliation has been used to enact controversial tax-related legislation
that could not pass through ordinary procedures.74
On the executive branch side, the task of developing the President’s
budget and then executing appropriations acts falls to OMB, housed in
the Executive Office of the President. Critically, agencies must obtain
OMB’s approval of their budget requests and comply with OMB’s instructions regarding what activities and programs to include.75 They are also
prohibited from disclosing disagreement with the budget requests the
President ultimately submits to Congress.76 The Antideﬁciency Act
requires that appropriations be apportioned over the year and among the
different programs and activities that each budget account covers.77 The
executive branch is generally allowed to reapportion or reprogram funds
to different uses within the account to which they were appropriated, but
transfers between accounts require statutory authority.78 Agencies propose
initial allotments of appropriated funds, but the actual apportionment of
funds that governs the agency is made by OMB. OMB’s approval is also
needed for any reprogramming or transfer of appropriated funds.79
71. See id. at 215.
72. Kate P. McClanahan, James V. Saturno, Megan S. Lynch, Bill Heniff Jr. & Justin
Murray, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R42647, Continuing Resolutions: Overview of Components and
Practices 2–4 (2019); Schick, Federal Budget, supra note 44, at 256–63.
73. See Schick, Federal Budget, supra note 44, at 142.
74. Oleszek et al., supra note 64, at 72–77; see also Barbara Sinclair, Unorthodox
Lawmaking: New Legislative Processes in the U.S. Congress 127–30 (5th ed. 2017) (noting
the use of reconciliation to enact controversial policies); Emily Cochrane, How Biden Could
Use Reconciliation to Speed Through His Pandemic Aid Plan, N.Y. Times. (Jan. 27, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/27/us/politics/budget-reconciliation-coronavirusstimulus.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing the possibility that
Democrats may use reconciliation to enact President Biden’s pandemic relief bill in the face
of Republican opposition and a divided Senate).
75. Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Off. of the President, Circular No. A-11, Preparation, Submission, and Execution of the Budget § 10.5 (2020), https://www.whitehouse
.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/a11.pdf [https://perma.cc/F9AV-KRA5] [hereinafter
Circular A-11].
76. Id. § 22.1; Pasachoff, The President’s Budget, supra note 24, at 2213–27.
77. 31 U.S.C. § 1512(a)–(b) (2018).
78. Id. § 1532; GAO Red Book, GAO-16-464SP, supra note 53, ch. 2, at 38–43; Michelle
D. Christensen, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R43098, Transfer and Reprogramming of Appropriations:
An Overview of Authorities, Limitations, and Procedures 2–8 (2013).
79. Circular A-11, supra note 75, § 120; Pasachoff, The President’s Budget, supra note
24, at 2231.
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Congress has also tasked GAO with a number of responsibilities related to
budget execution, such as auditing agencies’ expenditure of funds as well
as investigating and reporting on potential Antideﬁciency Act and ICA
violations.80
B.

Appropriations Today

1. Polarization, Appropriations, and Congress. — This official tale of the
budget and appropriations process—often called the “regular order” of
appropriations81—has always been somewhat aspirational; after all,
Congress has enacted appropriations bills on time only four times since
1977.82 But the gap between the ideal and the real has grown much larger
of late. For example, Congress enacted a budget resolution each year from
1975 to 1998 but has failed to do so seven times in the period FY2011–
FY2020.83 Appropriations bills are now regularly packaged together into
omnibus or minibus legislation to increase their chances of enactment. In
addition, they are often adopted well past the start of the new ﬁscal year,
necessitating enactment of multiple continuing resolutions (CRs) in the
interim.84 Congress is also foregoing authorization legislation for appropriations. In FY2020, $332 billion—nearly a third of all discretionary
spending—had an expired authorization, up from $121 billion in
FY2000.85
The congressional move to “unorthodox” procedures is certainly not
unique to appropriations and results from the same political forces undermining Congress’s ability to function in other domains.86 Historically,
80. 2 U.S.C. §§ 686–687 (2018); U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-16-463SP,
Principles of Federal Appropriations Law ch. 1, at 21–24 (4th ed. 2016) [hereinafter GAO
Red Book, GAO-16-463SP].
81. Peter Hanson, Too Weak to Govern: Majority Party Power and Appropriations in
the U.S. Senate 3, 17–18 (2014).
82. See, e.g., Drew Desilver, Congress Has Long Struggled to Pass Spending Bills on
Time, Pew Rsch. Ctr. (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/01/
16/congress-has-long-struggled-to-pass-spending-bills-on-time [https://perma.cc/DF8R-RZ
E9] (noting that Congress has enacted all of the budget and appropriations measures called
for in the CBA on time only four times since the CBA’s enactment in 1974).
83. Megan S. Lynch, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R44296, Deeming Resolutions: Budget
Enforcement in the Absence of a Budget Resolution 5 tbl.1 (2019).
84. Hanson, supra note 81, at 19, 25–32; Molly E. Reynolds, The Senate Passed Another
“Minibus” Funding Package. Now What?, Brookings (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.brook
ings.edu/blog/ﬁxgov/2018/08/02/minibus-funding-package-now-what [https://perma.cc
/4GH7-XGWL].
85. CBO, Expired and Expiring Authorizations of Appropriations: Fiscal Year 2020, at
3 tbl.1 (2020), https://www.cbo.gov/system/ﬁles/2020-02/56082-CBO-EEAA.pdf [https://
perma.cc/B9JX-VLNS]; CBO, Unauthorized Appropriations and Expiring Authorizations 4
tbl.1 (2000), https://www.cbo.gov/system/ﬁles/2019-04/12063-UAEA.pdf [https://perma
.cc/TU7X-ZVY4]; Chuzi, supra note 59, at 1011–15 & tbl.1.
86. See Thomas E. Mann & Norman J. Ornstein, It’s Even Worse than It Looks: How
the American Constitutional System Collided with the New Politics of Extremism, at xiii–xiv
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appropriations were an area of bipartisanship, but the intense partisan
polarization that has dominated Congress since the 1990s has now also
overtaken the appropriations process.87 Sharp partisan differences on
spending priorities, budget deﬁcits, and the loss of earmarks also impede
bipartisan compromise.88 Meanwhile, the narrow margins of party control
in each chamber of Congress operate to reinforce party loyalty, discourage
interparty compromise, and increase the chances of divided government.89
At the same time, these political factors increase the difficulty of enacting
legislation generally, making it more likely that members of Congress will
seek to attach substantive measures to appropriations bills to take
advantage of appropriations’ must-pass status and the greater ease of
getting appropriations measures to the ﬂoor.90
This turn toward enacting substantive policy through the appropriations process is evident in increased reliance on appropriations riders,
which are provisions in appropriations legislation that limit (or occasionally require) the use of funds for purposes or activities an agency is authorized to undertake.91 Riders are plainly aimed at changing governmental
policy: Their prime use is to forestall the executive branch from
proceeding with or developing particular agency initiatives, and they
frequently surface in prominent policy disputes when the President and
Congress are at odds.92 A 2010 study of riders found that approximately
(2012) (identifying two main sources of political dysfunction in Congress); Sarah Binder,
The Dysfunctional Congress, 18 Ann. Rev. Pol. Sci. 85, 94–98 (2015). See generally Sinclair,
supra note 74 (describing the “unorthodox lawmaking” phenomenon).
87. See Buhl et al., supra note 65, at 4, 7–11; Schick, Federal Budget, supra note 44, at
219–22; see also Lee Drutman & Peter C. Hanson, Does Regular Order Produce a More
Deliberative Congress?: Evidence from the Annual Appropriations Process, in Can America
Govern Itself? 155, 178–79 (Frances E. Lee & Nolan McCarty eds., 2019) (identifying
substantial bipartisanship still on appropriations but noting the dangers that polarization
poses); Nolan McCarty, The Decline of Regular Order in Appropriations: Does it Matter, in
Transformation of American Politics: Activist Government and the Rise of Conservatism
223, 224–32 (Paul Pierson & Theda Skocpol eds., 2007) (describing the impact of
polarization on appropriations, but arguing that other factors appear in play as well).
88. Buhl et al., supra note 65, at 11–12 (earmarks); David Scott Louk & David Gamage,
Preventing Government Shutdowns: Designing Default Rules for Budgets, 86 U. Colo. L.
Rev. 181, 202–16 (2015) (spending priorities and deﬁcits).
89. See Frances E. Lee, Insecure Majorities: Congress and the Perpetual Campaign 2–
3 (2016).
90. Buhl et al., supra note 65, at 9–10; Richard J. Lazarus, Congressional Descent: The
Demise of Deliberative Democracy in Environmental Law, 94 Geo. L.J. 619, 635–37 (2006).
91. Curtis W. Copeland, Cong. Rsch. Serv., RL34354, Congressional Inﬂuence on
Rulemaking and Regulation Through Appropriations Restrictions 3–12 (2008) (providing
examples of riders that limit or require rulemaking). Because appropriations riders usually
limit or prohibit activities, they are often called “limitation riders.” Jason A. MacDonald,
Limitation Riders and Congressional Inﬂuence over Bureaucratic Policy Decisions, 104 Am.
Pol. Sci. Rev. 166, 166 (2010).
92. Lazarus, supra note 90, at 632–52 (describing riders in the 1990s and noting their
decline with the Bush II presidency); Thomas O. McGarity, Deregulatory Riders Redux, 1
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300 riders affecting policy were included every year in appropriations bills
proposed by the House Appropriations Committee in the ten-year period
FY1993–FY2003, with most riders prohibiting speciﬁc agency actions.93
Although appropriations riders are a longstanding phenomenon, several
commentators trace an uptick in the use of such riders to the 1990s,
coinciding with the 1994 Republican takeover of the House and the onset
of intensiﬁed partisan divides in Congress.94
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) represents one of the most prominent uses of appropriations to push through controversial policy. The ACA
itself was initially passed through the reconciliation process to bypass the
Senate ﬁlibuster.95 More recently, appropriations riders substantially
curtailed the money available to cover insurer costs under the ACA’s nowexpired risk corridor program, and Congress also has refused to appropriate funds to cover cost-sharing obligations that the ACA imposes on
insurers.96 A particularly striking feature of these moves is that despite
Congress’s refusal to appropriate the necessary amounts, the government
remained statutorily obligated to cover insurers’ costs under the ACA’s risk
corridor and cost-sharing programs.97 According to Matthew Lawrence,
these instances are part of a newly emerging phenomenon of “legislative
failure to appropriate funds necessary to honor a government commitment.”98 To be sure, Congress regularly funds programs at less than their
fullest authorized amount, and often at less than the amount needed for
agencies to meet all their statutory responsibilities in a timely and effective
fashion.99 But in the past, these failures to fund tended to involve discretionary spending; Congress almost always honored mandatory spending

Mich. J. Env’t & Admin. L. 33, 53–56, 64–70 (2012) (detailing the environmental
appropriations riders during Obama’s second term); Price, supra note 33, at 371–78
(discussing riders affecting Guantánamo Bay transfers, diplomacy, and White House
advisors).
93. MacDonald, supra note 91, at 767, 769–70.
94. See, e.g., McGarity, supra note 92, at 35–36, 39–40; see also Neal E. Devins,
Regulation of Government Agencies Through Limitation Riders, 1987 Duke L.J. 456, 462–
63, 472–73 (tracing the uses of riders back to the 1870s).
95. Abbe R. Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding Congress’s
Plan in the Era of Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 62, 78–79 (2015) [hereinafter
Gluck, Imperfect Statutes].
96. See supra text accompanying notes 9–10.
97. Me. Cmty. Health Options v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1308, 1323 (2020); Cmty.
Health Choice, Inc. v. United States, 141 Fed. Cl. 744, 757–62 (2019), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, remanded, 970 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
98. Lawrence, Disappropriation, supra note 30, at 25; see also id. at 27–44 (providing
other examples).
99. See Oleszek et al., supra note 64, at 46; Rena Steinzor & Sidney Shapiro, The
People’s Agents and the Battle to Protect the American Public: Special Interests,
Government, and Threats to Health, Safety, and the Environment 4–5, 10, 12, 19, 24–25
(2010).
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obligations in statutes, even as such commitments came to dominate
annual expenditures.100
A second manifestation of growing partisanship in appropriations is
the increased reliance on temporary funding and greater risk of government shutdowns. Shutdowns occur when there is a funding gap of more
than trivial duration, with Congress failing to pass either appropriations
legislation for the new ﬁscal year or a CR to keep the government funded
in the interim.101 But what transforms a funding gap into a shutdown is the
Antideﬁciency Act’s prohibition on receipt of voluntary services, which
since 1981 has been read to necessitate furloughing most federal employees when there is a funding gap.102 Otherwise, employees could continue
to work with the expectation they would be paid once appropriations are
made.103 As shutdowns are tied to annual appropriations from Congress,
programs that are funded by permanent appropriations or agencygenerated funds such as user fees can continue to operate.104
Shutdowns are not a new phenomenon. The government has had
twenty funding gaps since the CBA was enacted in 1974, and early on a
number of these gaps lasted for ten days or more.105 But over time the
shutdown threat has become more constant, a result of growing polarization and stark partisan differences over the budget. Since 1981, ten
funding gaps have lasted more than a day and involved signiﬁcant costs
and furloughs, and three shutdowns have occurred in the last ten years.106
As signiﬁcant, Congress is relying more often and for longer periods on
temporary stopgap funding through CRs to keep the government
100. Lawrence, Disappropriation, supra note 30, at 26–27.
101. Clinton T. Brass, Ida A. Brudnick, Natalie Keegan, Barry J. McMillion, John W.
Rollins & Brian T. Yeh, Cong. Rsch. Serv., RL34680, Shutdown of the Federal Government:
Causes, Processes, and Effects 1–2 (2018). A funding gap of a day or less, or one occurring
over a weekend, may not lead to an actual government shutdown. Id. at 2.
102. See id. at 4–5; James V. Saturno, Cong. Rsch. Serv., RS20348, Federal Funding
Gaps: A Brief Overview 4 (2019) (noting that prior to 1981, “the expectation was that
agencies would not shut down during a funding gap”).
103. This expectation was codiﬁed into law with an amendment to the Antideﬁciency
Act in early 2019. Government Employee Fair Treatment Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-1, 133
Stat. 3 (to be codiﬁed at 31 U.S.C. § 1341).
104. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-19-289T, Government-Wide Inventory of
Accounts with Spending Authority and Permanent Appropriations, Fiscal Years 1995 to
2015, at 5–6 (2018) (statement of Tranchau (Kris) T. Nguyen, Acting Dir., Strategic Issues
& Julia C. Matta, Managing Assoc. Gen. Coins., Off. of the Gen. Couns.) https://www.gao.
gov/assets/700/695894.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Q7A-5W4K]; DeMuth & Greve, supra note
32, at 561–63.
105. See Saturno, supra note 102, at 1–3 & tbl.1 (2019) (counting only those funding
gaps for which there was at least one full day without budget authority).
106. Id. at 3 tbl.1; see also Josh Hicks, How Much Did the Shutdown Cost the Economy?,
Wash. Post (Oct. 18, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/federal-eye/wp/20
13/10/18/how-much-did-the-shutdown-cost-the-economy (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review) (detailing the cost of the 2013 shutdown).
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running.107 Both shutdowns and temporary funding impose signiﬁcant
costs on agencies—disrupting activities and creating uncertainty that
makes it difficult for agencies to plan effectively.108
2. Presidential Administration and Appropriations. — Eloise Pasachoff has
described in detail the many ways in which the ordinary budget drafting
and execution processes allow the President, through OMB, to wield
signiﬁcant power over agency policy and push presidential priorities.109
Even so, multiple scholars and budget participants report that Presidents
are now exercising more control over federal spending than at any point
in the recent past.110 This is part of a broader recent trend toward
presidential administration and greater presidential control over administrative government.111 Deepening partisan polarization is also an instigating factor here, making Presidents both less able to push their agendas
through Congress and more committed on partisan grounds to advancing
certain policies.112
President Trump’s transfer of appropriated funds to build the
southern border wall is exhibit A of such enhanced presidential control.113

107. Continuing resolutions have been used every ﬁscal year since FY1998 and their
period of use generally increased over the period FY1998–FY2020. McClanahan et al., supra
note 72, at 12–13 tbl.3; see also id. at 10 (noting that no appropriation bills were enacted
before the start of the ﬁscal year ﬁfteen times in the period FY1978–FY2010, with ten of
those instances happening since FY2001).
108. On the costs of shutdowns, see U.S. Senate, Perm. Subcomm. on Investigations,
The True Cost of Shutdowns 31, 45, 172 (2019); Brass et al., supra note 101, at 13–19, 25–
36. On the costs of temporary funding, see U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-18-368T,
Continuing Resolutions and Other Budget Uncertainties Present Management Challenges
4–6 (2018) (statement of Heather Krause, Dir., Strategic Issues), https://www.gao.gov/
assets/690/689914.pdf [https://perma.cc/5X8A-Q5ER]; U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off.,
GAO-09-879, Continuing Resolutions: Uncertainty Limited Management Options and
Increased Work Load in Selected Agencies 24–25 (2009), https://www.gao.gov/assets/300/
295970.pdf [https://perma.cc/V84Y-TF5E]; Philip G. Joyce, IBM Ctr. for Bus. of Gov’t, The
Costs of Budget Uncertainty: Analyzing the Impact of Late Appropriations 20–29 (2012),
http://www.businessofgovernment.org/sites/default/ﬁles/The%20Costs%20of%20Budge
t%20Uncertainty.pdf [https://perma.cc/SGB8-9UMX].
109. Pasachoff, The President’s Budget, supra note 24, at 2186; see also Lewis, supra
note 56, at 10–15 (discussing OMB efforts to inﬂuence agency spending and instances when
presidential inﬂuence is likely to be strong).
110. Emily Cochrane, As Trump Seizes Wall Money, Congress’s Spending Power
Weakens, N.Y. Times (Feb. 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/21/us/politics/
congress-spending-trump-wall.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
111. See Jerry L. Mashaw & David Berke, Presidential Administration in a Regime of
Separated Powers: An Analysis of Recent American Experience, 35 Yale J. on Regul. 549,
605–07 (2018); Kathryn A. Watts, Controlling Presidential Control, 114 Mich. L. Rev. 683,
692–706 (2016).
112. See Mashaw & Berke, supra note 111, at 561–62; Gillian E. Metzger, Agencies,
Polarization, and the States, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 1739, 1752–57 (2015).
113. See supra text accompanying notes 4–8.
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The FY2019 appropriations bill that ended the 2018–2019 shutdown provided $1.375 billion for “construction of primary pedestrian fencing . . . in
the Rio Grande Valley Sector,” whereas Trump had requested $5.7 billion
for a steel wall along the full border.114 After signing the bill, Trump
immediately declared a national emergency and claimed authority to
redirect up to $8.1 billion that had been appropriated for other purposes
to constructing the wall, with the DOD being the main source of the additional funds.115 Among the statutes that the Administration cited for this
authority, Section 8005 of the FY2019 DOD Appropriations Act empowered the Secretary of Defense, upon determining “that such action is necessary in the national interest,” to transfer up to $4 billion among DOD’s
appropriations accounts, provided certain conditions were met.116 Under
longstanding norms, agencies obtain approval from their appropriations
subcommittees before going ahead with a transfer, but here DOD went
ahead in the face of disapproval from both the House Appropriations and
Armed Services Committees. A joint resolution terminating the emergency declaration passed both houses of Congress twice, but both times it
was vetoed by the President.117 DOD initially transferred $1.8 billion to be
used for border wall construction and subsequently committed additional
amounts, invoking other transfer and reprogramming authority.118 In one
of his ﬁrst executive actions upon assuming office, President Biden issued
an executive order terminating the national emergency and calling for a
pause in wall construction, a review of the wall’s funding, and a plan for
redirecting funds.119
Presidents use their control over budget execution to advance their
policy interests in other ways than reprogramming appropriated funds.
114. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-6, § 230(a)(1), 133 Stat.
13, 28; Marianne Levine & Quint Forgey, White House Asks Congress for $5.7 Billion for
‘Steel Barrier’, Politico (Jan. 6, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/01/06/trump
-emergency-border-wall-government-shutdown-1082712 [https://perma.cc/FQ7A-5NLR].
115. Proclamation No. 9844, 84 Fed. Reg. 4949, 4949–50 (Feb. 15, 2019); President
Donald J. Trump’s Border Security Victory, White House (Feb. 15, 2019), https://trump
whitehouse.archives.gov/brieﬁngs-statements/president-donald-j-trumps-border-securityvictory [https://perma.cc/N6R2-JF5Y].
116. Department of Defense and Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education
Appropriations Act, 2019 and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2019 (CAA), Pub. L. No. 115245, § 8005, 132 Stat. 2981, 2999 (2018).
117. California v. Trump, 963 F.3d 926, 932 n.3 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. granted sub nom.
Trump v. Sierra Club, 141 S. Ct. 618 (2020); GAO Red Book, GAO-16-464SP, supra note 53,
ch. 2, at 46–47; see also Letter from Peter J. Visclosky, Rep., Ind., to David L. Norquist,
Under Sec’y of Def., Comptroller, Dep’t of Def. (Mar. 26, 2019) (denying DOD’s request to
reprogram funds for the border wall).
118. California v. Trump, 963 F.3d at 947 (noting the invocation of 10 U.S.C. § 2808
(2018)); Eloise Pasachoff, The President’s Budget Powers in the Trump Era, in Executive
Policymaking: The Role of the OMB in the Presidency 69, 80–82 (Meena Bose & Andrew
Rudalevige eds., 2020) [hereinafter Pasachoff, Trump Era Budget Powers].
119. See Proclamation No. 10142, 86 Fed. Reg. 7225, 7225–26 (Jan. 20, 2021).
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During the 2018–2019 shutdown, the Trump Administration took a broad
view of the extent to which nonessential personnel paid through annual
appropriations could work to process payments funded through
permanent appropriations without violating the Antideﬁciency Act.120
Meanwhile, the Obama Administration implemented its deferred action
initiative for parents of legal permanent residents and dreamers (DAPA)
through the Customs and Immigration Service, which is funded almost
entirely through fees. The effect was to immunize the initiative against
congressional Republican efforts to stop it through an appropriations
rider.121 Congress sometimes responds in kind, providing independent
funding streams that exempt agencies from presidential budgetary oversight, albeit also from congressional appropriations control. A prominent
recent example is the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB),
created in 2010, which by statute is entitled to the amount of funding from
the Federal Reserve’s earnings that the CFPB Director deems reasonably
necessary to carry out its responsibilities, up to a maximum percentage of
the Federal Reserve’s own expenses.122
Grant awards and conditions on federal spending are another key
mechanism for presidential inﬂuence.123 Prominent uses of federal grants
to push presidential policy occurred during the Obama Administration, a
prime example being the Race to the Top Competitive Grant Program at
the Department of Education.124 Although the American Reinvestment
and Recovery Act provided $5 billion for competitive grants and innovations awards in education, it left the speciﬁcs of how these funds were to
be allotted largely to the Secretary of Education’s discretion.125 The resultant Race to the Top Program put a premium on grant applicants that
adopted educational policy measures the Obama Administration favored
and was effective in getting states and localities to adopt even controversial
120. See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. United States, Nos. 19-50 (RJL), 19-51 (RJL),
19-62 (RJL), 2019 WL 266381, at *1 (D.D.C. Jan. 18, 2019); see also Am. Fed’n of Gov’t
Emps. v. Rivlin, No. 95-2115 (EGS), 1995 WL 697236, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 17, 1995)
(challenging a requirement that employees work without pay during the 1995–1996
shutdowns).
121. DeMuth & Greve, supra note 32, at 562–63.
122. 12 U.S.C. § 5497(a) (2018).
123. See Hudak, supra note 28, at 3, 6–7, 55–60, 62 (emphasizing the importance of
grants and arguing that funding allocations reﬂect presidential electoral interests and the
strategic importance of swing states); Christopher R. Berry, Barry C. Burden & William G.
Howell, The President and the Distribution of Federal Spending, 104 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 783,
797 (2010) (arguing that “members of the president’s party receive systematically more
federal outlays”).
124. Timothy J. Conlan, Federalism and Policy Instability: Centralization and
Decentralization in Contemporary American Federalism, 64 Revue française de science
politique (English ed.) 27, 38–39 (2014).
125. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009: Saving and Creating Jobs
and Reforming Education, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (Mar. 7, 2009), https://www2.ed.gov/policy
/gen/leg/recovery/implementation.html [https://perma.cc/CBE8-9EMZ].
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policies, such as common state standards and expanding the number of
charter schools.126 Loan programs can provide similar opportunities for
exercise of executive branch control. The Obama Administration
signiﬁcantly expanded access to student loan forgiveness by taking
advantage of a permanent appropriation for student loans.127
The Trump Administration also sought to advance its policies through
grant conditions, most notably by attaching new conditions on grants
under the DOJ’s Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (Byrne
JAG) Program, the main source of federal criminal justice funding to states
and localities.128 The new conditions were meant to assist the federal
government in immigration law enforcement and curtail immigration
sanctuary policies.129 Trump also suggested that any federal funds to help
states and localities with the ﬁscal impact of COVID-19 might be conditioned on revoking sanctuary policies.130 And the Trump Administration
imposed new conditions on grants under the competitive grant Teen
Pregnancy Prevention Program (TPPP).131
On the ﬂip side, Presidents also exert control by refusing to spend
appropriated funds at odds with presidential policies. Although prior
Presidents had occasionally “impounded” funds in this fashion, President
Nixon developed the practice into a high art, impounding tens of billions
of appropriated funds and triggering enactment of the ICA.132 Both
President George W. Bush and President Obama proposed few deferrals
and no rescissions, but President Trump was more active. In 2018, he
proposed $15 billion in rescissions targeting foreign aid, which Congress
rejected on a bipartisan basis, and in the last week of his presidency he
proposed an additional $27.4 billion in rescissions that President Biden

126. Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism Under Obama, 53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 567, 590–92
(2011); Grover J. “Russ” Whitehurst, Did Congress Authorize Race to the Top?, Brookings
(Apr. 27, 2010), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/did-congress-authorize-race-to-thetop [https://perma.cc/YH4X-Z5Z9].
127. See Sohoni, supra note 32, at 1699–700.
128. City of Chicago v. Barr, 961 F.3d 882, 886–87 (7th Cir. 2020).
129. Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Attorney General Sessions Announces Immigration
Compliance Requirements for Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Programs
(July 25, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-sessions-announcesimmigration-compliance-requirements-edward-byrne-memorial [https://perma.cc/8PRAKMT4] (last updated Nov. 8, 2017); see also City of Philadelphia v. Att’y Gen., 916 F.3d 276,
280 (3d Cir. 2019) (describing the conditions).
130. Justin Wise, Trump Suggests Coronavirus Funding for States Could Be Tied to
Sanctuary City Policies, Hill (Apr. 28, 2020), https://thehill.com/homenews/admini
stration/495170-trump-suggests-coronavirus-funding-for-states-could-be-tied-to [https://pe
rma.cc/2RMX-SFG9].
131. Planned Parenthood of Greater Wash. & N. Idaho v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum.
Servs., 946 F.3d 1100, 1106 (9th Cir. 2020).
132. Abner J. Mikva, Congress: The Purse, the Purpose, and the Power, 21 Ga. L. Rev.
1, 11 (1986).
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quickly reversed.133 Far more high proﬁle was the Trump Administration’s
delay in releasing hundreds of millions of dollars Congress appropriated
in military aid for Ukraine.134 The Trump Administration also withheld
funds appropriated to assist Puerto Rico and the WHO.135
3. Appropriations Litigation. — Appropriations matters are often
thought of primarily in terms of the political branches. But they are
increasingly showing up in court, with many of the developments detailed
above prompting litigation.
As mentioned, both the ACA risk corridor appropriations rider and
President Trump’s border wall funds transfer have surfaced at the
Supreme Court and also triggered substantial litigation in lower courts.136
133. Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Off. of the President, Proposed Rescission of Budget
Authority (2018), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/
POTUS-Rescission-Transmittal-Package-5.8.2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/BB8L-FR9L]; Updated Rescission Stat., Fiscal Years 1974–2017, B-330091, 2018 WL 4679596, at *2 (Comp.
Gen. Sept. 27, 2018); U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-10-320T, Impoundment Control
Act: Use and Impact of Rescission Procedures 4–5 (2009) (statement of Susan A. Poling,
Managing Assoc. Gen. Couns., Off. of Gen. Couns.), https://www.gao.gov/assets/130/
123935.pdf [https://perma.cc/9X72-NAPF] (noting that Bush proposed no rescissions but
undertook “cancellations” that GAO found to violate the ICA); Pasachoff, Trump Era
Budget Powers, supra note 118, at 7–9; Justine Coleman, Biden Reverses Trump Last-Minute
Attempt to Freeze $27.4 Billion in Programs, Hill (Jan. 31, 2021), https://thehill.com/
homenews/administration/536704-biden-reverses-trump-last-minute-attempt-to-freeze-274billion-of [https://perma.cc/7JZA-QMAY].
134. See Letter from Mark R. Paoletta, Gen. Couns., Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, to Tom
Armstrong, Gen. Couns., U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off. 1–2 (Dec. 11, 2019), https://www.
justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/ukraine-clearinghouse-letter_from_omb_g
c_paoletta_to_gao_gc_armstrong-2019.12.11.pdf [https://perma.cc/G4FA-XSQG]; Aaron
Blake, Philip Bump & Irfan Uraizee, The Full Trump-Ukraine Impeachment Timeline,
Wash. Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/politics/trump-impeachme
nt-timeline/ (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (last updated Jan. 27, 2020). In addition
to the $214 million, the appropriated funds put on hold included up to $168 million in
foreign military ﬁnancing through the State Department. See Off. of Mgmt. & Budget—
Withholding of Ukr. Sec. Assistance, B-331564, 2020 WL 241373, at *6 (Comp. Gen. Jan. 16,
2020).
135. Katy O’Donnell, Trump to Lift Hold on $8.2B in Puerto Rico Disaster Aid, Politico
(Jan. 15, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/01/15/trump-to-lift-hold-on-82b-inpuerto-rico-disaster-aid-099139 [https://perma.cc/NB4A-4WN8]; Erica Werner, Congressional
Democrats Allege Trump’s Move to Defund World Health Organization Is Illegal, Wash.
Post (Apr. 15, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2020/04/15/trumpwho-democrats (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
136. See supra notes 6–8 and accompanying text. A number of lower courts have ruled
the funds transfer unlawful. See, e.g., Washington v. Trump, 441 F. Supp. 3d 1101, 1115–23
(W.D. Wash. 2020) (ﬁnding that the funding plan violates the CAA and 10 U.S.C. § 2808
(2018)); El Paso County v. Trump, 408 F. Supp. 3d 840, 856–60 (W.D. Tex. 2019)
(concluding that the funding plan violates the CAA), aff’d in part, rev’d on other grounds,
982 F.3d 332 (5th Cir. 2020); see also Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Trump, 453 F. Supp. 3d
11, 46–51 (D.D.C. 2020) (holding that environmental groups’ suit could proceed on ultra
vires and appropriations act claims); Alvarez v. Trump, No. 19-cv-404 (TNM), 2019 WL
1771148 (D.D.C. Apr. 22, 2019) (indicating that the landowners voluntarily dismissed the
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After the Obama Administration’s effort to fund cost-sharing through a
permanent appropriation was enjoined, numerous insurers sued successfully in the Court of Claims to recover the unpaid cost-sharing payments.137
A number of federal defendants charged with marijuana crimes have also
succeeded in enjoining their prosecutions after Congress enacted an
appropriations rider prohibiting expenditure of appropriated DOJ funds
in a way that would prevent states from implementing their medical
marijuana laws.138
Many lawsuits were also ﬁled by states and localities challenging the
new Byrne JAG conditions. Most district and appellate courts held that the
Trump Administration lacked statutory authorization for the new
conditions, concluding that the conditions were at odds with the plain
meaning of the underlying statute and with the Byrne JAG’s status as a
formula grant program rather than one where awards are left to agency
discretion.139 However, the Second Circuit upheld the conditions, creating
a circuit split.140 Several courts have similarly invalidated the Trump
Administration’s new conditions on TPPP grants, unanimously concluding that at least some of the new conditions violate the plain meaning of
the program’s authorizing statute.141
Shutdowns and temporary funding measures, on the other hand,
have provoked relatively little litigation.142 During the lengthy 2018–2019
shutdown, government employees required to work without pay sued,
claiming inter alia that the government was violating the Antideﬁciency
case); U.S. House of Representatives v. Mnuchin, 379 F. Supp. 3d 8, 10 (D.D.C. 2019), aff’d
in part, vacated in part, remanded, 976 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (ﬁnding no standing).
137. See Cmty. Health Choice, Inc. v. United States, 141 Fed. Cl. 744, 751, 753–54
(2019), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, remanded, 970 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2020); supra text
accompanying note 9.
138. See, e.g., United States v. Pisarki, 965 F.3d 738, 740–43 (9th Cir. 2020); see also
United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163, 1177 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that a rider
prohibited the DOJ from spending appropriated funds “for the prosecution of individuals
who engaged in conduct permitted by the State Medical Marijuana Laws and who fully
complied with such laws”).
139. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Barr, 961 F.3d 882, 887–88 (7th Cir. 2020); City of
Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d 23, 32–34, 37–38, 42–43 (1st Cir. 2020); City of Los Angeles v.
Barr, 941 F.3d 931, 934 (9th Cir. 2019); City of Philadelphia v. Att’y Gen., 916 F.3d 276, 279,
287–88, 290 (3d Cir. 2019).
140. New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 951 F.3d 84, 103–04, 123–24 (2d Cir. 2020),
rehearing en banc denied, 2020 WL 3956260 (2d Cir. July 13, 2020).
141. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Greater Wash. & N. Idaho v. U.S. Dep’t of Health
& Hum. Servs., 946 F.3d 1100, 1113–14 (9th Cir. 2020); Multnomah County v. Azar, 340 F.
Supp. 3d 1046, 1068–69 (D. Or. 2018); Planned Parenthood of N.Y.C., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Hum. Servs., 337 F. Supp. 3d 308, 320–24 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
142. One reason is no doubt that the frequently short duration of shutdowns sometimes
leads suits that are ﬁled to be declared moot once the shutdown ends. See, e.g., Atlas Brew
Works, LLC v. Barr, 391 F. Supp. 3d 6, 9 (D.D.C. 2019), aff’d, 820 F. App’x 4, 5 (D.C. Cir.
2020).
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Act by reading its emergency exception too broadly.143 That claim might
well have legs on the merits; GAO subsequently held that some of the
Trump Administration’s excepted employee determinations violated the
Act.144 Not surprisingly, however, the district court was unwilling to second
guess agency determinations about which employees were needed on an
emergency basis to protect human safety and property.145 On the other
hand, the Court of Federal Claims held that employees forced to work
without pay during the 2013 shutdown were owed damages under the Fair
Labor Standards Act, notwithstanding that the Antideﬁciency Act
precluded the government from paying their wages.146 Contractors have
also brought administrative claims to recoup costs imposed by shutdowns,
with their success often turning on the nature of their contracts and the
presence of particular clauses.147 Still, despite these occasional suits for
compensation, shutdowns and reliance on temporary spending remain
predominantly political events.
This lack of litigation is also true of impoundments. Agency efforts to
withhold appropriated funds occasionally lead to suits but not violations
of the ICA.148 Instead, administrations have generally released the funds at
issue in the face of congressional outcry or a GAO ﬁnding of an ICA violation.149 In January 2020, GAO determined that the hold on Ukraine’s
143. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
144. Nat’l Archives & Recs. Admin.—Publ’n of Fed. Reg. During the Fiscal Year 2019
Lapse in Appropriations, B-331091, 2020 WL 4013489, at *1 (Comp. Gen. July 16, 2020)
(concluding that publications in the Federal Register violated the Act); see also U.S. Dep’t
of the Treasury—Tax Return Activities During the Fiscal Year 2019 Lapse in Appropriations,
B-331093, 2019 WL 5390179, at *1 (Comp. Gen. Oct. 22, 2019) (ﬁnding that using annually
funded employees to process tax returns violated the Act).
145. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. United States, Nos. 19-50 (RJL), 19-51 (RJL), 19-62
(RJL), 2019 WL 266381, at *2 (D.D.C. Jan. 18, 2019); see also Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v.
Rivlin, No. 95-2115 (EGS), 1995 WL 697236, at *4 (D.D.C. Nov. 17, 1995) (denying
plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order during the 1995–1996 shutdowns
because it was still unclear “how much deference, if any, . . . the court [should] afford to
the Executive Branch’s construction and interpretation of the relevant statutes and
regulations”).
146. Martin v. United States, 130 Fed. Cl. 578, 584–85 (2017).
147. Compare Cleveland Telecomms. Corp. v. United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 649, 650 (1997)
(holding that the contractor “should bear the risk of the unforeseen furlough” under a ﬁrm
ﬁxed-price contract), with Raytheon STX Corp. v. Dep’t of Com., GSBCA No. 14296-COM,
00-1 BCA P 30632 (1999) (determining that “cost-reimbursement contracts obligate the
Government to bear the increased costs attributable to the shutdown”). See generally
Darrell Curren, Note, Government Contracting in the Shadow of the October 2013
Shutdown, 44 Pub. Cont. L.J. 349 (2015) (reviewing “the use of risk allocation clauses in the
different types of contracts used between the government and contractors”).
148. E.g., In re Aiken County, 725 F.3d 255, 259–60 (D.C. Cir. 2013); see infra notes
258–261.
149. See, e.g., Impoundment of the Advanced Research Projects Agency–Energy
Appropriation Resulting from Legislative Proposals in the President’s Budget Request for
Fiscal Year 2018, B-329092, 2017 WL 6335684, at *1 (Comp. Gen. Dec. 12, 2017); U.S. Gov’t
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funds violated the ICA, rejecting OMB’s claim that it was simply an
acceptable programmatic delay.150 According to GAO, the hold was undertaken to advance President Trump’s policy goals, not because of some
external factor, and as a result represented a prohibited policy deferral.151
II. THE MARGINALIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS IN PUBLIC LAW DOCTRINE
Viewed cumulatively, these phenomena demonstrate the contemporary prominence of appropriations as a tool of government control, as well
as the extent to which current appropriations and budget practices are
deviating from the past regular order. These examples also show how
appropriations issues are spilling over into court. It is increasingly apparent that appropriations are playing a starring role in the contemporary
administrative state that lawyers cannot ignore.
Yet despite their importance, appropriations are marginalized in public law doctrine. This is particularly true of constitutional and administrative law doctrines and litigation, where appropriations are often ignored
or given little weight. Appropriations arise more frequently in statutory
interpretation case law but still are often downplayed in their import. And
while public law in the political branches engages with appropriations
extensively, marginalization is arguably evident here too, as political polarization and legislative–executive disputes increasingly push established
appropriations measures to the sidelines.
The term marginalization often carries a negative connotation, and
the discussion here identiﬁes several analytic ﬂaws underlying the lack of
attention to appropriations in public law doctrine. But as Parts III and IV
make clear, whether appropriations’ doctrinal marginalization is problematic is a hard question that cannot be determined in gross. The focus in
this Part is simply on demonstrating the many ways in which such doctrinal
exclusion of appropriations occurs.
A.

The How of Marginalization

Literally conveying being pushed to the margins or sidelines, to be
marginalized means to be “relegate[d] . . . to an unimportant or powerless

Accountability Off., Impoundment Control Act: Use and Impact of Rescission Procedures 2
(1999) (statement of Gary L. Kepplinger, Assoc. Gen. Couns., Off. of Gen. Couns.),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/110/108076.pdf [https://perma.cc/5LVS-4CW8] (noting funds
generally released and that GAO had ﬁled suit only once).
150. Off. of Mgmt. & Budget—Withholding of Ukr. Sec. Assistance, B-331564, 2020 WL
241373, at *7 (Comp. Gen. Jan. 16, 2020) (concluding that the hold was undertaken to
advance President Trump’s policy goals, not because of some external factor, and as a result
represented a prohibited policy deferral); Letter from Mark R. Paoletta to Tom Armstrong,
supra note 134, at 9.
151. Withholding of Ukr. Sec. Assistance, 2020 WL 241373, at *7.
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position.”152 Several distinct mechanisms of appropriations marginalization repeat across the doctrines discussed below. As a result, an initial taxonomy of the different forms that appropriations marginalization takes is
in order. Such a taxonomy helps not only to identify the shared marginalization dynamic linking these varying doctrines but also to underscore that
marginalization in doctrine and marginalization in practice are distinct
phenomena. Sometimes these two phenomena overlap, but sometimes the
effect of appropriations’ doctrinal marginalization is actually to expand
their real-world import.
1. Exceptionalism, Silence, Assimilation, and Jurisdictional Exclusion. — A
ﬁrst form of marginalization is what we might call appropriations
exceptionalism, or the application of legal rules that are speciﬁc to appropriations. Examples span the areas of doctrine detailed below, from the
singling out of appropriations for different constitutional and procedural
requirements that apply to regulation, to the frequent barriers to judicial
review of appropriations actions, to the imposition of special canons for
interpreting appropriations measures. Although appropriations are
thereby pushed to the edges of standard public law doctrines, whether they
are marginalized in the sense of being rendered unimportant depends on
the speciﬁc substantive rules to which they are then subject.
A second approach, appropriations silence, is diametrically opposite.
Rather than fashioning new legal requirements because of appropriations’
distinct features, this technique stands out for not taking heed of
appropriations. Sometimes courts ignore appropriations altogether, while
other times courts assimilate appropriations to existing legal doctrines
without considering whether those rules ﬁt the appropriations context. It
is worth noting, however, that not all appropriations assimilation takes the
form of appropriations silence. In some instances, courts explain why they
are subjecting appropriations measures to standard legal rules. The distinctive trait of appropriations silence, by contrast, is that courts fail to
engage with appropriations or to discuss whether the fact that appropriations are involved should affect the legal analysis. This distinction matters
because such express appropriations assimilation is not necessarily a manifestation of appropriations marginalization; appropriations are neither
pushed to the sidelines nor ignored but instead engaged with by courts
and treated as part of standard public law. Instead, like appropriations
exceptionalism, whether express appropriations assimilation ends up marginalizing appropriations will turn on the reasons the court gives for assimilating appropriations and the impact of such assimilation in practice.
The ﬁnal approach is jurisdictional exclusion. A striking array of
jurisdictional obstacles either preclude bringing appropriations claims in
court or at least allow such claims to be excluded. Such jurisdictional
exclusion sometimes takes the form of appropriations exceptionalism,
152. Marginalize, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
marginalize [https://perma.cc/7L54-KSSX] (last visited Jan. 15, 2021).
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with efforts to challenge appropriations measures or actions facing unique
barriers to judicial review. Sometimes, however, jurisdictional exclusion
results from appropriations silence and assimilation. For example, given
the frequent generalized aspect of appropriations and the fact that appropriations statutes are primarily geared to funding agencies, application of
standard standing or zone of interests requirements may serve to exclude
appropriations challenges from courts.153
2. Marginalization in Doctrine Versus Marginalization in Practice. — As
this description of the different methods of marginalization highlights, the
focus in what follows is primarily on appropriations’ marginalization in
doctrine. Sometimes doctrinal marginalization also serves to limit the
impact an appropriations measure has in practice, but that is not always
the case. On the contrary, some forms of doctrinal marginalization can
operate to enhance the potency of appropriations as a governance tool.
This variation between doctrine and practical effect results in large part
because doctrinal marginalization can allow appropriations to operate
with fewer judicially enforceable legal constraints. Hence, not surprisingly
it is doctrinal marginalization of the jurisdictional exclusion variety that is
most likely to expand the practical import of an appropriations measure.
Other forms of marginalization are less clearly identiﬁed with particular
practical outcomes—at times enhancing the power of an appropriations
measure and at times undermining it.
But generalizations here are easily misleading. In particular, it would
be a mistake to conclude that freeing appropriations from judicially
enforceable constraints enhances the potency of appropriations across the
board. Although jurisdictional exclusion makes appropriations a particularly powerful tool for the President and the executive branch, the effect
on Congress is mixed. Congress similarly beneﬁts from preserving ﬂexibility in appropriations and from being able to wield its political inﬂuence
without risk of judicial interference, but jurisdictional obstacles also limit
Congress’s ability to rely on courts to enforce statutory appropriations
requirements on a recalcitrant executive branch. These variations—
between doctrine and practice, and in the positions of the two political
branches—make it necessary to consider appropriations’ status in political
branch public law as well as in public law doctrine. This Part undertakes
both.

153. See infra text accompanying notes 175–183; see also Hein v. Freedom from
Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 599–607, 609–10 (2007) (rejecting taxpayer standing to
challenge an executive branch funding decision for violating the Establishment Clause and
distinguishing precedent allowing taxpayer standing to challenge appropriations statutes on
this ground); see also id. at 618 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that
precedent should be repudiated and no taxpayer standing be allowed).
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Appropriations and Constitutional Law

As the contemporary disputes noted above underscore, appropriations are central to the separation of powers in practice, and courts
frequently invoke the appropriations power as a tool Congress can use to
control the President.154 Nonetheless, much separation of powers case law
ignores appropriations altogether or pushes appropriations matters out of
the courts’ purview.
1. Delegation. — A good place to start is with delegation. Challenges to
congressional delegations as unconstitutional grants of legislative authority to the executive branch are the “Energizer Bunny” of the separation of
powers; notwithstanding longstanding precedent repeatedly knocking
down such challenges, they continue to be made.155 Indeed, delegation
challenges appear to be gaining traction. In Gundy v. United States, Justice
Gorsuch criticized the Court’s current approach to delegation, under
which a delegation is constitutional provided Congress provides an “intelligible principle,” very loosely deﬁned, to guide executive decisionmaking.156 At issue in Gundy was a provision of the Sex Offender Registration
and Notiﬁcation Act (SORNA) that authorized the Attorney General “to
specify the applicability” of the Act’s sex offender registration requirements to individuals convicted before SORNA was adopted and “prescribe
rules for [their] registration.”157 Writing for himself, Chief Justice Roberts,
and Justice Thomas, Gorsuch argued that this provision was an unconstitutional delegation because it allowed the Attorney General to make
“unbounded policy choices” about whether and how SORNA would apply
to pre-Act offenders.158 Although a plurality of the Court upheld the provision under the intelligible principle test in an opinion written by Justice
Kagan,159 Justice Alito separately voiced his willingness to reconsider the
nondelegation doctrine, as did Justice Kavanaugh after he joined the
Court.160

154. For a recent example, see Comm. on the Judiciary v. McGahn, 951 F.3d 510, 528–
29 (D.C. Cir. 2020), vacated en banc, 968 F.3d 755 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
155. Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 Va. L. Rev. 327, 330 (2002);
see also Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2129 (2019) (plurality opinion) (Kagan, J.)
(reviewing precedent).
156. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2138–40 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
157. 34 U.S.C. § 20913 (2018). SORNA was part of the Adam Walsh Child Protection
and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (codiﬁed at 34 U.S.C. § 20911
(2018)).
158. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2132–33 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
159. See id. at 2129 (plurality opinion) (Kagan, J.).
160. See id. at 2131 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (signaling support for
reconsidering “the approach we have taken [to nondelegation] for the past 84 years”); Paul
v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., statement on the denial of
certiorari) (“Justice Gorsuch’s scholarly analysis of the Constitution’s nondelegation
doctrine . . . may warrant further consideration in future cases.”).
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Interestingly, in concluding that the delegation at issue in Gundy was
unconstitutionally broad, Justice Gorsuch considered only the text of
SORNA itself.161 Justice Kagan similarly focused only on SORNA, among
other things describing detailed statements in SORNA’s legislative history
indicating that members of Congress were particularly concerned with
registering 100,000 past offenders who had not complied with existing
registration requirements.162 In so doing, both Gorsuch and Kagan were
in good company; the Court’s prior delegation precedents similarly look
only at the organic or substantive statute authorizing the agency action in
question.163 More speciﬁcally, these cases are prime examples of appropriations silence—they do not look to see if Congress has appropriated funds
or authorized appropriations for the action the agency took. Yet if
congressional determination of policy is the concern, then action taken by
Congress to fund or authorize funding for the agency’s policy should be
relevant.164
In the case of SORNA, Congress has not speciﬁcally addressed the
registration of pre-Act offenders in its appropriations legislation or subsequent authorization of appropriations. But since 2007, it has regularly appropriated substantial sums for SORNA implementation, including up to
$20 million annually for sex offender management assistance and up to
$50 million for the U.S. Marshals Service to assist in enforcing registration
requirements.165 The Attorney General’s ﬁnal guidelines on registration
by pre-Act offenders were issued in 2009. Hearings and reports held in
2008 and 2009 make clear that Congress was monitoring sex offender registration efforts and aware that the registration requirements were being

161. See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2131–32 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 2126–29 (plurality opinion) (Kagan, J.).
163. E.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 473–76 (2001).
164. See Jonathan H. Adler & Christopher J. Walker, Delegation and Time, 105 Iowa L.
Rev. 1931, 1956–57, 1966, 1979–80 (2020) (identifying periodic enactment of legislation
authorizing appropriations as a means of addressing concerns raised by delegation,
although arguing that limitations of the appropriations process mean that enactment of
appropriations measures alone is not enough to address delegation concerns).
165. E.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-31, div. B, tit. II, 131
Stat. 135, 204 (appropriating $20 million for state and local sex-offender-management
assistance and $1 million for a national registry); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-161, div. B, tit. II, 121 Stat. 1844, 1911 (2007) (appropriating roughly $4.2
million for sex offender management); William J. Krouse, Celinda Franco & Nathan James,
Cong. Rsch. Serv., RL34530, Department of Justice (DOJ) Appropriations for FY2008 and
FY2009, at 14, 27 (Aug. 1, 2008) (noting the allocation of $50 million in funding for U.S.
Marshals to enforce the Adam Walsh Act and other sex offender enforcement funding);
Garrine P. Laney, Cong. Rsch. Serv., RL32800, Sex Offender Registration and Community
Notiﬁcation Law: Recent Legislation and Issues 1–3, 30–32 (June 3, 2008) (describing
proposed and enacted legislation on sex offenders and noting funding amounts).
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applied retroactively.166 Despite being aware of the Attorney General’s application of SORNA and enacting legislation annually to fund SORNA
registration and enforcement, Congress never precluded the Attorney
General from using appropriated funds to register pre-Act offenders. To
the contrary, language in appropriations subcommittee reports from
FY2009 to FY2011 repeatedly voiced disappointment that the Obama
Administration did not request additional funds so that the U.S. Marshals
Service could address the “estimated caseload of 100,000 noncompliant
sex offenders.”167 These were the same 100,000 past offenders that Justice
Kagan ﬂagged as of particular concern to Congress in enacting SORNA
and that would only be subject to SORNA’s requirements if the Attorney
General applied SORNA retroactively. In addition, the conference
reports—reﬂecting the views of both houses—signaled that Congress
intended the Administration to be, if anything, more aggressive in enforcing SORNA with respect to these individuals, speciﬁcally recommending
that additional funds of $20 million and more be spent to reduce the caseload of noncompliant offenders.168
In short, Congress not only appropriated signiﬁcant funds to support
federal enforcement of SORNA well aware that the Attorney General had

166. See Sex Offender Notiﬁcation and Registration Act (SORNA): Barriers to Timely
Compliance by States, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland
Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 1–3, 51, 57–58, 158 (2009); Commerce,
Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2008: Hearing on H.R.
3093 and S. 1745 Before the Subcomm. on Comm., Just., Sci. & Related Agencies of S.
Comm. on Appropriations, 110th Cong. 290 (2007) (statement of Sen. Richard Shelby) (“As
many as 100,000 [sex offenders] are not in compliance with their registry requirements . . . .
How long would it take the [U.S. Marshals] Service to fully enforce this law, and what kind
of resources would be required?”).
167. H.R. Rep. No. 110-919, at 49–50 (2008) (“The Committee is disappointed that the
Administration did not request funds for the Marshals to execute their responsibilities
under the Adam Walsh . . . Act. Although this legislation was passed in 2006, the Marshals
still have no signiﬁcant resources dedicated to addressing an estimated caseload of 100,000
noncompliant sex offenders.”); see also S. Rep. No. 111-34, at 61 (2009) (noting the same
concern that the U.S. Marshals Service would need substantially greater resources to “fulﬁll
its Adam Walsh Act responsibilities” but not invoking the 100,000 number); H.R. Rep. No.
111-149, at 60–61 (2009) (“If the Marshals are going to make a signiﬁcant impact on the
estimated caseload of 100,000 non-compliant sex offenders, a concerted, multiyear effort to
dedicate additional resources to the program is necessary.”); S. Rep. No. 110-397, at 51
(2008) (“The Committee is deeply concerned that the administration has failed to request
resources to carry out this act.”). In FY2011, the relevant Senate subcommittee raised its
estimate of noncompliant offenders to 135,000. S. Rep. No. 111-229, at 57 (2010).
168. See H.R. Rep. No. 111-366, at 665 (2009) (Conf. Rep.) (“The conference
agreement includes an increase of $27,500,000 over the budget request to expand Adam
Walsh Act enforcement activities in districts across the country.”); see also S. Rep. No. 11134, at 61 (recommending an increase of $35 million); H.R. Rep. No. 111-149, at 61 (“[T]he
Committee’s recommendation includes $20,000,000 to expand Adam Walsh Act
enforcement . . . .”).
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applied registration requirements retroactively, it repeatedly recommended allocating more money speciﬁcally to expand enforcement of
SORNA against past offenders. True, these actions do not take the form of
an express statutory endorsement of the Attorney General’s approach. But
they surely call into question any suggestion that the Attorney General applied SORNA to pre-Act offenders without congressional sanction. Nonetheless, the opinions in Gundy—and the briefs—all ignored these appropriations actions entirely. Moreover, in a rare recent instance when claims
were made that Congress had sanctioned agency action through appropriations—involving the actions of the Federal Housing Finance Authority
(FHFA) with respect to the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie
Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac)
during the last ﬁnancial crisis—the Fifth Circuit en banc was highly
resistant to the suggestion of such appropriations ratiﬁcation.169
2. Article III. — When it comes to Article III, the marginalization of
appropriations is baked into the doctrine. This is particularly true with
respect to challenges arguing that Article III is violated by adjudication
occurring outside of federal courts. Traditionally, Article III adjudication
was not required for matters of public right, which centrally included disputes over public funds. Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.,
the paradigmatic case in which Article III adjudication was held to be not
required on public right grounds, involved a federal customs collector
found to owe the government over $1.3 million after an administrative
audit.170 Over the course of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court
moved away from giving the presence of a public right such talismanic
importance, but more recent jurisprudence has returned to drawing a
strict doctrinal divide between public and private rights in determining
whether Article III adjudication is required.171 In a similar vein, sovereign
immunity doctrine operates to bar suits for money from the federal government without its consent. As Congress has tied its consent to being sued
to certain venues, those seeking wrongfully withheld funds are often
forced to sue in the Court of Federal Claims rather than ordinary district
courts.172

169. Collins v. Mnuchin, 938 F.3d 553, 572–73 (5th Cir. 2019) (en banc), cert. granted,
141 S. Ct. 193 (2020).
170. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 275 (1856).
171. Compare Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct.
1365, 1373 (2018) (“When determining whether a proceeding involves an exercise of
Article III judicial power, this Court’s precedents have distinguished between ‘public rights’
and ‘private rights.’”), with Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833,
853–54 (1986) (“[T]his Court has rejected any attempt to make determinative for Article
III purposes the distinction between public rights and private rights . . . .”).
172. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., John F. Manning, Daniel J. Meltzer & David L. Shapiro,
Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 89–90 (7th ed. 2015)
[hereinafter Hart & Wechsler].
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This exemption from Article III is a form of appropriations exceptionalism, with the Court expressly invoking the fact that government funds
are involved as a reason why Article III adjudication is not required and
may even be precluded.173 On the other hand, the public rights doctrine
is not limited to instances of appropriations but applies more broadly to
civil adjudication in which the government is a party or the right at issue
“is integrally related to particular Federal Government action.”174 In that
sense, the exemption of public funds disputes from the mandatory scope
of Article III can also be viewed as simply the assimilation of appropriations
matters into a broader category for which Article III adjudication is
optional, rather than as an instance of appropriations-speciﬁc exceptionalism. Either way, the net result is to push some adjudication of appropriations disputes to the Article III sidelines.
A further sign of appropriations marginalization under Article III
comes from case law on standing. Courts regularly ﬁnd that entities and
individuals who claim a right to funds under a statute, or even a right to
compete for funds, have standing to challenge executive branch actions
that operate to deny them those funds.175 But establishing standing to
challenge government uses of funds or grants to third parties, without also
claiming a right to the funds in question, is more difficult.176 Courts can
be skeptical of plaintiffs’ claims of particularized injury and causality in
such appropriations contexts.177 Litigants sometimes resort to asserting
their interests as taxpayers, but the Court has repeatedly held that “[a]s a
general matter, the interest of a federal taxpayer in seeing that Treasury

173. See Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 281–84; Haines v. Fed. Motor Carrier
Safety Admin., 814 F.3d 417, 425–26 (6th Cir. 2016) (explaining that federal sovereign
immunity bars suit for money damages in federal district court).
174. Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 489–91 (2011).
175. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 429–36 (1998); Planned
Parenthood of Greater Wash. & N. Idaho v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 946 F.3d
1100, 1109 (9th Cir. 2020). This ability of individuals to sue for money they were entitled to
by law was established implicitly in Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.)
524, 623–26 (1838), which affirmed a writ of mandamus ordering the postmaster general to
pay out money owed to the plaintiffs.
176. See Sohoni, supra note 32, at 1706–07.
177. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 740 (1984) (rejecting standing to challenge
the IRS’s grant of tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory schools on the ground that
the plaintiffs did not show that this grant of ﬁnancial beneﬁts had harmed their children’s
access to desegregated schools and that the injury of funding racially discriminatory schools
was too generalized); El Paso County v. Trump, 982 F.3d 332, 339–42 (5th Cir. 2020)
(concluding that standing was lacking to challenge diverted appropriations because the
alleged injury was too general, causation insufficiently direct, and redressability unclear).
But see California v. Trump, 963 F.3d 926, 935–40 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. granted sub nom.
Trump v. Sierra Club, 141 S. Ct. 618 (2020) (concluding that states met the tripartite
standing requirements because the government’s use of funds to build the border wall
harmed their environmental interests).
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funds are spent in accordance with the Constitution does not give rise to
the kind of redressable ‘personal injury’ required for Article III standing.”178
To be sure, establishing standing based on claims of injury from the
impact of government actions on third parties can be difficult outside the
appropriations context as well.179 But these generalized injury and causation problems are especially predictable when it comes to appropriations,
given appropriations’ programmatic aspect and the optional character of
ﬁnancial incentives. Yet courts silently assimilate appropriations to
standard standing analysis, without addressing how well that analysis ﬁts
the appropriations realities.
The appropriations context is also home to many disputes over
congressional standing. In Raines v. Byrd, the Supreme Court held that
individual members of Congress lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Line Item Veto Act, which authorized the President to
cancel statutory provisions granting discretionary budget authority, direct
spending, or limited tax relief within ﬁve days of enactment.180 Raines is
striking in its refusal to take account of Congress’s constitutional role in
appropriations, instead insisting that the case should be governed by the
same standing rules that apply to private suits against governmental
action.181 Recently, the en banc D.C. Circuit concluded that neither Raines
nor subsequent Supreme Court case law addressing state legislative standing precluded the House of Representatives from suing to challenge the
Trump Administration’s transfer of funds appropriated for other purposes
to build the border wall.182 According to the D.C. Circuit, the House met
the conventional requirements of standing because the transfer caused it
a distinct institutional injury, in the form of the loss of its constitutionally
protected power to prevent expenditures, that it could seek to redress in
court.183
3. Congressional and Presidential Powers. — Appropriations play a
surprisingly tangential role in cases addressing the scope of congressional
and presidential powers, given how central the congressional–presidential
178. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 599–600 (2007); see
also United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 174–75 (1974) (rejecting a taxpayer’s effort
to enforce the Appropriations Clause’s statement-and-account requirement to obtain a
statement of the CIA’s expenditures).
179. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561–62 (1992).
180. 521 U.S. 811, 829–30 (1997) (discussing 2 U.S.C. § 691(a) (1996)).
181. Id. at 820–21 (“[A]ppellees’ claim of standing is based on a loss of political power,
not loss of any private right, which would make the injury more concrete.”). But see id. at
841–42 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (ﬁnding that the “systematic nature of the harm” to the
validity of the laws, including “all appropriations laws,” presented a stronger claim for
justiciability than the majority observed).
182. See U.S. House of Representatives v. Mnuchin, 976 F.3d 1, 6–13 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
183. See id. at 8–9, rev’ing 379 F. Supp. 3d 8, 14–16, 18–19 (D.D.C. 2019) (holding in
the district court that the House lacked standing to challenge President Trump’s transfer
and reprogramming of military funds to build the border wall, relying heavily on Raines).
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rivalry over spending is in practice to the balance of power between the
branches. One of the rare instances of appropriations factoring into such
assessments involves invocation of military appropriations as signaling congressional sanction for presidentially initiated military activities. Although
courts rarely review the constitutionality of presidential uses of force, several decisions emphasized congressional appropriations in rejecting legal
challenges to the Vietnam War.184 Congress subsequently stated in the War
Powers Resolution that congressional authorization for the use of force
shall not be inferred from “any provision of law . . . including any provision contained in any appropriation Act,” unless the provision speciﬁcally
so states.185 Yet appropriations continue to factor into executive branch
justiﬁcations for use of force and are occasionally identiﬁed by courts as
reasons why challenges to military actions are nonjusticiable political
questions.186
Several leading separation of powers decisions have emerged from
the appropriations and budget context. Strikingly, however, the Court
engaged in appropriations silence and ignored the appropriations
dimension of these cases, other than to note how appropriations provided
the factual background of the dispute at hand. Clinton v. City of New York is
a prime example.187 The Line Item Veto Act at issue there was inextricably
tied to the appropriations process; not only did the Act authorize
presidential vetoing of revenue and spending measures, but the Act
emerged from concerns over Congress’s lack of budget discipline and
prior battles over presidential impoundments of appropriated funds.188 Yet
in holding the Act unconstitutional, the majority focused on the
184. See, e.g., Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1042 & n.2 (2d Cir. 1971) (“Congress
has ratiﬁed the executive’s initiatives by appropriating billions of dollars to carry out military
operations in Southeast Asia . . . .”); see also Banks & Raven-Hansen, supra note 37, at 119
(characterizing the Vietnam War appropriations as “legitimating,” from which “the
executive infers authority for national security actions”). But see Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d
611, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (“This court cannot be unmindful of what every schoolboy
knows . . . . A Congressman wholly opposed to the war’s commencement and continuation
might vote for the military appropriations . . . because he was unwilling to abandon without
support men already ﬁghting.”).
185. 50 U.S.C. § 1547(a)(1) (2018).
186. Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (noting that Congress could
end the United States’ involvement in Yugoslavia by “cut[ting] off funds for the American
role in the conﬂict”); Authorization for Continuing Hostilities in Kos., 24 Op. O.L.C. 327,
346–65 (2000) (discussing in detail whether appropriations have authorized the use of force
and concluding that emergency supplemental appropriations for military operations in
Kosovo had such an effect, even though a bill authorizing the action failed in Congress).
187. 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
188. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-491, at 15 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (“This legislation . . . moves
to meet [the demand for greater ﬁscal accountability] by enhancing the President’s ability
to eliminate wasteful federal spending and to cancel special tax breaks.”); see also Clinton,
524 U.S. at 449, 451 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting the relationship to excessive
spending).
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Constitution’s general bicameralism and presentment requirements for
enacting legislation and did not address whether the appropriations
context might affect how—or whether—those requirements apply.189
Bowsher v. Synar similarly involved a budget measure, the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deﬁcit Control Act of 1985, known as the Gramm–
Rudman–Hollings Act.190 It set maximum deﬁcit amounts that declined
over ﬁve years until reaching zero and directed the Comptroller General—
the head of GAO who was removable by a joint resolution by Congress—
to specify required spending reductions by program if the annual federal
deﬁcit exceeded the allowed amount, after reviewing reductions proposed
by OMB and CBO.191 The arrangement was challenged as an
unconstitutional exercise of congressional control over law execution.192
Writing in dissent to uphold the measure, Justice White suggested that the
fact appropriations were involved mattered to the analysis:
Determining the level of spending by the Federal
Government is not by nature a function central either to
the exercise of the President’s enumerated powers or to
his general duty to ensure execution of the laws; rather,
appropriating funds is a peculiarly legislative function, and
one expressly committed to Congress by Art. I, § 9 . . . .
Delegating the execution of this legislation . . . to an
officer independent of the President’s will does not
deprive the President of any power that he would
otherwise have or that is essential to the performance of
the duties of his office.193
But Justice White was a lone voice. A majority of the Court concluded
that this scheme entailed Congress retaining control of an executive
officer in violation of the separation of powers,194 while two concurring
Justices held it was an instance of part of the legislative branch acting outside of the Constitution’s requirement of bicameralism and presentment.195 Neither opinion gave any attention to the fact that the appropriations power was involved.

189. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 438–40; see also id. at 440–41, 446–47 (brieﬂy rejecting the
relevance of the executive branch’s historical discretion over expenditures and the statute’s
lockbox aspect). The dissenters gave more play to the appropriations background, arguing
that the President’s discretion under the Act was “no broader than the discretion
traditionally granted the President in his execution of spending laws.” Id. at 466–69 (Scalia,
J., dissenting); id. at 470–71, 483 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
190. 478 U.S. 714, 717–18 (1986).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 719–21.
193. Id. at 763 (White, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 733–34 (majority opinion).
195. Id. at 737 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Finally, appropriations largely have not factored into analysis of
whether agencies are too insulated from presidential control. To begin
with, unitary executive claims that the Constitution grants the President
full control over all executive branch officers and decisionmaking rarely
engage with the fact that Congress’s power of the purse allows it to impose
quite detailed instructions on the executive branch.196 In addition, courts
have given little consideration to whether an agency has access to independent funding and what the impact of that budgetary independence
might mean. Indeed, in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight
Board, the Court went beyond appropriations silence to expressly dismissing the signiﬁcance of appropriations.197 There, Chief Justice Roberts’s
majority opinion dismissed the fact that the budget of the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) was entirely controlled by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), deeming questions of “who
controls the agency’s budget requests and funding” to be “bureaucratic
minutiae” not relevant to the separation of powers challenge at hand.198
There are signs that this exclusion of appropriations from jurisprudence on presidential power may be changing. Some courts invalidating
the Trump Administration’s conditions on Byrne JAG grants held that the
conditions violated the separation of powers,199 and the Ninth Circuit also
raised separation of powers concerns in the border wall litigation.200 Even
196. See Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary
Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1153, 1183 n.149 (1992) (“Neither the unitary
executive debate nor the jurisdiction-stripping debate has yet turned on the scope of
Congress’s ability to use the appropriations power to undermine the separation of
powers.”). For a rare discussion of the President’s spending dependence as a sign of limits
on presidential control of the executive branch, see Saikrishna B. Prakash, Fragmented
Features of the Constitution’s Unitary Executive, 45 Willamette L. Rev. 701, 702, 711–12
(2009).
197. 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
198. Id. at 499–500, 504; see also id. at 524 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that “who
controls the agency’s budget requests and funding . . . [is] more likely to affect the
President’s power to get something done” than a power of at-will removal but otherwise not
mentioning appropriations); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 660–63 (1988) (upholding
the constitutionality of the independent counsel without discussing that the DOJ had to pay
the counsel’s costs but could not control them, nor referencing the multiple provisions in
the independent counsel statute specifying costs the counsel could incur); PHH Corp. v.
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 881 F.3d 75, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc) (“The CFPB’s
independent funding source has no constitutionally salient effect on the President’s
power.”), abrogated by Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183
(2020).
199. See City & County of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1231 (9th Cir. 2018);
City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 579, 639 (E.D. Pa. 2017); City of Chicago v.
Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933, 943 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
200. California v. Trump, 963 F.3d 926, 943 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. granted sub nom.
Trump v. Sierra Club, 141 S. Ct. 618 (2020); Sierra Club v. Trump, 963 F.3d 874, 887 (9th
Cir. 2020), cert. granted, 141 S. Ct. 618 (2020); Sierra Club v. Trump, 929 F.3d 670, 686–87,
689, 701–04 (9th Cir. 2019).
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more signiﬁcant is Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
from last Term, in which the Court held that removal protection for the
Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau violated the
President’s constitutional powers.201 In reaching this result, Chief Justice
Roberts noted the CFPB’s independent budget authority, arguing that the
“CFPB’s receipt of funds outside the appropriations process further
aggravates the agency’s threat to Presidential control” by denying the
President’s ability to inﬂuence the agency’s actions through “budgetary
controls.”202 Appropriations may also factor in the latest removal power
challenge involving the FHFA, pending before the Court when this Article
went to press.203 Not only does the FHFA also enjoy budgetary autonomy,
the action challenged in the case arose out of the government’s provision
of hundreds of billions of dollars to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—two
government-sponsored enterprises—during the last recession.204
Yet so far, these references to appropriations in presidential power
disputes have been ﬂeeting and undeveloped. Even in Seila, appropriations were treated as a sideshow, with the Court focusing predominantly
on the CFPB’s single-director structure and removal protection. Remarkably, moreover, in Seila the Court only mentioned the impact of the CFPB’s
budgetary independence on the President. It never considered whether
making the CFPB Director removable at will—and thus giving the
President broad control over an agency that operates independent of
Congress’s budgetary constraints—would raise separation of powers concerns of its own.
At the same time that appropriations are excluded from jurisprudence on presidential power, questions about presidential power are often
ignored in cases that focus on appropriations.205 Courts generally
approach challenges alleging that administrative actions violate statutes
appropriating funds or providing grants solely as questions of statutory
interpretation. As a result, they avoid the issue of whether the President
enjoys any inherent constitutional power to spend without congressional
authorization or to refuse to spend in the face of congressional direction.
This avoidance is evident in numerous cases addressing President Nixon’s
impoundment of funds. Although Nixon claimed a right to refuse to

201. 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2192 (2020).
202. Id. at 2204.
203. Collins v. Mnuchin, 938 F.3d 553 (5th Cir. 2019) (en banc), cert. granted, 141 S.
Ct. 193 (2020).
204. See id. at 564–65, 567–68.
205. An exception is Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414
(1990). There, the Court emphasized that “[i]f agents of the Executive were able, by their
unauthorized oral or written statements to citizens, to obligate the Treasury for the payment
of funds, the control over public funds that the Clause reposes in Congress in effect could
be transferred to the Executive.” Id. at 428.
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spend with constitutional overtones,206 the government defended the challenged impoundments in statutory terms, and the courts overwhelmingly
rejected impoundments on a similar statutory basis.207 The effect was to
deny any presidential impoundment power not provided by statute, but
courts let that implication go almost entirely unacknowledged.208 According to Keith Whittington, the courts’ limited intervention also made clear
that “[c]ontrolling the constitutional budgeting process required institution building more than it required judicial pronouncements.”209 This
recognition underlay enactment of the major 1974 budget reforms, both
the CBA and the ICA, and Congress’s assumption of a more active role in
the budget process.210
4. The Spending Power. — It is hard to view spending power jurisprudence as an instance of doctrinal marginalization of appropriations. To be
sure, these cases fall squarely in the camp of appropriations exceptionalism, with courts creating a body of doctrine speciﬁcally to govern the use
of federal funds. But far from being pushed to the sidelines, questions
about the constitutional signiﬁcance of federal funds take center stage
here. In the past, spending power cases have largely focused on claims that
statutory spending conditions violate federalism or individual rights, but,
as noted above, separation of powers has risen to the fore in many recent
sanctuary cities decisions. These cases arose out of a Trump executive
order directing that jurisdictions that willfully refuse to allow their agencies and employees to share immigration information with federal immigration authorities “are not eligible to receive Federal grants, except as
deemed necessary for law enforcement purposes.”211 Concluding that this
206. See 119 Cong. Rec. 4143 (1973) (statement of Rep. Pickle) (“The constitutional
right for the President of the United States to impound funds . . . is absolutely clear.”
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting The Impoundment Battle, Wash. Post, Feb. 6,
1973 (quoting President Nixon))).
207. See Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 43–44 (1975) (concluding that $5 billion
to $7 billion appropriated for grants in FY1973–FY1975 to help cover the cost of municipal
sewers and sewage treatment works were statutorily required to be allotted, rejecting
President Nixon’s instruction that no more than $2–3 billion be allotted); see also Brief for
the Petitioner at 46 n.17, Train, 420 U.S. 35 (Nos. 73-1377, 73-1378), 1974 WL 187558 (“The
question whether Congress’s use of mandatory language can subsequently prevent the
President from spending less than the total amount appropriated . . . presents difficult and
complex constitutional issues involving the allocation of powers [that the Court need not
reach].”).
208. The Eighth Circuit noted in passing that “[i]t should require no citation of
authority to reaffirm the proposition that the Secretary’s authority is limited to carrying out
the law according to its terms.” State Highway Comm’n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099, 1111 (8th
Cir. 1973).
209. Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and
Constitutional Meaning 168 (1999).
210. Id. at 168–73.
211. Exec. Order 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017) (referencing the
requirement of 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (2012) that “a Federal, State, or local government entity or

2021]

TAKING APPROPRIATIONS SERIOUSLY

1117

condition on federal grants was not authorized by Congress, the Ninth
Circuit and several other courts held that the executive order “violate[d]
the constitutional principle of the Separation of Powers” because the
Administration had “claimed for itself Congress’s exclusive spending
power . . . [and] also attempted to coopt Congress’s power to legislate.”212
Yet there is one way in which spending power doctrine could be said
to marginalize appropriations: by leaving the spending of federal funds
relatively free from judicially enforceable constitutional limits.213 Although
the Court has invalidated some spending measures as unconstitutional
and imposed signiﬁcant clear statement requirements,214 the spending
power remains less constrained than other major congressional authorities.215 The textual requirement that spending must advance the “general
Welfare” is left for political determination, and the courts are also highly
deferential to the political branches on whether a spending condition is
related to the federal interest in the program under which a grant is
made.216 Further, the Court has often rejected individual rights challenges
to spending conditions, emphasizing the government’s ability to use public funds to advance its preferred message and insisting that “[a]s a general
matter, if a party objects to a condition on the receipt of federal funding,
its recourse is to decline the funds.”217
official may not prohibit . . . any government entity or official from sending to, or receiving
from, . . . [federal immigration authorities] information regarding the citizenship or
immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual”).
212. City & County of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1234–35 (9th Cir. 2018);
see also City of Chicago v. Barr, 961 F.3d 882, 887 (7th Cir. 2020) (“The executive branch
has signiﬁcant powers over immigration matters; the power of the purse is not one of them.
This tendency to overlook the formalities of the separation of powers to address the issueof-the-day has been seen many times by the courts, and it is no more persuasive now . . . .”).
But see New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 951 F.3d 84, 111 (2d Cir. 2020) (“The Attorney
General was authorized to impose the challenged Certiﬁcation Condition and did not
violate the . . . separation of powers by doing so.”).
213. NFIB, 567 U.S. 519, 537 (2012); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206–07 (1987).
214. See Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Open Soc’y (USAID), 570 U.S. 205, 217 (2013) (ruling
that a funding condition violated the First Amendment); NFIB, 567 U.S. at 580–82 (striking
down a condition on Medicaid funds as coercive); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (implementing a clear statement requirement); United
States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315–17 (1946) (invalidating an appropriations measure as an
unconstitutional bill of attainder).
215. NFIB, 567 U.S. at 537; see also Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley (NEA), 524
U.S. 569, 587–88 (1998) (“Government may allocate competitive funding according to
criteria that would be impermissible were direct regulation of speech or a criminal penalty
at stake.”).
216. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207–09; see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause Litigation
in the Roberts Court, 58 Duke L.J. 345, 367–69 (2008).
217. USAID, 570 U.S. at 214; see also NEA, 524 U.S. at 572, 587–88 (upholding the
requirement that NEA “tak[e] into consideration general standards of decency” in making
grant awards); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193–95 (1991) (upholding a prohibition on
doctors in a government-funded program from discussing abortion with their patients).
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Of course, even if this lack of constitutional limits is seen as marginalizing spending in constitutional doctrine, it has the opposite effect in practice. The federal government’s ability to employ federal funds in ways that
it cannot regulate enhances appropriations’ usefulness as a policymaking
tool. Indeed, the same is true of some other forms of appropriations’ marginalization in constitutional law. The ability to adjudicate appropriations
disputes in non–Article III contexts, or limitations on standing to challenge appropriations decisions, also serve to enhance appropriations’
potency as mechanisms of action for the government.
C.

Appropriations and Administrative Law

For all that appropriations are sidelined in constitutional jurisprudence, their marginalization in administrative law is even more pronounced. Across a number of central domains in administrative law—
administrative procedure, access to judicial review, and judicial review of
administrative decisionmaking—appropriations are pulled out of the
usual analytic frameworks. And often litigation over appropriations takes
place in venues and under statutes quite different than those that dominate standard administrative law.
1. Administrative Procedure. — On the procedural front, the marginalization of appropriations stems not from administrative law doctrine but
instead from the text of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Section
553 of the APA requires notice and an opportunity for comment, as well
as publication and a statement of basis and purpose, for most agency rulemaking.218 But it excepts rulemakings “to the extent that there is
involved . . . a matter relating to agency management or personnel or to
public property, loans, grants, beneﬁts, or contracts.”219 A number of substantive statutes impose rulemaking requirements on beneﬁt programs,220
and many grantmaking agencies have waived this exemption in keeping
with recommendations from the Administrative Conference of the United
States.221 But the exemption means that the use of standard rulemaking
procedures may be optional for government actions involving loans,
218. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2018).
219. Id. § 553(a)(2). Appropriations programs do not enjoy a similar categorical
exemption from adjudication procedures, but the procedures mandated by the APA are
likely to be limited because the applicability of formal adjudication requirements and the
substance of the requirements themselves are often read narrowly. See Michael Asimow,
ACUS Sourcebook on Federal Administrative Adjudication Outside the Administrative
Procedure Act 15–18 (2019).
220. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395hh(a)–(c) (2018) (imposing a notice, comment, and
publication requirement for regulations promulgated under the Medicare Act).
221. ACUS Recommendation 69-8, Elimination of Certain Exemptions from the APA
Rulemaking Requirements, 1 C.F.R. § 305.69-8 (1992) (repealed 1995); see also, e.g., 29
C.F.R. § 2.7 (1981) (DOL); 36 Fed. Reg. 2532 (Jan. 28, 1971) (Department of Health,
Education and Welfare).
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grants, beneﬁts, and contracts, all of which are closely tied to appropriations.222 The impetus behind the APA exemption was the same idea that
underlies the public rights doctrine that puts appropriations outside of
Article III’s strictures: Use of public property or receipt of public beneﬁts
and contracts was considered voluntary and a matter of privilege rather
than of right, in contrast to instances when individuals had no choice but
to adhere to governing regulations of their private conduct.223 That traditional right–privilege distinction no longer governs procedural due process analysis but lives on in the APA’s rulemaking exemption.224
A similar lack of statutorily mandated procedure surrounds other
administrative decisions on appropriations, such as OMB and agency
apportionment, reprogramming, and transfer decisions. Statutes often
require agencies to notify the relevant appropriations subcommittees and
subject-matter committees and wait a set period before transferring or
reprogramming. In practice, the norm is for agencies to obtain committee
approval, given that angering their appropriations overseers risks triggering a pullback in funding and transfer authority in the future.225 But few
other signiﬁcant procedures are generally imposed; the government is not
even currently required to provide public disclosure of its reprogramming
and transfer decisions.226 Reprogramming decisions, which occur within a
single budget account, are especially hard for external observers to identify and police if agencies fail to disclose them.227 And the Antideﬁciency
222. Some agencies, such as the USDA, have rescinded their earlier waivers of the
§ 553(a)(2) exemption. See Public Participation in Rule Making, 36 Fed. Reg. 13,804 (July
24, 1971) (exempting rulemakings related to “public property, loans, grants, beneﬁts, or
contracts” from the notice and comment requirements); see also Revocation of Statement
of Policy on Public Participation in Rulemaking, 78 Fed. Reg. 64,194 (Oct. 28, 2013)
(rescinding the 1971 waiver of a § 553(a)(2) exemption).
223. See Arthur Earl Bonﬁeld, Public Participation in Federal Rulemaking Relating to
Public Property, Loans, Grants, Beneﬁts, or Contracts, 118 U. Pa. L. Rev. 540, 571–73
(1970).
224. As a result, individual determinations under beneﬁt programs funded through
appropriations may be subject to procedural due process requirements. E.g., Kapps v. Wing,
404 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 2005).
225. Louis Fisher, The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, 56 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 273, 288–91 (1993) [hereinafter Fisher, Legislative Veto]; see also GAO Red Book,
GAO-16-464SP, supra note 53, ch. 2, at 46–47 (describing agency norms); cf. Lincoln v. Vigil,
508 U.S. 182, 193 (1993) (“[O]f course, we hardly need to note that an agency’s decision to
ignore congressional expectations may expose it to grave political consequences.”).
226. Legislation that would require such disclosure was recently introduced in the
House of Representatives. See Congressional Power of the Purse Act, H.R. 6628, 116th
Cong., §§ 101–105, 201–214 (2020). But the bill ultimately did not receive a vote and was
not enacted into law. H.R.6628—Congressional Power of the Purse Act, Congress.gov,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/6628/all-actions [https://perma.c
c/K9WV-X2FD] (last visited Jan. 26, 2021).
227. Lewis, supra note 56, at 7; see also Pasachoff, The President’s Budget, supra note
24, at 2251–62 (raising concerns about secrecy in budgeting generally, especially OMB’s
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Act simply requires apportionment and stipulates which official shall
apportion without imposing any other procedures on how apportionment
is done.228 The APA’s rulemaking exemption plays a role here too: Given
that decisions setting requirements on future uses of government funds
have been held to be rules, some reprogramming and apportionment
decisions might trigger notice and comment requirements were it not for
the exemption.229
2. Access to Judicial Review. — Perhaps no area demonstrates
appropriations’ marginalization in administrative law more than doctrines
governing access to judicial review. To begin with, the sovereign immunity
waiver in the APA is limited to those “seeking relief other than money
damages.”230 The Supreme Court has read this language to allow an
equitable action seeking speciﬁc relief, even if the effect of the relief would
be to require an agency to pay funds.231 But lower courts have held that in
order to avoid being barred by sovereign immunity, a suit under the APA
can seek only additional funds from the same appropriation under which
the funds were mistakenly withheld.232 Often, however, those appropriations are exhausted by the time suit is brought, leading to suits being
dismissed as moot.233
Even when amounts remain available in an appropriation, the
Supreme Court has rejected suits challenging agency allocation decisions
under lump-sum appropriations on the grounds that such decisions are
“committed to agency discretion under law” and not reviewable under
Section 701(a)(2) of the APA.234 In Lincoln v. Vigil, the Indian Health
Service decided to discontinue the provision of clinical services to handi-

role); Michelle Mrdeza & Kenneth Gold, Reprogramming Funds: Understanding the
Appropriators’ Perspective, Gov’t Affs. Inst. at Georgetown Univ., http://gai.georgetown
.edu/reprogramming-funds-understanding [https://perma.cc/8XG9-7L7Q] (“At some
level, all agencies routinely move funds around within accounts as needs shift, and as a
matter of sound budgeting. Much of this takes place without the knowledge of
appropriators, or even high level agency officials.”) (last visited Jan. 15, 2021).
228. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1512–1513 (2018).
229. See Sugar Cane Growers Co-op of Fla. v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 89, 95–97 (D.C. Cir.
2002); see also Lincoln, 508 U.S. at 196–98 & n.5 (stating that even if the decision by the
Indian Health Service to discontinue using lump-sum appropriations to provide clinical
services was a rule, it was exempt from notice and comment requirements as a general
statement of policy, noting that the agency had waived its § 553(a)(2) exemption).
230. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2018).
231. Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 893–94 (1988).
232. See Modoc Lassen Indian Hous. Auth. v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 881 F.3d
1181, 1195–98 (10th Cir. 2017); County of Suffolk v. Sebelius, 605 F.3d 135, 140–44 (2d Cir.
2010); City of Houston v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 24 F.3d 1421, 1428 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
233. See, e.g., County of Suffolk, 605 F.3d at 137–38.
234. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).
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capped Native American children in the southwest, opting instead to reallocate resources to support nationwide programs.235 A group of children
eligible for services challenged this decision—announced in a memorandum that sought “public input” but not through notice and comment
procedures—under the APA.236 Noting that Congress had never expressly
authorized funds for the program and the Service previously paid for the
program using annual lump-sum appropriations, the Court identiﬁed “a
fundamental principle of appropriations law” as being that when
“‘Congress merely appropriates lump-sum amounts without statutorily
restricting what can be done with those funds, a clear inference arises that
it does not intend to impose legally binding restrictions.’”237 As a result,
the Court concluded that “the allocation of funds from a lump-sum
appropriation is . . . [an] administrative decision traditionally regarded as
committed to agency discretion.”238 This lack of judicial review for lumpsum appropriations underlies agencies’ broad powers to reprogram funds
within a single budget account.
The nonreviewability of lump-sum appropriations is a prime example
of appropriations exceptionalism. With respect to substantive statutes, the
fact that an agency enjoys broad discretion to set policy does not preclude
judicial review.239 Moreover, the treatment of lump-sum appropriations
actions stands out even compared to other agency actions pulled out from
judicial review as committed to agency discretion. Agency nonenforcement decisions are another category of agency action that is often nonreviewable on this basis—in part on a similar rationale that nonenforcement
decisions turn on assessments about how to most effectively utilize agency
resources that are particularly within agency expertise.240 Yet nonenforcement decisions are only presumptively nonreviewable,241 whereas Lincoln
imposed no such qualiﬁcation.
Lincoln does not preclude judicial review of appropriations decisions
when Congress does allocate funds for speciﬁc programs or imposes
speciﬁc prohibitions.242 But here a separate obstacle to suit under the APA
235. 508 U.S. 182, 182 (1993).
236. Id. at 188–89.
237. Id. at 192 (quoting LTV Aerospace Corp., B-183851, 1975 WL 11581, at *11 (Comp.
Gen. Oct. 1, 1975)).
238. Id.
239. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 139 S. Ct. 361, 370–72 (2018).
240. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831–34 (1985).
241. Id.
242. Cf. Lincoln, 508 U.S. at 193; see also Shawnee Tribe v. Mnuchin, 984 F.3d 94, 100
(D.C. Cir. 2021) (rejecting the Secretary’s argument that the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and
Economic Security (CARES) Act appropriation, which provided funds for “necessary
expenditures incurred due to the public health emergency with respect to” COVID-19 and
directed the Secretary to “ensure that all amounts available” be “distributed to Tribal
governments,” was a lump-sum appropriation (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 801(c)(7), (d)(1) (2018))). The court further held that the CARES Act
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can arise, namely the requirement that to sue under the APA’s right of
action a challenger must be within the zone of interests protected by the
statute at issue.243 Ordinarily, the APA’s zone of interests test is easily met.244
All that is required is that the interest asserted by the plaintiff be “‘arguably
within the zone of interests to be protected . . . by the statute,’” with suit
foreclosed “only when a plaintiff’s ‘interests are so marginally related to
or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute.’”245 However, the
zone of interests test can prove more challenging to meet in the appropriations context, because the interests asserted by parties injured by uses of
appropriated funds may be pretty marginal to the appropriations statutes
at issue. Hence, here appropriations assimilation in the form of applying
the usual zone of interests test can operate to exclude appropriations from
judicial review.
Consider the Ninth Circuit border wall litigation, where a number of
states and environmental organizations challenged the Trump Administration’s transfer of appropriated funds as unlawful and violating Section 8005
of the FY2019 DOD Appropriations Act. All based their claims of injury
largely on the environmental effects of the border wall and its impact on
wildlife in the region.246 The Ninth Circuit held that the states satisﬁed the
APA’s zone of interests requirement with respect to Section 8005, emphasizing that their interests “are congruent with those of Congress” and the
challenge they were raising “actively furthers Congress’s intent to ‘tighten
congressional control of the reprogramming process’” and “congressional
power over appropriations.”247 The appellate court also emphasized that
in the past Section 8005 had been used to transfer funds to rebuild military
bases in states hit by natural disasters, arguing that showed states were
appropriation provided a judicially manageable standard by which to judge the Secretary’s
action. Id. at 100. Courts have sometimes found speciﬁc appropriations committed to
agency discretion as well, however. See, e.g., Milk Train, Inc. v. Veneman, 310 F.3d 747, 751–
52 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
243. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2018) (“A person . . . adversely affected or aggrieved by agency
action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.”); Nat’l
Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co., 522 U.S. 479, 488 (1998).
244. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 130
(2014) (“We have said, in the APA context, that the test is not ‘especially demanding.’”
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of
Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 567 U.S. 209, 225 (2012))).
245. Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band, 567 U.S. at 225 (ﬁrst quoting Ass’n of Data
Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970); then quoting Clarke v. Sec.
Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987)).
246. California v. Trump, 963 F.3d 926, 936–40 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. granted sub nom.
Trump v. Sierra Club, 141 S. Ct. 618 (2020) (asserting additionally the states’ sovereign
interests in enforcing their environmental laws); see also Sierra Club v. Trump, 963 F.3d
874, 883–84 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. granted, 141 S. Ct. 618 (2020) (asserting “recreational,
professional, scientiﬁc, educational, and aesthetic beneﬁts” from their activities in the U.S.–
Mexico border area and the wildlife in those areas).
247. California v. Trump, 963 F.3d at 942 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 93-662, at 16 (1973)).
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predictable challengers under Section 8005.248 But these arguments
mistakenly focus on the nature of the states’ claim—that the reprogramming was unlawful—rather than the environmental and wildlife
interests the states were asserting, which are marginal at best to Congress’s
interests in controlling the federal ﬁsc.249 It also claimed that the states
have unique sovereign interests in enforcing their laws, but that argument
would be more on point if Section 8005 itself displaced state law, which it
does not.250
The Ninth Circuit’s more interesting arguments sounded in a constitutional register. Perhaps recognizing that its zone of interests arguments
were tenuous, it insisted that “[t]he ﬁeld of suitable challengers must be
construed broadly in this context because . . . restrictions on congressional
standing make it difficult for Congress to enforce [Section 8005’s] obligations itself.”251 The appellate court deserves credit for emphasizing the
separation of powers harm that would result if no one could enforce
statutory appropriations limits on the executive branch. But the Supreme
Court has long rejected the argument that “otherwise no one could sue”
as reason to allow a suit to go forward.252 More precedent supports the
Ninth Circuit’s argument that no statutory cause of action was required
because an implied equitable action exists to challenge allegedly
unconstitutional or ultra vires actions. Here, the constitutional claim was
that the unauthorized transfers violated the Appropriations Clause.253 Yet
the Supreme Court has pulled back on this line of case law allowing
equitable actions.254 And the Court signaled skepticism about this basis for
suit here when it stated that “the Government has made a sufficient
showing at this stage that the plaintiffs have no cause of action to obtain

248. See id. at 943.
249. See id. at 960–62 (Collins, J., dissenting); see also Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed., 497
U.S. 871, 883 (1990) (“[T]he plaintiff must establish that the injury he complains of . . . falls
within the ‘zone of interests’ sought to be protected by the statutory provision whose
violation forms the legal basis for his complaint.”).
250. California v. Trump, 963 F.3d at 938–40; id. at 954, 960 (Collins, J., dissenting). The
appellate court also contended that states had beneﬁted from past Section 8005 transfers
and therefore were predictable challengers. But that amounts to the claim that “once within
the zone, always within the zone,” regardless of interests asserted, which seems a dubious
proposition.
251. Id. at 942.
252. Thole v. U.S. Bank, 140 S. Ct. 1615, 1621 (2020).
253. Sierra Club v. Trump, 963 F.3d 874, 887–93 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. granted, 141 S.
Ct. 618 (2020); see also Nat’l Lab. Rels. Bd. v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 556–57 (2014)
(implying a cause of action based on the Recess Appointments Clause).
254. See Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 325–27 (2015). The
APA has been held to not displace the traditional equitable cause of action, however. See
Dart v. United States, 848 F.2d 217, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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review of . . . compliance with § 8005” in granting the stay that the Ninth
Circuit denied.255
Cause of action obstacles also arise with respect to other appropriations statutes.256 For instance, courts have read the Antideﬁciency Act’s
provisions for administrative reporting and penalties as precluding a private right of action to enforce the Act.257 The ICA authorizes the
Comptroller General to sue if funds that the Comptroller General concludes were unlawfully withheld are not released, a remedial provision that
some courts have read as indicating no private right of action exists to
enforce the ICA.258 On the other hand, the ICA also provides that nothing
in it “shall be construed as . . . affecting in any way the claims or defenses
of any party to litigation concerning any impoundment.”259 President
Nixon’s impoundments prompted a number of lawsuits under the substantive statutes at issue,260 and given the ICA’s caveat, such statutory suits
should still be available as a means to challenge impoundments.261
3. Judicial Review of Administrative Decisionmaking. — In short, judicial
review of agency decisionmaking on appropriations can be hard to come
by and may confront obstacles that are not a signiﬁcant impediment for
other challenges to administrative action. Appropriations disputes also
look different when judicial review does occur. Most notably, courts rarely
defer to agency interpretations of appropriations statutes.262 Many reasons
are given for this lack of deference. In denying a stay of preliminary relief
in the border wall litigation, the Ninth Circuit held that Chevron deference
255. Trump v. Sierra Club, 140 S. Ct. 1 (2019) (mem.).
256. In the federal grant context, the Court has pulled back signiﬁcantly on implying
causes of actions in governing statutes, and the extent to which third-party beneﬁciaries can
enforce contractual requirements that underlie federal government grants is unclear. See
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 279, 284, 293 (2001) (concluding that a private right
of action exists to enforce the prohibition on intentional racial discrimination contained in
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act but not governmental regulations enforcing that
prohibition); Fahey, supra note 35, at 2382–87 (describing the evolution of case law on
third-party beneﬁciary enforcement).
257. See, e.g., Feldman v. Bowser, 315 F. Supp. 3d 299, 305 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting
Thurston v. United States, 696 F. Supp. 680, 683 (D.D.C. 1988)).
258. See, e.g., Rogers v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 39, 50 (1987), aff’d, 861 F.2d 729 (Fed.
Cir. 1988); Pub. Citizen v. Stockman, 528 F. Supp. 824, 827 (D.D.C. 1981).
259. 2 U.S.C. § 681 (2018).
260. See, e.g., Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 40 (1975).
261. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., OGC-82-9, President’s Eighth Special Message
for Fiscal Year 1982, at 4–24 (1982) (discussing in detail the continuing vitality of pre-ICA
impoundment case law and concluding it is still valid); see also Maine v. Goldschmidt, 494
F. Supp. 93, 98–99 (D. Me. 1980) (holding that a mandatory spending obligation in a statute
allows suit).
262. Matthew B. Lawrence, Congress’s Domain: Appropriations, Time, and Chevron, 70
Duke L.J. 1057, 1082–90 (2021) [hereinafter Lawrence, Congress’s Domain] (noting that
“[j]udicial decisions regarding the applicability of Chevron to appropriations are relatively
rare” and describing a range of approaches largely denying deference).
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would be inappropriate for DOD’s interpretation of Section 8005 because
the DOD had not issued its interpretation through rulemaking and did
not have rulemaking power under its appropriations statutes.263 It further
rejected even weaker Skidmore deference on the ground that DOD’s
statement was “entirely conclusory.”264 At other times, courts have rejected
deference after concluding that the agency lacked any special expertise
with respect to the appropriation statute at issue or that the meaning of
the statute was clear so deference was inapplicable.265 Often, courts review
agency interpretations de novo without even addressing the question of
Chevron deference.266
To be sure, on occasion courts do ﬁnd deference applicable to appropriations,267 and more importantly grounds exist for denying deference
that are not unique to the appropriations context. For example, Chevron
deference is only applicable when Congress has given an agency distinct
responsibility to implement a statute,268 and Congress has charged multiple actors—agencies, the President and OMB, and GAO—with responsibility for implementing appropriations.269 Moreover, as Lawrence has
263. Sierra Club v. Trump, 929 F.3d 670, 692–93 (9th Cir. 2019).
264. Id. at 693.
265. Oregon v. Trump, 406 F. Supp. 3d 940, 961–62 (D. Or. 2019) (concluding that the
DOJ’s interpretation of grant conditions applicable under the Byrne JAG program was not
entitled to Chevron deference because the statute at issue was clear and the interpretation
did not carry the force of law); Multnomah County v. Azar, 340 F. Supp. 3d 1046, 1063 (D.
Or. 2018) (determining Chevron to be inapplicable when the statute is clear); see also U.S.
House of Representatives v. Burwell, 185 F. Supp. 3d 165, 188 (D.D.C. 2016), vacated in part
sub nom. U.S. House of Representatives v. Azar, No. 14-1967 (RMC), 2018 WL 8576647
(D.D.C. May 18, 2018) (refusing to grant Chevron deference to agencies’ interpretation of a
tax refund provision because agencies were not delegated authority to ﬁll gaps and the
provision’s meaning was clear).
266. See, e.g., California v. Trump, 963 F.3d 926, 944–49 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. granted
sub nom. Trump v. Sierra Club, 141 S. Ct. 618 (2020) (concluding that Section 8005 clearly
prohibited DOD’s transfers without referencing deference doctrines or GAO’s contrary
view); Planned Parenthood of Greater Wash. & N. Idaho v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum.
Servs., 946 F.3d 1100, 1112–14 (9th Cir. 2020) (concluding that the meaning of a statute
providing grants for TPPP was clear and at odds in part with agency interpretation, with only
a passing citation to Chevron); Moda Health Plan, Inc. v. United States, 892 F.3d 1311, 1320–
22 (Fed. Cir. 2018), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Me. Cmty. Health Options v. United
States, 140 S. Ct. 1308 (2020) (determining the meaning of an appropriations rider de novo
without discussing deference); see also United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163, 1174–79
(9th Cir. 2016) (interpreting independently an appropriations rider limiting the DOJ’s
ability to prosecute without considering the applicability of Chevron, but in a criminal
context where Chevron does not usually apply).
267. See California ex rel. Becerra v. Azar, 950 F.3d 1067, 1084–88 (9th Cir. 2020);
WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Forest Serv., 668 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1329–31 (D.N.M. 2009).
268. See Pro. Reactor Operator Soc’y v. U.S. Nuclear Regul. Comm’n, 939 F.2d 1047,
1051 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“[C]ourts do not owe the same deference to an agency’s
interpretation of statutes that, like the APA, are outside the agency’s particular expertise
and special charge to administer.”).
269. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. §§ 1513–1514 (2018).
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noted, annual appropriations measures often are not on the books long
enough for agencies to interpret them through notice and comment rulemaking, which would increase the chances of deference.270 Hence, the
frequent lack of deference to agency interpretations of appropriations
statutes can be the result of applying the standard Chevron framework to
appropriations—an instance of appropriations assimilation more than
appropriations exceptionalism. Yet the rarity of deference stands out and
suggests that courts do not intuitively view appropriations as a proper
instance for deference to agency views. Indeed, sometimes courts say so
expressly.271
Instead of deference to agencies, courts regularly invoke general
appropriations principles, often as stated by GAO.272 Indeed, although
they do not put their reliance on GAO in these terms, courts give GAO’s
approach to interpreting appropriations statutes a weight akin to Skidmore
deference.273 In its recent decision on the risk corridor rider, for example,
the Supreme Court primarily relied on appropriations principles enunciated in past case law and by GAO, only noting in passing how the implementing agencies had interpreted the rider.274 This interpretive reliance
on GAO is unusual given GAO’s ties to the legislative branch, but reﬂects
the expertise GAO has developed through its appropriations enforcement
and oversight roles.275 One effect, however, is to downplay the area-speciﬁc

270. Lawrence, Congress’s Domain, supra note 262, at 1062; see also U.S. House of
Representatives v. Burwell, 185 F. Supp. 3d 165, 188 (D.D.C. 2016), vacated in part sub nom.
U.S. House of Representatives v. Azar, No. 14-1967 (RMC), 2018 WL 8576647 (D.D.C. May
18, 2018) (arguing that whether a permanent appropriations provision extended to cover
insurers’ cost-sharing payments under the Affordable Care Act is a major question for which
deference is inappropriate).
271. See California v. Trump, 267 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (invoking
separation of powers as a reason to not read appropriations statutes broadly); Burwell, 185
F. Supp. 3d at 174 (arguing that the statute governing appropriations interpretation imposes
a clear statement requirement).
272. See Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 567 U.S. 182, 187–88 (2012) (failing to
mention deference and instead invoking GAO appropriations principles to determine that
the government owed tribes the full cost of provided services).
273. See U.S. Dep’t of the Navy v. Fed. Lab. Rels. Auth., 665 F.3d 1339, 1349 (D.C. Cir.
2012) (stating that the court gives weight but does not defer to GAO, ultimately exercising
independent judgment in interpreting appropriations statutes).
274. Compare Me. Cmty. Health Options v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1308, 1319–21
(2020) (relying on GAO principles to determine that the ACA created a government
obligation to pay insurers), with id. at 1324–25 (committing one paragraph to the relevant
agency’s “response to the riders”).
275. See Dep’t of the Navy, 665 F.3d at 1349 (noting GAO’s legislative connection);
Nevada v. Dep’t of Energy, 400 F.3d 9, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“[W]e give special weight to
[GAO’s] opinions due to its accumulated experience and expertise in the ﬁeld of
government appropriations.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Int’l Union,
United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers v. Donovan, 746 F.2d 855, 861 (D.C.
Cir. 1984))).
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policy aspects of appropriations measures by framing appropriations disputes in terms of broader government contracting and ﬁscal principles.
This may result in interpretations of appropriations measures that poorly
ﬁt the policy contexts in which they are operative, even as it produces a
more coherent body of overall appropriations law.
D. Appropriations and Statutory Interpretation
As this discussion of deference suggests, statutory interpretation is a
public law area where appropriations do receive judicial attention.
Appropriations exceptionalism is common, with courts developing a body
of doctrinal rules speciﬁc to the appropriations context. For instance, the
making of an appropriation must be expressly stated, an interpretive rule
that is statutorily codiﬁed.276 Similarly, although later-passed appropriations legislation can trump earlier substantive legislation, the Supreme
Court has held that the usual presumption against repeals by implication
is especially strong in the appropriations context.277 There is also “a very
strong presumption that if an appropriations act changes substantive law,
it does so only for the ﬁscal year for which the bill was passed.”278 As a
result, if Congress wants to change substantive legislation through an
appropriation it must do so clearly,279 and if it wishes to change substantive
law going forward it must include language of “futurity” such as the word
“hereafter.”280 Courts also construe appropriations measures narrowly
when they arguably conﬂict with authorizing statutes.281 These rules draw
on GAO’s statements of appropriations principles and in turn are codiﬁed

276. 31 U.S.C. § 1301(d) (2018); Off. of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 424
(1990).
277. Me. Cmty. Health Options, 140 S. Ct. at 1323; Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y,
503 U.S. 429, 440 (1992); GAO Red Book, GAO-16-464SP, supra note 53, ch. 2, at 57–58,
76–78.
278. Tin Cup, LLC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 904 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir. 2018)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dep’t, AFL-CIO v.
Martin, 961 F.2d 269, 273 (D.C. Cir. 1992)); see also Minis v. United States, 40 U.S. 423, 445
(1841) (stating that a temporary appropriations act ought not be read as imposing a
provision on “all future appropriations . . . unless it is expressed in the most clear and
positive terms, and where the language admits of no other reasonable interpretation.”).
279. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 619 F.3d 1289,
1296–300 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Congress has the power to effect a repeal through an
appropriations bill—Congress just needs to be clear it is doing so.” (citing United States v.
Will, 449 U.S. 200, 222 (1980))).
280. Tin Cup, 904 F.3d at 1073 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Nat’l Res.
Def. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 421 F.3d 797, 806 n.19 (9th Cir. 2005)); see also United
States v. Vulte, 233 U.S. 509, 524 (1914) (emphasizing the need for “words of prospective
extension”).
281. See, e.g., Calloway v. District of Columbia, 216 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“When
Congress wants to use an appropriations act to limit court authority, it knows precisely how
to do so.”).
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in those statements and applied in GAO’s own decisions.282 The Supreme
Court also has invoked features of the appropriations process to justify
these rules, arguing that members of Congress expect appropriations
legislation to be short-term and therefore are less likely to be focused on
changes to substantive law when voting on appropriations.283
Despite such attention to appropriations, marginalization occurs here
as well. Most of these appropriations-speciﬁc rules downplay the
substantive import of appropriations, making it difficult for Congress to
use appropriations to change governing law. Even general interpretive
doctrines are applied to limit appropriations’ impact.284 Perhaps the prime
example of this is Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill.285 There, Congress
repeatedly had appropriated funds to ﬁnish building a dam whose operation would violate the Endangered Species Act, and statements in the
Appropriations Committee reports made clear that this violation should
not prevent the dam from being completed.286 Nonetheless, the Court
enjoined construction of the dam, arguing that giving weight to the
reports would allow the Appropriations Committee to invade the authorizing committee’s domain and push its policy onto an unsuspecting
Congress.287 Occasionally, courts put more substantive weight on appropriations measures, as the Federal Circuit recently did in concluding that the
risk corridor rider suspended the government’s obligation in the ACA to
make risk corridor payments.288 But the Supreme Court promptly
reversed, holding nearly unanimously that the appropriations measure did
no such thing.289
Indeed, the Court’s concern to limit the substantive impact of appropriations helps explain seeming inconsistencies in its recent approaches
to appropriations measures. In a 2012 decision, Salazar v. Ramah Navajo
Chapter, the Court dismissed the fact that the substantive statute made provision of funds under the Act “subject to the availability of appropriations”
282. See, e.g., Me. Cmty. Health Options, 140 S. Ct. at 1319–21.
283. See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190–91 (1978); Tin Cup, 904 F.3d at 1073.
284. See, e.g., Nevada v. Dep’t of Energy, 400 F.3d 9, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (applying to
appropriations legislation “the ‘general principle of statutory construction,’ that ‘a more
speciﬁc statute will be given precedence over a more general one’” (quoting Busic v. United
States, 446 U.S. 398, 406 (1980))).
285. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
286. Id. at 163–71.
287. Id. at 191–92; see also Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Canonical
Construction and Statutory Revisionism: The Strange Case of the Appropriations Canon, 14
J. Contemp. Legal Issues 669, 676–84 (2005) (sourcing the origin of the appropriations
canon in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill).
288. See Moda Health Plan, Inc. v. United States, 892 F.3d 1311, 1325–27 (Fed. Cir.
2018), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Me. Cmty. Health Options, 140 S. Ct. 1308.
289. See Me. Cmty. Health Options, 140 S. Ct. at 1323–26; see also id. at 1332–34 (Alito,
J., dissenting) (failing to address whether the rider changed the government’s statutory
obligation to pay).
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in concluding that the government’s obligation to pay tribes for their full
costs was not affected by an insufficient appropriation.290 Just eight years
later, however, the Court emphasized that the risk corridor provision did
not contain language conditioning payments on provision of funding,
such as the “subject to the availability of appropriations” language, in holding that the appropriations rider did not alter the government’s obligation
to pay. The Court never acknowledged this inconsistency and cited Salazar
approvingly.291 Yet despite this contrary reasoning, the bottom-line result
in the two cases was the same: The Court refused to read an appropriations
measure as limiting a payment promise contained in an authorization statute, in contexts where services were already provided in reliance on the
payment promises. It is hard not to see a desire to protect expectations
and enforce statutory obligations as driving both decisions, despite their
inconsistency.
Moreover, in developing these appropriations statutory interpretation
doctrines, courts for the most part have not paid close attention to
important aspects of the appropriations process. For example, courts do
not distinguish between annual and permanent appropriations measures,
but the two differ in important ways that appear relevant to how they
should be interpreted.292 Similarly, empirical studies of congressional
drafting practices reveal that members of Congress give particular weight
to appropriations committee reports in understanding appropriations
legislation and also give substantial weight to CBO’s estimates of the
budgetary impact of legislation. Yet courts treat appropriations reports no
differently than other committee reports and do not look to CBO
interpretations of statutory meaning as particularly instructive.293
E.

Appropriations and Political Branch Public Law

There is one public law arena where appropriations play a starring
role: political branch public law. Historically, it was the political branches
that set out the constitutional contours of appropriations, with nineteenthcentury politics marked by constitutional debates over using federal funds

290. 567 U.S. 182, 190–91, 197, 199–200 (2012).
291. Me. Cmty. Health Options, 140 S. Ct. at 1319, 1322–23.
292. See Lawrence, Congress’s Domain, supra note 262, at 1090–91 (arguing that
because Congress is better able to push back on agency implementation and interpretation
of appropriations measures through annual appropriations than permanent appropriations, agency views of annual measures deserve deference, but their views of permanent
measures do not).
293. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the
Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I,
65 Stan. L. Rev. 901, 980–82 (2013); Abbe R. Gluck, Congress, Statutory Interpretation, and
the Failure of Formalism: The CBO Canon and Other Ways that Courts Can Improve on
What They Are Already Trying to Do, 84 U. Chi. L. Rev. 177, 180–81 (2017).
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for internal improvements and presidential impoundments.294 In addition
to the key statutes governing the budget and appropriations process, a
number of other statutes extensively regulate the Treasury, management
of public funds, agency ﬁnancial personnel and accounting, and much
more.295 In response to the Trump Administration’s border wall reprogramming, legislation in the House tightened the ICA and required
greater transparency over apportionment, transfer, and reprogramming
of appropriated funds, among other measures.296 A vast array of administrative issuances further govern appropriations and implement these statutes, such as OMB memos and circulars, GAO decisions and statements of
appropriations principles, and legal interpretations from the Office of
Legal Counsel (OLC) at the DOJ.297 On top of this are norms and practices
long adhered to across the legislative and executive branches.298 Many of
these measures are largely limited to the political branches and as noted
above may not be enforceable in courts.299
Yet the separation between political and judicial public law on
appropriations is easy to exaggerate. Frequently, political branch actors
invoke court decisions in addressing appropriations questions. In
particular, GAO regularly cites and relies on judicial decisions in its
compilation of principles of appropriations law known as the Red Book.300
As a result, many of the judicial doctrines that marginalize appropriations
have the same effect in the political realm. This is especially true of
doctrines limiting the extent to which appropriations measures are read
as changing substantive enactments, which are echoed in GAO
interpretations.301
Moreover, some of this political branch public law of appropriations
is fraying in the face of deep partisan divides. This fraying is evident not
only in the number of recent appropriations disputes appearing in court,
but also in increased deviations from longstanding norms and divisions
between legislative and executive interpretations of appropriations
measures. The Trump Administration’s “position ha[d] become one of
294. See Alison L. LaCroix, The Interbellum Constitution: Federalism in the Long
Founding Moment, 67 Stan. L. Rev. 397, 409–44 (2015).
295. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 101–3907 (2018); supra text accompanying notes 49–56, 66–74.
296. Congressional Power of the Purse Act, H.R. 6628, 116th Cong. §§ 101–105, 201–
214 (2020). Congress also enacted additional budget accountability and transparency
measures. See William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2021, H.R. 6395, 116th Cong., 2d Sess. § 9601 (2020) (enacted).
297. See supra text accompanying notes 75–80; infra text accompanying note 351.
298. See supra text accompanying notes 42–44, 69, 117.
299. See supra text accompanying notes 257–261.
300. See, e.g., GAO Red Book, GAO-16-463SP, supra note 80, ch. 1, at 2 (noting that
GAO would update the Red Book annually “to incorporate new Comptroller General case
law as well as discussions of particularly prominent decisions from the courts”).
301. See, e.g., id., ch. 2, at 76–79.
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open deﬁance” of requirements of congressional consultation and
approval.302 In addition to agencies proceeding with transfers and
reprogramming of funds notwithstanding appropriations committee
opposition, OMB expanded its understanding of Antideﬁciency Act exceptions and in other ways pushed at the limits of accepted appropriations
practices.303 It also asserted its power over what constitutes an
Antideﬁciency Act violation that must be reported to GAO.304 OMB did so
in the face of conﬂicting GAO views, instructing agencies and officials that
GAO determinations are not binding on the executive branch and that
agencies should not report Antideﬁciency Act violations unless the agencies, consulting with OMB, agreed that a violation occurred.305 In short,
the substance of political branch appropriations law appears increasingly
undermined by the same broader forces of political polarization and
expansive assertions of executive power. Whether this trend continues
under the Biden Administration, particularly now that Democrats control
both Congress and the White House, remains to be seen.
III. IS THE MARGINALIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS A PROBLEM?
This account of how appropriations are marginalized in public law
doctrine raises two pressing questions: First, why have appropriations been
pushed to the sidelines of so many public law doctrines? And second, is
this marginalization a problem? These two questions are closely linked, in

302. Molly E. Reynolds & Philip A. Wallach, Am. Enter. Inst., Does the Executive Branch
Control the Power of the Purse? 5 (2020), https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/
10/Does-the-executive-branch-control-the-power-of-the-purse.pdf?x88519 (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review).
303. See Department of the Interior—Activities at National Parks During the Fiscal Year
2019 Lapse in Appropriations, B-330776, 2019 WL 4200991, at *1, *11–12 (Comp. Gen.
Sept. 5, 2019) (concluding that the Department of the Interior violated the Antideﬁciency
Act during the partial shutdown by using resources to pay for expenses that ordinarily would
be covered by National Park Service appropriations); supra text accompanying note 120;
see also Louise Radnosfsky, Much of Federal Government Expected to Keep Running in
Shutdown, Wall St. J. (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/much-of-the-federalgovernment-wouldnt-shut-down-in-a-government-shutdown-1516357801 (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review) (contrasting Obama’s and Trump’s approaches to the Antideﬁciency
Act).
304. See Circular A-11, supra note 75, § 145.8 (instructing agencies to report such
violations only if “the agency, in consultation with OMB, agrees with GAO that a violation
has occurred”).
305. See Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Off. of the President, Memorandum for Agency
General Counsels 1–2 (2019), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/
2019/11/Memo-to-Agencies-on-A-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/QL4L-S9DK] (“When an
agency of the Legislative Branch interprets a law differently than the Executive Branch, the
Executive Branch is not bound by its views . . . . [A]n Executive Branch agency is under no
obligation to report an action it has determined does not constitute an [Antideﬁciency Act]
violation.”); supra text accompanying notes 120–144; see also Agency Reporting of GAO
Determinations of Antideﬁciency Act Violations, B-331295, 2019 WL 4594337, at *1 (Comp.
Gen. Sept. 23, 2019) (disagreeing with OMB’s position).
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that whether the marginalization of appropriations is problematic turns
largely on whether the rationales for marginalization are justiﬁed. This
part identiﬁes three overarching rationales—a view of appropriations as
closely tied to sovereignty; the belief that therefore appropriations should
be left to the purview of the political branches; and a normative prioritization of substantive legislation—and argues that none justify the current
marginalization of appropriations. To the contrary, the minimizing of
appropriations in public law doctrine departs from the importance of
appropriations in the Constitution, undercuts key constitutional values,
and creates a de facto presidential spending authority fundamentally at
odds with the separation of powers.
A.

The Why of Appropriations Marginalization

The numerous examples detailed above highlight the shared theme
of appropriations being pushed to the doctrinal sidelines, but they also
highlight that appropriations’ doctrinal marginalization is not monolithic.
Not only do these examples fall into different methodological camps—
appropriations exceptionalism, silence, assimilation, or jurisdictional
exclusion—but they have signiﬁcantly different impacts in practice. Some
instances operate to limit the practical import of appropriations, such as
appropriations-exceptionalist rules of statutory interpretation that make it
difficult for appropriations measures to change substantive legislation. A
similar result follows from the courts’ general failure to engage with
appropriations in separation of powers analysis. Other doctrinally limiting
moves, however, actually make appropriations a more powerful means of
governmental action. The nonreviewability of agency decisions involving
lump-sum appropriations is a case in point; the effect of this exclusion of
appropriations is to give the executive branch freedom to reallocate funds
(usually with congressional approval) without the risk of litigation.
These examples also reveal different underlying rationales for
appropriations’ marginalization in doctrine. Three rationales repeatedly
arise: a perception of appropriations as primarily an issue for the political
branches; an identiﬁcation of government funds as especially tied to
sovereignty; and a normative prioritization of substantive legislation.
Indeed, the practical impact of an instance of appropriations
marginalization often reﬂects its underlying rationale. Forms of doctrinal
marginalization that operate to enhance appropriations’ practical impact
tend to be based on a perception of appropriations as primarily an issue
for the political branches or an identiﬁcation of government funds as
especially tied to sovereignty. By contrast, the underlying driver when
marginalization limits the practical impact of appropriations is often a
normative prioritization of substantive legislation.
The ﬁrst two of these rationales—the political nature and sovereignty
ties of appropriations—are closely related. Appropriations are seen as a
political prerogative and not for the courts in part because control of the
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federal ﬁsc is closely tied to sovereignty. Thus, in justifying the adjudication
of government funds disputes outside of Article III, the Court has
connected the public rights doctrine “to the traditional principle of
sovereign immunity, which recognizes that the Government may attach
conditions to its consent to be sued” and “draws upon a historical understanding that certain prerogatives were reserved to the political Branches
of Government.”306 Early on, the Appropriations Clause was identiﬁed as
an express constitutional basis for the federal government’s sovereign
immunity in damages actions.307 Granted, sovereign immunity is not limited to suits for money and embodies a broader principle that forcing the
government to be subject to suits by private parties is an affront to its “sovereign dignity.”308 But the Court has insisted that the link between sovereign immunity and a state’s control of its treasury is particularly tight, both
historically and as a matter of democratic principle: Financial independence is essential for the states’ “ability to govern in accordance with the
will of their citizens. Today, as at the founding, the allocation of scarce
resources among competing needs and interests lies at the heart of the
political process.”309
Yet the idea that the allocation of government funds represents a core
prerogative of the political branches surfaces outside the context of
sovereign immunity as well. In Lincoln, it took the form of a pragmatic
assessment of institutional competency. In holding lump-sum allocation
decisions nonreviewable, the Court there emphasized that such decisions
involved complicated balancing of factors and priorities that were
peculiarly within an agency’s expertise and not a court’s.310 This same
emphasis on political prerogatives is also evident in some spending power
cases that reach the merits, with the Court underscoring the government’s

306. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67 (1982) (plurality
opinion) (Brennan, J.); Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18
How.) 272, 283 (1855); see also Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 489 (2011) (emphasizing
the sovereign immunity roots of Murray’s Lessee while acknowledging that the category of
public right has expanded to include instances in which the government is not a party but
the suit is between two private parties over a right that is “integrally related to particular
Federal Government action”).
307. Paul F. Figley & Jay Tidmarsh, The Appropriations Power and Sovereign Immunity,
107 Mich. L. Rev. 1207, 1261–64 (2009) (“Early commentaries on the Constitution . . . drew
an explicit connection between the Appropriations Clause and the sovereign immunity of
the federal government in damage actions.”); see also Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the Federal
Government: Sovereignty, Immunity, and Judicial Independence, 35 Geo. Wash. Int’l L.
Rev. 521, 541–52 (2003) [hereinafter Jackson, Suing the Federal Government] (identifying
several sources for federal sovereign immunity, including not just the Appropriations Clause
but also Congress’s control of federal court jurisdiction and English common law).
308. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999).
309. Id. at 751.
310. Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 193 (1993) (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S.
821, 831 (1985)).
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broad freedom to impose conditions on government funds when using
those funds to advance government policies.311
This discussion highlights that the marginalization of appropriations in public law doctrine is closely linked to the centrality of appropriations in the political branches. Both reflect the identification of
appropriations as inherently political and an arena where courts should
play a limited role. Moreover, despite invoking the political branches
generically and on occasion focusing on executive branch discretion,
appropriations jurisprudence makes clear that control over government
funds falls fundamentally to Congress.312 Indeed, the link between
political prerogatives and sovereign immunity reinforces Congress’s
centrality, as the power to waive sovereign immunity lies with Congress
and not with the executive branch.313
Still, political prerogatives and sovereignty alone do not explain
appropriations’ doctrinal marginalization. After all, governments also set
policy and exercise their sovereignty through substantive legislation and
administrative regulations. But unlike appropriations, these types of
measures lie at the core of public law doctrines, with courts regularly
engaged in policing the legality of such governmental actions. What also
animates the marginalization of appropriations is a view of legislation and
public law that puts primacy on substantive enactments that formally bind
private parties.
This ideal of lawmaking keyed to substantive legislation that coerces
private individuals is particularly evident in separation of powers cases.314
Perhaps most clearly, in Gundy, Justice Gorsuch deﬁned the legislative
power as “the power to adopt generally applicable rules of conduct governing future actions by private persons.”315 That description fails to
account for appropriations measures, which aim at funding the government rather than regulating private actors. As John Harrison has

311. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229,
235 (2000) (stating that “[w]hen the government speaks, for instance to promote its own
policies or to advance a particular idea, it is, in the end, accountable to the electorate and
the political process for its advocacy,” but requiring viewpoint neutrality when the government seeks to create a forum for speech).
312. Off. of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 427–28 (1990); see also Lincoln, 508
U.S. at 193 (emphasizing that Congress can limit executive discretion over funding
allocations through line-item appropriations).
313. Wagstaff v. Dep’t of Educ., 509 F.3d 661, 664 (5th Cir. 2007).
314. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (tying deference to
Congress’s grant to an agency of the power to issue rules with legal force and effect, as well
as the agency’s exercise of that power); Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 446–47
(1998) (putting primacy on changes to formally enacted text and dismissing the President’s
past ability to achieve much the same result in practice using standard appropriations
controls).
315. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2133 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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remarked, Gorsuch’s deﬁnition excludes matters involving the government’s use of public resources, even though such use similarly requires
legislative authorization.316 And the public rights doctrine is premised on
the claim that ordinary separation of powers constraints only apply to
governmental actions that regulate private individuals and property.317
In like vein, the Court has “repeatedly characterized . . . Spending
Clause legislation as ‘much in the nature of a contract,’” precisely because
it becomes operative only upon recipients’ voluntary and knowing
acceptance of funding conditions and not through compulsion alone.318
Relatedly, in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius the Court
made clear that spending conditions qua spending conditions are
unconstitutional if they cross the line from voluntary to coercive.319 Much
spending power litigation involves state and local governments and thus
lacks the emphasis on binding private parties evident in the separation of
powers context. Yet these cases reveal a shared belief that coercion is the
focus of constitutional concern and add an understanding of federal funds
as generally noncoercive.
Judicial accounts of the legislative process also display an emphasis on
general substantive enactments.320 The Court paints the national legislative process as structured to make lawmaking deliberate and difficult; “legislation should not be enacted unless it has been carefully and fully considered by the Nation’s elected officials.”321 Appropriations also go
316. John C. Harrison, Executive Discretion in Administering the Government’s Rights
and the Delegation Problem 1–2, 4, 10 (Sept. 3, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3686204
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (unpublished manuscript) (noting that Congress’s
legislative power under Article I is not limited to the ability to “adopt general and
prospective rules” but also includes its postal and general spending powers).
317. See Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 559,
569–70 (2007) (explaining that, traditionally, only actions against private individuals or
property necessitated the involvement of courts).
318. NFIB, 567 U.S. 519, 578 (2012) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Barnes v. Gorman,
536 U.S. 181, 186 (2002)).
319. Id. at 578–79; see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the
Spending Clause after NFIB, 101 Geo. L.J. 861, 864, 871–73 (2013) (noting that,
notwithstanding NFIB’s willingness to ﬁnd coercion based on practical ﬁnancial pressure,
courts generally take a more formalist approach to what counts as binding).
320. See, e.g., Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Earmarking Earmarking, 49 Harv. J. on
Legis. 249, 250 (2012) (emphasizing that, when determining whether earmarks constitute
desirable legislative activity, judicial “interpretations . . . often pivot on normative
presumptions about the lawmaking process—including in some instances the idea that
general authorizing legislation is preferable to targeted appropriations as a means of
shaping substantive policy outcomes”).
321. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 949 (1983); see also Gundy
v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2134 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Framers “[r]estrict[ed] the task of legislating to one branch characterized by difficult and
deliberative processes” to “promote fair notice and the rule of law” as well as protect liberty
and minority rights).
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through the bicameralism and presentment process, but in the case of
appropriations the emphasis is instead on the need to enact legislation to
avoid funding gaps rather than on the dangers of too-frequent enactments. Indeed, concern not to burden the appropriations process with
substantive disputes contributed to the early separation of substantive
measures and appropriations legislation through House and Senate
rules.322 In Hill, the Court expressly invoked these process contrasts to
defend a higher threshold before appropriations measures are found to
alter substantive legislation, arguing that “[w]hen voting on appropriations measures, legislators are entitled to operate under the assumption
that the funds will be devoted to purposes which are lawful . . . . Without
such an assurance, every appropriations measure would be pregnant with
prospects of altering substantive legislation . . . .”323 As Matthew
McCubbins and Daniel Rodriguez have argued, Hill also took a decidedly
dim view of using the appropriations process to set policy.324 According to
the Court, the “Appropriations Committees had no jurisdiction over the
subject of endangered species, much less did they conduct the type of
extensive hearings which preceded passage of the . . . substantive
legislation” that would be amended; “there is no indication that Congress
as a whole was aware” of the issue.325 Therefore, the repeated explicit
statements in the Committee’s reports that the dam should be built
represented nothing more than the “personal views” of Committee
members.326
B.

Evaluating the Marginalization of Appropriations

The marginalization of appropriations in public law creates a
substantial disconnect between governance reality and public law. Such a
disconnect is hardly unique to appropriations. A number of scholars have
detailed how existing statutes and public law doctrines ill-ﬁt actual
practices in Congress and the executive branch. Dan Farber and Anne
Joseph O’Connell have gone so far as to identify a “lost world of
administrative law” that rests on assumptions no longer true of how the
administrative state primarily functions.327 Abbe Gluck has made a similar
322. Chuzi, supra note 59, at 999–1000.
323. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190 (1978); see also Robertson v. Seattle
Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 440 (1992) (“[A]lthough repeals by implication are especially
disfavored in the appropriations context, Congress nonetheless may amend substantive law
in an appropriations statute, as long as it does so clearly.” (citation omitted)).
324. McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 287, at 683, 687–90.
325. Hill, 437 U.S. at 191–92.
326. Id. at 193.
327. Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of Administrative Law,
92 Tex. L. Rev. 1137, 1140 (2014); see also Abbe R. Gluck, Anne Joseph O’Connell & Rosa
Po, Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 1789, 1792,
1852–54 (2015) (explaining the mismatch between modern reliance on unorthodox
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claim about Congress and statutory interpretation, and the point is also
true of actual congressional–presidential relationships and constitutional
law.328 A variety of explanations are offered for these divides, ranging from
the effects of political polarization and congressional inaction, to the need
for greater operational efficiency, to the fact that current doctrines
emerged in an era in which different practices and concerns dominated.329
Whatever the causal explanation, the repeated theme is one of deep
disconnect between public law and the way government institutions
actually function today.330 Public law on the books is increasingly not
public law in practice.
Whether such disconnects justify revising public law is a harder
question.331 In particular, to the extent the Constitution puts primacy on
substantive enactments, or leaves appropriations to the political branches
and minimizes the courts’ role, then the disconnect between doctrine and
reality in appropriations may be proper. The current marginalization of
appropriations might also be thought normatively preferable, by
increasing political accountability and public deliberation over policy and
also enhancing the rule of law.
In fact, however, the current doctrinal marginalization of appropriations is at odds with constitutional structure, disempowers Congress, and
undermines political accountability as well as the rule of law. While legislative and regulatory reforms are unquestionably essential in addressing
appropriations abuses, the courts are also a necessary element of the
rulemaking and the now-outdated views of regulation that underpin administrative law);
Michael S. Greve & Ashley C. Parrish, Administrative Law Without Congress, 22 Geo. Mason
L. Rev. 501, 504 (2015) (examining “agency ‘rewrites’ of statutes, . . . procedural shell games
and manipulation; and . . . broad regulatory waivers”).
328. See Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, supra note 95, at 87–103 (describing how
presumptions used in statutory interpretation contain outdated assumptions about
Congress and the drafting process); Gluck et al., supra note 327, at 1850–52 (describing
how, despite the Court’s claims otherwise, presumptions in statutory interpretation are not
well tailored to unorthodox lawmaking); see also Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes,
Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 2311, 2349–68 (2006) (describing how
separation of powers is grounded in an understanding of the branches as “the locus of
democratic competition,” in contrast to the reality, where parties are that locus).
329. See Farber & O’Connell, supra note 327, at 1155–67 (discussing reasons); Greve &
Parrish, supra note 327, at 502–03 (discussing congressional inaction and hyperlegislation);
Levinson & Pildes, supra note 328, at 2314–15 (discussing the rise of political parties);
Michael A. Livermore & Daniel Richardson, Administrative Law in an Era of Partisan
Volatility, 69 Emory L.J. 1, 3–6 (2019) (emphasizing the out-of-date historical and political
context in which current doctrines emerged).
330. Richard Pildes has argued that such a disconnect is endemic to public law doctrine.
See Richard H. Pildes, Institutional Formalism and Realism in Constitutional and Public
Law, 2013 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 2–5.
331. See Gluck et al., supra note 327, at 1850–64 (suggesting that the answer turns on
whether the goal of doctrine should be to “reﬂect how policymaking actually happens,” or
to “advance [values such as] accountability or the rule of law”).
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solution. Recognition of these points supports greater incorporation of
appropriations into public law doctrine and greater legal acceptance of
appropriations’ policy-setting role.
1. The Constitutional Importance of Congress’s Appropriations Power. — A
good place to begin assessing the doctrinal marginalization of appropriations is with the Constitution. Constitutional text, structure, and history all
make clear that the appropriations power is one of Congress’s central
authorities and particularly essential in ensuring the power of Congress
vis-à-vis the executive branch.
The ﬁscal provisions of the Constitution were critical to its adoption.
Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress lacked a power to tax and
was dependent on requisitioning the states for revenue—requisitions that
frequently went unpaid.332 The need for a consistent source of revenue
and means by which the federal government could pay its debts “drove the
constitutional Revolution of 1787.”333 Congress’s powers to tax and
appropriate are not simply economically intertwined but also textually
conjoined at the outset of the list of Congress’s enumerated powers. Both
powers are presented in terms that appear very broad and have been so
read by the Supreme Court.334 Congress is given power to “lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the
common Defence and general Welfare,” with taxes subject to a few
additional limitations.335
The Constitution then goes further, specifying in the Appropriations
Clause that such spending requires an appropriation “by Law.”336 The reinforcement provided by the Appropriations Clause is textually unnecessary.
Simply vesting the spending power in Congress would be sufficient to give
Congress control over appropriations, and the requirement that Congress
act by law is a necessary concomitant of the Bicameralism and Presentment
Clauses, which mandate passage by both houses and consent from the
President (or overriding the President’s veto by a supermajority of both
332. Michael J. Klarman, The Framers’ Coup: The Making of the United States
Constitution 15–21 (2016).
333. Roger H. Brown, Redeeming the Republic: Federalists, Taxation, and the Origins
of the Constitution 3 (1993); Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 Colum.
L. Rev. 1, 6–7 (1999) (“The Federalists . . . would never have launched their campaign
against . . . the Articles of Confederation[] had it not been for its failure to provide adequate
ﬁscal powers for the national government.”).
334. See supra text accompanying notes 213–217 (discussing the spending power).
Some scholars insist that these terms are far more conﬁning than longstanding doctrine
admits. See, e.g., David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 Duke L.J. 1, 49–53 (1994)
(arguing that “one can be very easily seduced into thinking that any ‘general Welfare’
objective is an enumerated one”).
335. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. The additional limitations are a requirement that taxes be
uniform, id.; a requirement that direct taxes be apportioned, id. § 2; and a prohibition on
taxing exports from a state, id. § 9.
336. Id. § 9, cl. 7.
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houses) for all legislative action.337 This textual reinforcement of
Congress’s role—something the Constitution omits for other congressional powers—shows the importance that the Framers assigned to popular legislative control over government funds.338 The requirement that
appropriations be made by law also puts the onus on the executive branch
to identify affirmative congressional authorization before obligating
funds; congressional silence or the lack of a congressional prohibition
does not suffice. Justice Story acknowledged this point early on, stating
that “[i]f it were otherwise, the executive would possess an unbounded
power over the public purse of the nation; and might apply all its monied
resources at his pleasure.”339
The real signiﬁcance of the Appropriations Clause is thus what it
signals about the Constitution’s structure: The Appropriations Clause
imposes congressional control of government funds as a critical check on
the executive branch.340 Indeed, this function is built into the Clause.
337. Id. § 7; Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952 (1983); see
also Stith, supra note 34, at 1349–50 (“If the Constitution thus strictly forbids ‘executive
appropriation’ of public funds, the exercise by Congress of its power of the purse is a
structural imperative.” (footnotes omitted)).
338. Gregory Sidak rejects the argument that the Appropriations Clause’s requirement
of appropriations by law reinforces congressional control, emphasizing that “‘[l]aw’ can
consist of the Constitution, legislation, treaties, the common law, and contract” and that
“one could argue that the appropriations clause establishes the general rule that when any
one of the three branches (not just Congress) spends public funds, it must have a legal
authorization for doing so.” Sidak, supra note 34, at 1168, 1170–71. But Sidak’s argument
ignores the fact that Article I, § 8 expressly grants Congress the power to spend, a power not
given to any other branch. Against this backdrop, the reference to law in the Appropriations
Clause logically means legislation, as that is the means by which Congress acts. This reading
of “law” as “legislation” is further reinforced by the Clause’s surfacing in Article I, which up
through Section 9 (where the Clause is found) addresses only the legislative branch. See
U.S. Const. art. 1, §§ 1–9. And all the other references to “law” in Article I refer to
legislation. See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. I, § 2 (providing that representation shall be
apportioned based on an “actual Enumeration” undertaken “in such Manner” as “the
Congress of the United States . . . shall by Law direct”); id. § 4 (“The Times, Places and
Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each
State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such
Regulations . . . .”); id. § 7 (discussing the various ways that a bill can “become a Law”).
339. 3 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution § 1342, at 213–14 (Boston,
Hillard, Gray & Co. 1833). Story praised this assignment of appropriations control to
Congress:
“As all the taxes raised from the people, as well as the revenues arising
from other source, are to be applied to the discharge of the expenses, and
debts, and other engagements of the government, it is highly proper, that
congress should possess the power to decide, how and when any money
should be applied for these purposes.”
Id. at 213.
340. See Edward S. Corwin, The Constitution and What It Means Today 134 (14th ed.
1978) (describing Congress’s appropriations power as “the most important single curb” on
the President); see also Stith, supra note 34, at 1349 (arguing that “a primary signiﬁcance
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Unlike Congress’s regulatory authorities, which directly target private
action and impose duties on government to implement substantive
legislative regimes, the Appropriations Clause is focused ﬁrst and foremost
on the government itself. This is not to suggest that Congress does not use
appropriations to affect private action—of course it does. But the central
aim of appropriations is providing the government with the funds needed
to operate. Moreover, particularly when combined with the practice of
annual or time-limited appropriations, the Clause ensures that the
executive branch must continuously secure congressional support for its
chosen courses of action.341 As Josh Chafetz has emphasized, the result is
to give Congress critical leverage over government policy.342
The history of the Appropriations Clause also shows the importance
of legislative appropriations control and the Clause’s role as a check on
the executive. Along with the Origination Clause, which requires revenueraising bills to originate in the House, the Appropriations Clause was
added as part of the great compromise that combined popular
representation in the House with equal state representation in the
Senate.343 Debates from the Constitutional Convention make clear that the
Framers agreed that control of the public ﬁsc must lie with the legislature
and was a preeminent power.344 Such agreement on the need for legislative
control of the purse is not surprising in light of Parliament’s historical use
of appropriations to rein in the British monarchy, as well as the practice in
early state constitutions of granting the state legislature broad control over
state ﬁnances and state treasurers.345 James Madison put the point plainly
in Federalist No. 58, where he wrote that the “power over the purse may,
in fact, be regarded as the most complete and effectual weapon with which
of the appropriations clause . . . lies in what it takes away from Congress: the option not to
require legislative appropriations prior to expenditure.”). For the contrary view that
Congress lacks any broad power of the purse with which to check the President and that the
Appropriations Clause was simply intended to ensure ﬁscal responsibility, see Sidak, supra
note 34, at 1164–83.
341. See Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, supra note 37, at 62; Price, supra note 33, at
367–69.
342. Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, supra note 37, at 66–73; see also Josh Chafetz,
Opinion, Don’t Be Fooled, Trump Is a Winner in the Supreme Court Tax Case, N.Y. Times
(July 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/09/opinion/trump-taxes-supremecourt-.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (explaining how Congress could have
used its “power of the purse” to compel President Trump to release his tax information).
343. Figley & Tidmarsh, supra note 307, at 1248–52 (describing the legislative history of
the Appropriations Clause at the Constitutional Convention).
344. Id. at 1248–55; see also Banks & Raven-Hansen, supra note 37, at 27–32 (describing
discussion of appropriations in the Convention and during ratiﬁcation); Michael W.
McConnell, The President Who Would Not Be King: Executive Power Under the
Constitution 101 (2020) (“It was undisputed the executive would have no prerogative power
to tax, spend, or borrow.”).
345. Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, supra note 37, at 45–55; Casper, supra note 47,
at 3–8.
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any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the
people . . . .”346 And members of Congress were quick to try to use this
weapon of inﬂuence, with efforts to assert congressional appropriations
control through itemized appropriations beginning in the last years of the
Washington Administration.347
Although few dispute Congress’s primacy in appropriations, more
controversy exists over whether the Constitution’s assignment of appropriations to Congress precludes the President from exercising any independent spending power. Notwithstanding the Appropriations Clause,
Presidents have made unauthorized expenditures since the Founding—
sometimes seeking subsequent congressional approval.348 They have also
long challenged some legislative limits on appropriated funds as intruding
on constitutionally granted presidential powers.349 In his famous 1981
opinion on the Antideﬁciency Act, Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti
stated—without further elaboration—that “[m]anifestly, Congress could
not deprive the President of [a constitutional] power by purporting to
deny him the minimum obligational authority sufficient to carry this
power into effect.”350 Interestingly, however, the executive branch has on
occasion rejected broad claims of presidential power over governmental
funds. A prime example is William Rehnquist’s opinion, when head of
OLC, disclaiming presidential impoundment authority in the face of a
congressional directive to spend, despite presidential impoundment
practices dating back to the eighteenth century.351

346. The Federalist No. 58, at 359 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1st ed. 1961).
347. See Wilmerding, supra note 36, at 20–49.
348. Id. at 4–19.
349. Price, supra note 33, at 373–78; see also Legis. Prohibiting Spending for
Delegations to U.N. Agencies Chaired by Countries that Support Int’l Terrorism, 33 Op.
O.L.C. 221, 221 (2009) (concluding that a limit in an appropriations act prohibiting
spending funds for U.S. delegation to certain United Nations bodies unconstitutionality
infringed on the President’s constitutional power to conduct foreign relations and may be
disregarded); Memorial of Captain Meigs, 9 Op. Att’y Gen. 462, 468–69 (1860) (stating, in
the course of interpreting an appropriations provision, that Congress could not interfere
with the President’s constitutional power to determine “what officer shall perform any
particular duty”).
350. Auth. for the Continuance of Gov’t Functions During a Temp. Lapse in
Appropriations, 43 Op. Att’y Gen. 293, 297, 299 (1981); see also Memorandum from Walter
Dellinger, Assistant Att’y Gen., Off. of Legal Couns. to the Dir., Off. of Mgmt. & Budget,
Gov’t Operations in the Event of a Lapse in Appropriations 4–5 (Aug. 16, 1995),
https://www.justice.gov/opinion/file/844116/download [https://perma.cc/9DDP-WWPT]
(agreeing with the 1981 opinion’s exception to the Antideﬁciency Act for presidential
powers).
351. Presidential Authority to Impound Funds Appropriated for Assistance to Federally
Impacted Schools, 1 Op. O.L.C. Supp. 303, 309–11 (1969); see also Memorandum from
Homer S. Cummings to the President, Presidential Authority to Direct Departments and
Agencies to Withhold Expenditures from Appropriations Made 16 (May 27, 1937),
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Courts have not ruled on whether any such presidential spending
authority exists.352 This is perhaps another sign of appropriations’
doctrinal marginalization but also reﬂects the fact that the political
branches usually have avoided head-on disputes over appropriations.353
Constitutional scholarship on the question is divided. In response to Iran–
Contra, Kate Stith concluded that the President and executive officials
could never spend without legislative authorization,354 while Gregory Sidak
argued that Presidents can spend the minimum amount they deem
necessary in order to wield presidential prerogatives or satisfy presidential
duties, even if Congress has denied funds or provided a lesser amount.355
More often, claims for presidential spending authority fall somewhere in
between these extremes. Recently, for example, Zachary Price has argued
that the President can spend without congressional authorization only
with respect to what Price terms “resource-independent” powers that the
President can exercise personally and that serve to check the legislative
branch or assert presidential control over the executive.356 Yet even moderate efforts run into difficulties, given the lack of a textual basis for the
lines they draw and the presence of conﬂicting structural imperatives.357
https://www.justice.gov/ﬁle/19191/download [https://perma.cc/6DAF-98CU] (“Opinions of the Attorney General indicate that presidential power over appropriations must ﬁnd
its source in legislation.”).
352. Price, supra note 33, at 379. One decision that arguably comes close is United States
v. Klein, which invalidated a provision in an appropriations bill stripping jurisdiction over
some claims on the grounds, among others, that the provision “impair[ed]” the effect of a
presidential pardon. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147–48 (1871). But Klein is a notoriously opaque
decision more focused on congressional power to strip court jurisdiction, and it discusses
appropriations only in passing. See id. at 144, 146–47. A more express rejection of the
proposition of independent presidential spending authority came from Justice McReynolds
dissenting in Myers v. United States. See 272 U.S. 52, 187 (1926) (McReynolds, J., dissenting)
(“He must utilize the force which Congress gives. He cannot, without permission, appoint
the humblest clerk or expend a dollar of the public funds.”).
353. For instance, despite questioning the constitutionality of an appropriations
provision prohibiting the use of funds to transfer Guantánamo Bay detainees, President
Obama generally complied with its terms. Price, supra note 33, at 374–75.
354. Stith, supra note 34, at 1345, 1348–51, 1356–61; see also Prakash, supra note 196,
at 704 (“The President may wish to have funds to defray the projected expenses of the
executive branch, but he has no constitutional right to them.”).
355. Sidak, supra note 34, at 1166–73, 1185–94.
356. Price, supra note 33, at 361–63. Price further contends that Congress cannot use
its appropriations power to manipulate how the President wields her constitutional powers.
Id. at 404–13; see also Banks & Raven-Hansen, supra note 37, at 160–63, 166–68 (denying
that the President has inherent spending authority and assessing the constitutionality of
spending limits by balancing the extent of intrusion on presidential constitutional functions
against congressional need).
357. As a case in point, Price’s intriguing account runs into the difficulty that no
presidential powers are truly and distinctively resource independent. Meaningful exercise
of the veto, pardon, and appointment powers, for example, entails resources and staff. Price
acknowledges as much and focuses instead on the formal exercise of these powers, which
he argues a President could do alone. Price, supra note 33, at 390–91, 406–07. But it is also
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The claim that Presidents enjoy broad independent authority to
spend as they deem necessary is impossible to square with the
Appropriations Clause’s text and history. Contrary to the Civiletti
Memorandum’s assertion, even a more limited presidential authority to
obligate the minimal level of funds objectively necessary to wield express
presidential powers is far from “manifest[].”358 To be sure, allowing
Congress carte blanche to prevent the President from exercising expressly
granted powers through funding denials is also constitutionally troubling,
with its theoretical potential to undermine the ability of Presidents to perform their constitutional functions.359 But the best way to accommodate
these dueling constitutional imperatives may well be to conclude that
Congress is constitutionally obliged to provide the funds needed for the
President to function effectively, not that the President can claim
constitutional authority to spend unauthorized funds when Congress fails
to act. In her seminal work on the appropriations power, Stith made a
structural argument for such a nonjudicially enforceable duty, contending
that “Congress is obliged to provide public funds for constitutionally
mandated activities—both obligations imposed on the government
generally and independent constitutional activities of the President.”360
Even accepting that some independent presidential spending
authority exists, however, it is operative at the margins. Hence, this debate
should not obscure the fundamental thrust of the Appropriations Clause
as a central mechanism of congressional empowerment. Correspondingly,
the rationales for appropriations marginalization in public law doctrine
should be assessed, at least in part, on the extent to which they accord with
this congressional empowering function.
2. The Illegitimacy of Prioritizing Substantive Statutes. — This constitutional backdrop undercuts those forms of appropriations marginalization
possible to imagine the President formally undertaking direct law enforcement, albeit
poorly, or—to name two early functions of the early American state—providing customs
guidance or deciding on applications for land grants. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Creating the
Administration Constitution: The Lost One Hundred Years of American Administrative Law
34 (2012). More persuasive is Price’s emphasis on whether a presidential power operates as
a check on Congress and whether Congress is seeking to manipulate the exercise of
presidential powers. Price, supra note 33, at 395, 405–06. But one could argue that these
factors resolve to the familiar if amorphous inquiry into “the extent to which [a legislative
restriction] prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned
functions.” Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).
358. Auth. for the Continuance of Gov’t Functions During a Temp. Lapse in
Appropriations, 43 Op. Att’y Gen. 293, 299 (1981). Constitutional scholar Charles Black
famously stated that “Congress could . . . reduce the president’s staff to one secretary for
answering social correspondence.” Charles L. Black, Jr., The Working Balance of the
American Political Departments, 1 Hastings Const. L.Q. 13, 15 (1974).
359. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988) (“[T]he real question is whether
the removal restrictions are of such a nature that they impede the President’s ability to
perform his constitutional duty.”).
360. Stith, supra note 34, at 1348–52.
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that are based on prioritizing substantive statutes over appropriations
measures. Provision of Congress’s new substantive authorities, especially
the power to regulate foreign and interstate commerce, was also a central
concern of the Framers.361 But acknowledging appropriations’ constitutional importance does not entail subordinating Congress’s other authorities. The claim is instead simply that the policy choices Congress makes
using its appropriations power deserve equal stature. Indeed, despite
rivalries between authorization and appropriations committees, the
relationship between Congress’s substantive and appropriations powers is
more supportive when viewed from the perspective of Congress as a
whole.362 In particular, appropriations can serve to reinforce Congress’s
substantive authorities by providing ongoing avenues for congressional
control of policy in between enactment of substantive measures. In a world
marked by broad delegations of substantive authority to the executive
branch, the need to secure annual appropriations “preserve[s]
congressional inﬂuence over the executive’s implementation of permanent programs.”363 Appropriations also may allow for discrete policy
adjustments without opening up the broader policy for revision.364
This suggests a broader ﬂaw in the prioritization of substantive
statutes over appropriations. Underlying this prioritization is a misguided
understanding of lawmaking that puts primacy on initial enactments. But
in fact, lawmaking is a far more iterative and ongoing process, with
Congress responding to executive branch implementation and policies
and the executive branch in turn responding to Congress. Appropriations
measures are a critical part of that ongoing process—along with oversight,
informal legislative–executive interactions, appropriations authorizations,
and statutory amendments. Taking appropriations seriously thus allows for
a fuller and more accurate understanding of our constitutional system for
making law.
a. Political Accountability. — Those prioritizing Congress’s substantive
authorities often justify doing so on political accountability grounds. A
familiar critique of policy-based appropriations riders is that they are
adopted by appropriations committees whose members and staff have less
expertise in the substantive area in question.365 In addition, the time
restrictions of the appropriations process offer little opportunity to
361. See Klarman, supra note 332, at 21–25, 129.
362. Cf. Black, supra note 358, at 15 (“And underlying all the powers of Congress is the
appropriations power . . . .”).
363. Lawrence, Disappropriation, supra note 30, at 54, 58–60; see also Chafetz,
Congress’s Constitution, supra note 37, at 61–66 (“[I]ncreased budgetary capacity gives
Congress more power to affect non-ﬁscal policy.”); Beermann, supra note 30, at 85–90
(discussing Congress’s use of appropriations riders to supervise the execution of federal
laws).
364. See McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 287, at 705–06.
365. See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 90, at 653–56.
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ventilate issues or explore alternatives, and members often vote on vast
omnibus appropriations bills without knowing what they contain.366 Moreover, sometimes the appropriations process can seem like crass politics at
its worst, ﬁlled with leadership backroom deals and logrolling to get members of Congress on board.367 By contrast, authorizing legislation—
whether in the form of organic statutes or periodic appropriations authorizations—originates with the legislative committee that has substantive
responsibility for the relevant subject area. Not only do its members and
staff have greater knowledge of the ﬁeld, they are more connected to the
relevant stakeholders and programmatic agency staff, and the slower process of enactment for authorization measures allows more opportunity for
investigation and consideration.368 The greater deliberation and debate
connected to substantive enactments are also said to ensure that members
of Congress are aware of the policy being enacted and allow broader popular engagement.369 These arguments connect to the Constitution’s
concern with ensuring deliberation in lawmaking, so as “to protect the
whole people from improvident laws” by ensuring “that the legislative
power would be exercised only after opportunity for full study and debate
in separate settings.”370
It’s worth noting, however, that other scholars have questioned these
characterizations, arguing that in fact the Appropriations Committees are
more representative of Congress, appropriations bills are more bipartisan,
and the appropriations process is in some ways more transparent and open
than are authorizing committees and legislation.371 Recent experience
with earmarks provides a good illustration of this point. For many,
earmarks—speciﬁc allocations of funds at the behest of a member of
Congress as the price of the member’s support for appropriations bills—
are the epitome of corrupt politics and wasteful spending. Yet some
scholars argue that singling out earmarks for condemnation of this score
366. See, e.g., Luke Broadwater, Jesse Drucker & Rebecca R. Ruiz, Buried in Pandemic
Aid Bill: Billions to Soothe the Richest, N.Y. Times (Dec. 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.
com/2020/12/22/us/politics/whats-in-the-covid-relief-bill.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia
Law Review) (describing a rushed COVID-19 stimulus bill that lawmakers could not read in
advance).
367. See Sinclair, supra note 74, at 111–14, 117–20; Lazarus, supra note 90, at 650; Price,
supra note 33, at 368–69.
368. See Lazarus, supra note 90, at 653–61; see also Adler & Walker, supra note 164, at
1956; Devins, supra note 94, at 457–58; Chuzi, supra note 59, at 1005–07.
369. See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S 153, 190–91 (1978); see also Elizabeth
Garrett, Rethinking the Structures of Decisionmaking in the Federal Budget Process, 35
Harv. J. on Legis. 387, 425–26 (1998) (“[T]he formulation of the federal budget . . . is a
complex process in which important decisions can be hidden in omnibus bills or through
the use of dense, technical language . . . . In short, the complexity and immensity of
budgeting undermine the value of political accountability.”).
370. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
371. See, e.g., McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 287, at 695–706.
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is unjustiﬁed; corruption in the form of undue inﬂuence and lobbying by
regulated interests is often at play in substantive legislation as well, if less
transparent and acknowledged.372 Moreover, while enactment of an
earmark ban in 2011 did not remove corruption from politics, it did serve
to make enacting legislation more difficult, by denying legislators a central
tool for obtaining buy-in from lawmakers.373
Even if the claimed political accountability advantages of authorization statutes are real, such differences do not justify courts prioritizing
substantive enactments as a constitutional matter. The constitutional concern with deliberation is not free-ﬂoating but instead derives from the
bicameralism and presentment process for legislation.374 That process
applies to both substantive and appropriations measures. As important,
the Constitution leaves the choice of procedures for enacting legislation
beyond bicameralism and presentment entirely up to Congress.375 This
means that Congress gets to decide whether to set policy through substantive enactments or appropriations and also could provide for greater deliberation of policy measures attached to appropriations if it so chose. If
Congress hasn’t done so, no constitutional basis exists for courts to secondguess Congress’s choices.
A potentially stronger argument for prioritizing substantive enactments is that the House and Senate, exercising their procedural authority,
have long had rules barring legislating through appropriations.376 But
these rules contain many exceptions and are frequently waived, and if
thereby inapplicable should not get interpretive weight.377 Furthermore, if
Congress is now choosing to set policy through appropriations, then
respecting Congress’s exercise of its constitutional prerogatives prohibits
courts from enforcing congressional rules to which Congress itself no
longer adheres.

372. Cuéllar, supra note 320, at 277; see also Russell W. Mills & Nicole Kalaf-Hughes,
Exit Earmarks, Enter Lettermarks, R Street Policy Study, Jan. 2017, at 2–5 (“Despite the ban
on earmarks, political scientists would argue that lawmakers still face electoral pressure to
secure federal funding for their districts.”).
373. See Mills & Kalaf-Hughes, supra note 372, at 2–3; Cuéllar, supra note 320, at 254–
55. But see Andrew H. Sidman, Pork Barrel Politics: How Government Spending
Determines Elections in a Polarized Era 131 (2019) (questioning the extent to which
lawmakers will trade votes for earmarks under polarization).
374. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 950–51; John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary
Interpretation, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 1939, 1982–83 (2011) (“By carving up the lawmaking
power . . . [bicameralism and presentment] appears to promote several overlapping interests: . . . [I]t restrains momentary passions by promoting caution and deliberation . . . .”
(footnote omitted)).
375. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its
Proceedings . . . .”); Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 671 (1892).
376. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
377. See Chuzi, supra note 59, at 1003–04.
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Equally important, comparative assessment of political accountability
cannot be made in a theoretical vacuum. The argument for prioritizing
substantive measures based on their functional advantages fails to account
for contemporary governance realities of deep partisan polarization and
divisiveness in Congress.378 Setting policy by substantive legislation may
well be the preferred course, and Congress still enacts many substantive
measures.379 Realistically, however, substantive legislative enactments are
very difficult now for many contentious policy areas.380 If in practice appropriations measures are a central mechanism by which Congress is able to
act today, then appropriations are a better policymaking tool for Congress
than substantive enactments alone. Under these circumstances, prioritizing substantive enactments over more contemporaneous policy choices
contained in appropriations measures serves to disempower the current
Congress compared to its predecessors. Moreover, if appropriations are
the terrain on which policy is actually determined, then public law’s focus
on authorization statutes and processes obscures power realities and misdirects public attention. Public law doctrine would better serve accountability goals by acknowledging reality and potentially spurring changes to
improve the policy-setting capacity of the appropriations process.381
b. The Rule of Law. — A separate argument for prioritizing substantive
enactments is that doing so advances the rule of law by protecting reliance
and helping ensure the government lives up to its funding commitments.
This rule of law concern underlies the Court’s special resistance to implied
repeal by appropriations statutes, especially when parties provided services
based on statutory promises of payment. But the same concern can exist
when a program promises permanent beneﬁts yet is funded on an annual
basis and Congress fails to provide adequate funding.382 Indeed, arguably
a similar concern exists when Congress imposes substantive responsibilities on agencies and then massively underfunds them. Even when the
national government is not unfairly proﬁting from services it has not paid
for, a wide array of actors may end up relying on the government to perform promised tasks to their detriment.

378. See supra text accompanying notes 86–90.
379. See Adler & Walker, supra note 164, at 1957; Chuzi, supra note 59, at 1019–24;
Sean Farhang, Legislative Capacity and Administrative Power Under Divided Polarization
8–13 (Oct. 15, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3712521 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review) (unpublished manuscript).
380. See McCarty, supra note 87, at 223–24, 233–36; Jody Freeman & David B. Spence,
Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 2, 4, 14–16 (2014); see also Craig Volden
& Alan E. Wiseman, Legislative Effectiveness in the United States Congress: The Lawmakers
123–55 (2014) (emphasizing that while Congress is able to overcome partisanship on some
issues, other issues remain intractable).
381. Cf. Pasachoff, The President’s Budget, supra note 24, at 2251–61 (emphasizing the
need for greater transparency from the entities that execute appropriations).
382. Lawrence, Disappropriation, supra note 30, at 47–51.
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Although these reliance and fairness concerns are quite real, it is hard
to justify appropriations marginalization on rule of law grounds. To begin
with, there is a tension between these reliance and fairness concerns on
the one hand and political accountability on the other. In essence, the
concern is that it is too easy for Congress to change policy through appropriations, but that very ability to change policy with relative ease enhances
political accountability.383 Lawrence has sought to reconcile this tension by
emphasizing the political accountability costs of courts mistakenly concluding that an appropriations statute denied funding for a statutory obligation when that was not what Congress and the President intended. He
argues that to avoid thereby frustrating “the will of . . . Congress as
expressed in a clear underlying permanent legislative commitment[,] . . .
courts should presume when interpreting ambiguous appropriations that
Congress always pays its debts.”384 Yet such a presumption would simply
trade one political accountability hit for another, namely the risk that
courts then would downplay congressional efforts to change substantive
law through appropriations. An approach more likely to approximate congressional intent on the whole would be for courts to interpret the appropriations measure at issue without presumptions either way.
More broadly, privileging substantive enactments over appropriations
can undermine the rule of law by increasing the risk of legal system
inconsistency. The ACA risk corridor program provides a case in point.
There, Congress both imposed funding obligations on the government
and clearly prohibited the government from meeting that obligation
through the risk corridor rider. Reading a later-in-time appropriations
measure as altering a payment promise may actually advance rule of law
concerns by removing such contradictions. Indeed, the Federal Circuit
appears to have made a move along these lines, arguing that Congress
would not intend the risk corridor funding obligation to exist in “ﬁscal
limbo.”385 Of course, that leaves the substantial inequity of plans incurring
the substantial ﬁnancial costs of participating in the ACA exchanges only
to have the government renege on its promise to pay after the fact. But
unless the government’s action amounted to a regulatory taking or due
process violation, this inequity is one for Congress to remedy or avoid
causing in the ﬁrst place.
Appropriations marginalization undermines the rule of law in other
ways as well. In the form of jurisdictional exclusion, appropriations
marginalization can put appropriations challenges outside the orbit of
383. See generally Daryl Levinson & Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and
Public Law, 125 Yale L.J. 400 (2015) (discussing how prioritizing substantive enactments
may entrench policy at the cost of democratic legitimacy).
384. Lawrence, Disappropriation, supra note 30, at 79.
385. Moda Health Plan, Inc. v. United States, 892 F.3d 1311, 1325–27 (Fed. Cir. 2018),
rev’d and remanded sub nom. Me. Cmty. Health Options v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1308
(2020).
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judicial scrutiny, thereby limiting the extent to which courts are available
to ensure that the government operates within its lawful authority—a
policing role that contributes to the legitimacy of the national
administrative state.386 The rule of law is similarly at odds with the
sovereignty claims that underlie appropriations marginalization; whereas
the former demands that the government operate in accordance with the
law, the latter excuses the government from being legally forced to meet
its obligations or pay for its legal transgressions.387 Given Congress’s
enactment of numerous statutes consenting to suit against the
government, one could question the extent to which sovereignty can
justify appropriations marginalization today, at least independent from
concerns with protecting the prerogatives of the political branches.388 At a
minimum, however, relying simultaneously on the rule of law and
sovereignty to justify appropriations marginalization seems incongruous.
c. The Duty to Fund. — I have elsewhere suggested that while Congress
can alter the government’s substantive responsibilities, it may violate a
nonjusticiable constitutional duty to fund if it leaves statutory responsibilities in place but sabotages the government’s ability to meet them by
providing grossly inadequate funding.389 Although early suggestions of
such a duty can be found in congressional debates, these suggestions did
not bear fruit and today “the great weight of historical practice contradicts
it.”390 But a duty to fund can be based on a structural constitutional principle of a duty to supervise delegated power.391 Arguably, it could also be
rooted in constitutional concerns to secure effective government—concerns that animated the Framers to grant Congress direct revenue-raising
capacity.392 Albeit different in scope, such a duty bears similarities to Stith’s
claim that the grant to the President of certain constitutional powers
entails the minimum resources necessary to wield them.393 She also argued
that “Congress has not only the power but also the duty to exercise

386. On the historical importance of the availability of judicial review to the legitimacy
of administrative government, see generally Daniel R. Ernst, Tocqueville’s Nightmare: The
Administrative State Emerges in America, 1900–1940 (2014) (discussing the rise of judicial
review of administrative procedure and agency fact-ﬁnding).
387. The tension between sovereign immunity and the rule of law is well known. See,
e.g., United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882) (rejecting the federal government’s claim
to sovereign immunity and proclaiming that “[n]o man in this country is so high that he is
above the law”); Jackson, Suing the Federal Government, supra note 307, at 523.
388. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 172, at 896–904 (describing relevant statutes).
389. Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 Yale L.J. 1836, 1931–
32 (2015) [hereinafter Metzger, Duty to Supervise].
390. Price, supra note 33, at 382–86 (describing the surfacing of the duty to fund idea
in the Jay Treaty and Reconstruction debates).
391. Metzger, Duty to Supervise, supra note 389, at 1931–32.
392. See supra text accompanying notes 332–333.
393. See supra text accompanying note 354.

1150

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 121:4

legislative control over federal expenditures.”394 Where speciﬁc statutory
obligations and commitments are involved, due process and fundamental
fairness concerns also come into play in justifying a duty to fund.395
Such a duty to fund is somewhat in tension with my argument here,
insofar as the duty prioritizes substantive legislation over appropriations
measures as the means by which Congress sets policy. Moreover, given its
constitutional basis, a duty to fund should trump countervailing policy
concerns. The judicial nonenforceability of the duty mitigates this tension
to some extent, but does not fully remove it. Congress is independently
obligated to adhere to constitutional requirements, whether or not those
are judicially enforced.
One factor helping to alleviate this tension is that such a general duty
to fund is largely operative at the extremes of funding denial for an agency
and thus likely would not come into play in the mine run of congressional
appropriations decisions. Even more important, the duty to fund is
compatible with a robust view of Congress’s appropriations power when
both are understood as part of an overall obligation by Congress to
supervise delegated authority. Whether providing adequate funding or
refusing to fund on policy grounds, Congress is playing that supervisory
role. The two are also aligned in both offering ways of targeting systemic
legal inconsistency, albeit from opposite angles—one urging Congress to
provide funding to meet statutory obligations and the other arguing that
Congress’s failure to fund should be recognized as sometimes changing
the underlying law.
3. Appropriations Marginalization and the Separation of Powers. — Prioritizing substantive enactments thus fails to justify appropriations marginalization. But the rationale of preserving political branch prerogatives,
especially of Congress, appears to have a stronger basis. Limiting the
appearance of appropriations disputes in court allows Congress broad
room to wield its appropriations power without fear of judicial intrusion.
In practice, knowing that Congress can enact detailed appropriations that
would restrict agencies’ ﬂexibility has incentivized agencies to be attentive
to their congressional funders’ informal instructions on how funds should
be used.396 Moreover, current doctrine gives Congress some say over when
judicial review is available, in that Congress can increase court access by
providing for speciﬁc mandatory appropriations. At the same time, leaving
394. Stith, supra note 34, at 1345.
395. The extent to which due process creates a judicially enforceable right to funds is a
matter of dispute. Compare, e.g., Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106, 110–11 (1994) (holding
that due process requires a “clear and certain” remedy for unlawfully collected taxes but
that remedy can be pre-deprivation, post-deprivation, or a hybrid approach), with Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 740 (1999) (suggesting that due process under Reich simply “requires
the state to provide the remedy it has promised”).
396. See Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, supra note 37, at 71–72; supra text
accompanying note 225.

2021]

TAKING APPROPRIATIONS SERIOUSLY

1151

appropriations to the political branches has kept the scope of presidential
spending authority an open question for political negotiation rather than
judicial resolution.
The suggestion that separation of powers considerations militate
against judicial involvement in setting the metes and bounds of appropriations powers is an unusual one for the Supreme Court. Although in the
past the Court was often willing to leave separation of powers to political
determination, its course over many decades has been markedly different.397 Today, the Justices portray judicial enforcement of the separation
of powers as essential to the preservation of individual liberty, a task the
Court is duty-bound to perform.398 A number of scholars question this turn
to the courts to resolve separation of powers disputes between the political
branches. They argue variously that the current judicialization of such
disputes is a historical anomaly,399 that courts are unlikely to resolve these
disputes well,400 and that the net result is just another separation of powers
problem in the form of aggrandizement of the courts.401 From this
perspective, the marginalization of appropriations in public law doctrine
is a welcome and rare instance of courts adhering to their proper historical
role.
Yet this focus on judicial aggrandizement obscures that there is a real
separation of powers cost to the doctrinal marginalization of appropria-

397. Nikolas Bowie & Daphna Renan, The Separation-of-Powers Counterrevolution 43–
46 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (unpublished manuscript) (tracing the change to
the Supreme Court’s decision in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926)).
398. See, e.g., United States v. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2135 (2019) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting) (“[W]hen a case or controversy comes within the judicial competence, the
Constitution does not permit judges to look the other way . . . . [T]he framers afforded us
independence from the political branches in large part to encourage exactly this kind of
‘fortitude . . . to do [our] duty as faithful guardians of the Constitution.’” (alteration in
original) (quoting The Federalist No. 78, at 470 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1st ed. 1961))); Nat’l Lab. Rels. Bd. v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 949 (2017) (Thomas,
J., concurring) (“The Judicial Branch must be most vigilant in guarding the separation
between the political powers precisely when those powers collude to avoid the structural
constraints of our Constitution.”).
399. Bowie & Renan, supra note 397, at 22–40 (identifying a pattern of political
development and enforcement of the separation of powers until the 1870s and tying the
turn to a juriscentric and rigid separation of powers to post-Reconstruction, white
supremacist revisionism).
400. Aziz Z. Huq, The Negotiated Structural Constitution, 114 Colum. L. Rev. 1595,
1674-83 (2014).
401. Josh Chafetz, Executive Branch Contempt of Congress, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1083,
1085–86, 1149–51 (2009) [hereinafter Chafetz, Executive Branch Contempt] (allowing
separation of powers suits between the branches aggrandizes the courts at the political
branches’ expense); Tara Leigh Grove, Government Standing and the Fallacy of
Institutional Injury, 167 U. Pa. L. Rev. 611, 615–16 (2019) (allowing governmental standing
for institutional injuries aggrandizes the courts and government institutions at the public’s
expense).
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tions. Increasingly, it operates to expand presidential power over government funds at Congress’s expense. As the border wall and Ukraine episodes demonstrate, presidential control over budget execution provides
signiﬁcant opportunity to reprogram, transfer, and delay obligation of
funds.402 And appropriations marginalization means that the executive
branch can often do so in ways that deviate from governing statutes with
limited fear of legal reprisal. Standing and justiciability doctrines create
substantial barriers to some suits seeking to enforce appropriation statutes.
Even private entities denied funding may lack a judicial remedy if the
appropriation was expended or is discretionary, assuming no independent
legal violation.403 Seeds of judicial shift are evident in the lower courts, with
the Ninth Circuit’s decision allowing states and environmental
organizations to bring an APA challenge to Trump’s border wall
reprogramming and the D.C. Circuit’s decision allowing the House of
Representatives to challenge the legality of this action.404 The Supreme
Court has yet to bless these decisions, however.405
Granted, Trump’s assertions of appropriations power were extreme
and perhaps should not be the basis for broader doctrinal rethinking. But
to view these appropriations actions as simply phenomena isolated to the
Trump presidency is to ignore the broader background of deep political
polarization of which they are part. In an era in which a political tribalism
led well over a hundred members of Congress to challenge President
Biden’s victory in court and at the electoral college count,406 it is hard to
imagine that such political manipulation of appropriations will suddenly
disappear. All the more because Trump’s actions were part of a trend
toward greater presidential efforts to manipulate appropriations for policy
gain that also surfaced under Obama.407 In addition, the impact of this de
facto presidential control over funding needs to be assessed against the
402. See Pasachoff, Trump Era Budget Powers, supra note 118, at 4–18 (discussing how
the Trump Administration used apportionment, rescissions and deferrals, transfers and
reprogramming, and management of government shutdowns to shape policy priorities);
supra section II.B.2.
403. See supra text accompanying notes 232–233; see also supra note 214 (noting that
some appropriations may violate constitutional prohibitions).
404. See supra text accompanying notes 182–183, 246–255.
405. See Trump v. Sierra Club, 140 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2019) (staying the district court
injunction); see also Trump v. Sierra Club, 141 S. Ct. 618, 618 (granting certiorari).
406. See Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief Amicus Curiae of U.S.
Representative Mike Johnson and 125 Other Members of the U.S. House of Representatives
in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a Bill of Complaint and Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction at 2, Texas v. Pennsylvania, No. 155 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2020); Barbara
Sprunt, Here Are the Republicans Who Objected to the Electoral College Count, NPR (Jan.
7, 2021), https://www.npr.org/sections/congress-electoral-college-tally-live-updates/2021/
01/07/954380156/here-are-the-republicans-who-objected-to-the-electoral-college-count
[https://perma.cc/B59G-EPCR].
407. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 9–10.
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background of signiﬁcantly expanded presidential assertions of administrative power generally.408 One of Congress’s main tools to push back at
such presidential unilateralism is its control of the purse. As a result, the
inability to enforce appropriations constraints on the executive branch
can have a far-reaching effect on the legislative–executive balance of
power.
Of course, Congress has the ability to punish the executive branch for
appropriations transgressions without resorting to the courts, by overturning executive branch repurposing of funds, enacting new constraints, or
cutting agency funding. But leaving aside the question of how these new
constraints then get enforced on a recalcitrant executive branch, the same
partisan divisions that lead to appropriations exploitation will prove an
obstacle to congressional response. Of particular note, it is much harder
for Congress to enact legislation overturning presidential uses of already
appropriated funds than to deny the funds in the ﬁrst place. Overturning
legislation will inevitably face a presidential veto and lacks the must-pass
status of the initial appropriations bill. Meanwhile, retaliation in the next
appropriations bill may come too late, and in some contexts Congress may
not be willing to dramatically cut back funding. An equally critical factor
is the partisan politics that characterize Congress today. For Congress to
succeed in rebuffing presidential spending adventurism, both houses
need to be committed to asserting their institutional prerogatives over
appropriations. But as Daryl Levinson and Richard Pildes have
underscored, partisan rather than institutional ties drive Congress.409
Other important nonjudicial checks against presidential abuse of
spending authority exist, such as oversight from GAO and inspectors
general (IGs), executive branch lawyers, and agency officials who may fear
personal Antideﬁciency Act liability.410 Such internal governmental checks

408. See Mashaw & Berke, supra note 111, at 605–07 (concluding that presidential
administration has expanded under Presidents Obama and Trump, especially during
periods of uniﬁed government); Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power
of Unilateral Action, 15 J.L. Econ. & Org. 132, 136–38 (1999) (noting a trend of legacyconscious Presidents exploiting constitutional ambiguity of agencies to accomplish
agendas); see also Charles M. Cameron, Studying the Polarized Presidency, 32 Presidential
Stud. Q. 647, 647–48 (2002) (arguing that polarization has a “pervasive” impact on
presidency).
409. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 328, at 2324–25.
410. See Lawrence, Disappropriation, supra note 30, at 82–83 (describing how civil
servants play an important role in enforcing legal limits on executive spending and
commitments to spend); see also Dino P. Christenson & Douglas L. Kriner, Political
Constraints on Unilateral Executive Action, 65 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 897, 908–12 (2015)
(arguing that informal political constraints on presidential unilateralism are more robust
than generally acknowledged).
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are essential law-enforcing mechanisms in the administrative state.411 Yet
their effectiveness may be limited in the face of presidential resistance.
Both GAO and IGs can be sidelined by the executive branch, as has
occurred in recent years.412 It also seems unlikely that the executive branch
would impose penalties on agency officials who spend or withhold funds
at the direction of the President, OMB, or their agency leadership. A
future administration led by a different party might do so, but the
Antideﬁciency Act has never been criminally enforced, and administrative
penalties will not be relevant for political officials who have left the
government.413
A more basic ﬂaw with arguments for political rather than legal
enforcement of appropriations limits is that these two types of constraints
are interdependent.414 The effectiveness of political branch appropriations checks often stems from legal checks that lie in the background.
Agencies will likely be more attentive to congressional input on spending
if they fear a lawsuit that would enjoin their funding moves as unauthorized, thereby forestalling independent executive branch action. The
opposite is also true; particularly given the lack of transparency involving
appropriations, litigation may often depend on internal watchdogs, GAO
investigations, or congressional hearings for evidence of executive branch
violations of appropriations statutes. In short, neither legal nor political
mechanisms of enforcement may be as effective alone as they are together.
Hence, even if in theory the marginalization of appropriations in
public law doctrine corresponds to the constitutional assignment of
411. See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger & Kevin M. Stack, Internal Administrative Law, 115
Mich. L. Rev. 1239, 1244–45, 1256–63 (2017) (discussing how internal executive branch
measures qualify as law).
412. See supra text accompanying notes 303–305; see also Jen Kirby, Trump’s Purge of
Inspectors General, Explained, Vox (May 28, 2020), https://www.vox.com/2020/5/28/
21265799/inspectors-general-trump-linick-atkinson (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
413. 31 U.S.C. § 1350 (2018) (authorizing criminal penalties); GAO Red Book, GAO06-382SP, supra note 48, ch. 6, at 144 (3d ed. 2006) (“As far as GAO is aware, it appears that
no officer or employee has ever been prosecuted, much less convicted, for a violation of the
Antideﬁciency Act . . . .”); see also Gordon Gray, The Antideﬁciency Act: A Primer, Am.
Action F. (Aug. 3, 2016), https://www.americanactionforum.org/research/antideﬁciencyact-primer [https://perma.cc/MMY2-4V7T] (noting the lack of prosecutions and that, in
the ten years preceding 2016, eight federal employees were suspended or removed from
their positions for violating the Act). There is also no evidence of such enforcement against
career officials by an incoming administration. Cf. Oral Argument at 40:24, U.S. House of
Representatives v. Mnuchin, 969 F.3d 353 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (No. 19-5176),
https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/recordings/recordings2019.nsf/8E4D5177F505006
4852585580063B278/$ﬁle/19-5176and19-5331.mp3 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review)
(arguing on behalf of the Trump Administration that “the political deterrent that will stop
any . . . official” from engaging in illegal spending is the prospect of a future administration
pursuing criminal prosecutions under the Antideﬁciency Act).
414. Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and
External Separation of Powers, 59 Emory L.J. 423, 442–47 (2009).
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appropriations to Congress, in practice it operates to erode that
constitutional structure. Against the background of today’s political
climate and the structural barriers Congress faces in reacting to executive
branch abuses of appropriations, leaving appropriations to the political
branches too often amounts to transferring a de facto power over
appropriations to the President. Correspondingly, expanding judicial
involvement in appropriations may actually serve to enforce the separation
of powers insofar as it reasserts congressional appropriations control.
This is not to deny that drawing courts more into appropriations
disputes can have real downsides. In addition to a systemic risk of judicial
aggrandizement, greater judicial scrutiny can tie executive branch appropriations actions up in litigation, a signiﬁcant issue in the appropriations
context when funds must be obligated within a one-year window and the
government needs ﬂexibility to respond to sudden demands.415 Perhaps
more concerning, greater judicial involvement can operate to further
undermine longstanding appropriations norms that are not judicially
enforceable, such as the practice of agencies obtaining the approval of
their appropriations subcommittee before reprogramming appropriated
funds.416
What this means is that neither judicial involvement nor judicial
exclusion is appropriate across the board. Instead, a nuanced approach is
required that will target judicial involvement in ways that strengthen
congressional power over appropriations and recognize appropriations as
a central congressional policy-setting tool.
IV. INCORPORATING APPROPRIATIONS
Taking appropriations seriously requires action by all three branches
of government. Recent developments have identiﬁed areas that could
beneﬁt from legislative reform, from the lack of transparency over budget
execution and apportionment to the breadth of statutory grants of transfer
authority.417 Congress also could expand its use of appropriations to push
back at other forms of executive branch excess and should consider
amending its internal rules governing appropriations to better align with
its actual practices.418 Meanwhile the executive branch could renew its
commitment to appropriations norms and issue new regulations and
guidance that pull back from more aggressive appropriations practices.
415. See Trump v. Sierra Club, 140 S. Ct. 1, 2 (2019) (mem.) (Breyer, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part from grant of stay).
416. For discussion of this norm, see supra text accompanying note 117.
417. For discussion of possible measures, see Pasachoff, Trump Era Budget Powers,
supra note 118, at 88–91; see also supra note 296 and accompanying text.
418. See Kevin M. Stack & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Oversight Riders, 97 Notre Dame
L. Rev. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 5–6, 26–28) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review) (advocating the use of riders that would prohibit the executive branch from using
appropriated funds to prevent compliance with congressional subpoenas).
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This Part takes up the task of sketching what taking appropriations
seriously might mean for the courts. It assesses how existing public law
doctrines should be altered to better take account of appropriations. It
then examines what such an approach might mean in practice by applying
it to the border wall dispute.
A.

Incorporating Appropriations in Public Law Doctrine

Accepting that appropriations should be incorporated more into
public law doctrine, what would that entail? At a minimum, taking appropriations seriously requires actually engaging with appropriations. As a
result, of the techniques used to marginalize appropriations, appropriations silence is the hardest to justify. On the other hand, the derivation of
special rules for appropriations per se—appropriations exceptionalism—
often may be the proper approach. Many congressional powers are
governed by distinct doctrines, reﬂecting their different constitutional
scope and basis.419 No reason exists why the same should not be true about
the appropriations power, provided the appropriations-speciﬁc rule does
not stem from an effort to minimize appropriations’ signiﬁcance. Put differently, appropriations exceptionalism is problematic when it unjustiﬁably subordinates Congress’s power of the purse. Appropriations-speciﬁc
rules that help ensure the effectiveness and equal treatment of Congress’s
appropriations power, or that reﬂect the scope and unique features of that
power, are legitimate.
The following discussion assesses how better to integrate appropriations into current public law doctrine, focusing on the role of appropriations in separation of powers analysis, interpretation of appropriations
statutes, and jurisdiction over appropriations disputes. Importantly, in
many instances taking appropriations seriously does not entail changes to
current doctrine, even as it requires that courts engage with appropriations more directly.
1. Appropriations Exceptionalism and Constitutional Analysis. — The
rejection of appropriations silence, and potential acceptability of appropriations exceptionalism, are of particular relevance to constitutional analysis. The Court’s general silence on appropriations in separation of powers
cases is especially striking when considered against the constitutional

419. Compare Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 21–22 (2005) (upholding commerce power
legislation after deferring to congressional choices of the level at which to regulate and not
scrutinizing congressional ﬁndings under the commerce power), and Murphy v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1475–79 (2018) (rejecting a commerce power
measure that prohibited state enactments as unconstitutional commandeering under the
commerce power), with Nev. Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 729–32, 735 (2003)
(upholding as within Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power a measure
imposing family-leave requirements on state governments after scrutinizing legislative and
judicial records for adequate evidence of sex discrimination by the state).

2021]

TAKING APPROPRIATIONS SERIOUSLY

1157

importance of Congress’s appropriations power and that power’s central
role as a check on the executive branch.
a. Delegation. — As suggested above, delegation challenges are one
area where express consideration of appropriations is particularly merited,
all the more so given the current interest in revitalizing the nondelegation
doctrine.420 The SORNA example discussed above421 provides an illustration of what paying attention to appropriations in delegation challenges
would look like in practice. Had the SORNA appropriation acts expressly
included provision of funds to enforce application of SORNA to all preAct offenders, that would have defeated the delegation challenge on its
own. Even an express reference in the statutory text to “the estimated
caseload of 100,000 noncompliant sex offenders,” a number that necessitated SORNA applying to all pre-Act offenders, should have sufficed. As
discussed below, a strong argument can be made that the statements in the
Appropriations Committee’s reports to this effect should be viewed as
establishing that Congress understood the Act to apply to all pre-Act
offenders or sanctioned that application.422 At a minimum, however, this
evidence should have been considered by the Court, along with the other
provisions of SORNA’s text and history, as a constraint on executive
branch discretion.
More broadly, the fact that Congress oversees and controls agency
implementation of statutes through the appropriation process—even
absent reference to the speciﬁc agency action provoking a delegation
challenge—is further support for the largely moribund state of the
nondelegation doctrine. In the face of this practice, nondelegation’s
central claim that agencies are setting policy without Congress is hard to
maintain. Similarly, the fact that Congress speciﬁcally provides funds for
an agency to undertake certain responsibilities should count as express
delegation for purposes of assessing whether Congress wished to assign
those responsibilities to the agency.423 Taking appropriations seriously
requires acknowledging that the delegation of authority in a substantive
or organic statute is only one component in determining the scope of an
agency’s discretion; the amount of funds that Congress has provided for
the agency to perform speciﬁc tasks is another crucial variable. Furthermore, although perhaps most salient to functionalist and pragmatic
approaches to constitutional structure, this ongoing control through
appropriations would seem relevant to assessing the constitutionality of

420. See supra section II.B.1.
421. See supra text accompanying notes 157–169.
422. See infra text accompanying notes 443–448.
423. Cf. King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 486 (2015) (stating that “had Congress wished to
assign” a “question of deep ‘economic and political signiﬁcance’ . . . central to . . . [a]
statutory scheme . . . to an agency, it surely would have done so expressly” (quoting Util. Air
Regul. Grp. v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014))).
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delegations across a range of interpretive methods.424 The fact that this
control results from appropriations statutes enacted annually through
bicameralism and presentment should matter to textualists and formalists,
while early British and American uses of appropriations to constrain executive officials suggest that appropriations should also be relevant for
originalists.425
A separate question is whether Congress should be able to delegate
control over appropriations to the executive branch. The constitutional
importance of Congress’s power of the purse as a check on the executive
might suggest that delegations here should be narrow. In this vein, Stith
argued that permanent appropriations are unconstitutional when
Congress does not specify the total amount of spending authority and
undertake periodic review and thereby check executive action.426 Yet
Congress’s longstanding practices of permanent and lump-sum appropriations, combined with the historical exemption of government funds from
the usual separation of power constraints, makes imposing special delegation constraints on appropriations hard to justify.427 Concerns about
delegations of appropriation authority undermining the constitutional
structure are better addressed by reading such grants of authority
narrowly, as suggested below.428
b. Bowsher, Clinton, and One-House Vetoes. — With respect to delegation, express consideration of appropriations might thus simply lead to

424. For a classic description of different modes of constitutional interpretation, see
Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution 6–7 (1982); see also M.
Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1127,
1136–47 (2000) (describing functionalism and formalism in separation of powers analysis).
425. See Casper, supra note 47, at 2–8 (describing the use of appropriations by the
British Parliament, as well as by colonial and early state legislatures, to control executive
officials). The originalist assessment of appropriations is complicated by the early practice
of distinguishing appropriations and substantive legislation. See supra text accompanying
note 43.
426. Stith, supra note 34, at 1345–46, 1382–84.
427. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 466–67 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
see also Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308, 321–22 (1937) (“Appropriation
and other acts of Congress are replete with instances of general appropriations of large
amounts, to be allotted and expended as directed by designated government agencies.”);
supra text accompanying notes 170–174 (describing the public rights doctrine). Some
scholars argue that delegation restrictions are in fact looser when public rights are involved.
See Aditya Bamzai, Delegation and Interpretive Discretion: Gundy, Kisor, and the Formation
and Future of Administrative Law, 133 Harv. L. Rev. 164, 180–82 (2019); Harrison, supra
note 316 (manuscript at 6–13). This is on top of recent scholarship contending that no
historical foundation exists for the nondelegation doctrine at all. See Julian Davis
Mortenson & Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at the Founding, 121 Colum. L. Rev. 277, 279–82
(2021). But see Ilan Wurman, Nondelegation at the Founding, 130 Yale L.J. (forthcoming
2021) (manuscript at 4–9), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3559867
[https://perma.cc/HYR5-BP4N] (disputing Mortenson and Bagley’s view).
428. See infra text accompanying note 442.
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assimilation of appropriations into existing frameworks. In other
separation of powers contexts, however, it might yield appropriations
exceptionalism. Consider Bowsher in this regard, where the Court held that
the Gramm–Rudman–Hollings Act was unconstitutional without ever
engaging with the fact that the Act was regulating the appropriations
process.429 As Justice White argued in Bowsher, the Court’s emphasis on
Congress’s potential role in removing the Comptroller General is an
unsatisfactory basis for holding the Act unconstitutional. Indeed, given the
Constitution’s emphasis on congressional exercise of the appropriations
power and the fact that the Act assigned the Comptroller General a central
role in determining the amounts available to agencies to spend, a lack of
congressional role would be constitutionally suspicious. Justice Stevens’s
concurrence, concluding that the Act was unconstitutional because the
Comptroller was exercising legislative power outside of the bicameralism
and presentment process, recognized this central point.430 But Stevens’s
opinion in turn failed to consider whether the requirements of
bicameralism and presentment apply the same way to appropriations
measures as to other legislation.431
A case also can be made for allowing one-house vetoes to cancel
executive branch reprogramming of appropriated funds. To be sure, the
Appropriations Clause makes clear that bicameralism and presentment
are required to authorize an appropriation; absent that process, an
appropriation would not be “made by Law.”432 But using one-house vetoes
to cancel executive branch reprogramming—the effect of which is simply
to reassert the original appropriation that Congress made through
bicameralism and presentment—appears more compatible with the
Clause’s text. Moreover, as Peter Strauss has argued, the appropriations
process—marked by ongoing political negotiations, time-limited
measures, at least annual use of the full legislative process, and the
429. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 763–73 (1986) (White, J., dissenting).
430. Id. at 737–39, 753–58.
431. In Stevens’s defense, that application would seem to follow from the Court’s
decision in INS v. Chadha three years earlier, holding that all exercises of legislative power
must go through bicameralism and presentment in the course of invalidating the legislative
veto. 462 U.S. 919, 956–59 (1983). Although Chadha involved immigration adjudication, the
Court subsequently summarily affirmed application of Chadha to other contexts. See, e.g.,
Process Gas Consumers Grp. of Am. v. Consumer Energy Council of Am., 463 U.S. 1216,
1216 (1983), aff’g Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 673
F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The D.C. Circuit paid more attention to the fact that
appropriations were involved in concluding Congress would not want the President to be
able to defer spending appropriated funds without the possibility of a legislative veto and
therefore invalidated the deferral provision initially enacted under the ICA. But the D.C.
Circuit also failed to consider if appropriations were any different, stating simply that “[t]he
appellants concede, as they must, that the legislative veto provision . . . [in the ICA] is
unconstitutional under” Chadha. City of New Haven v. United States, 809 F.2d 900, 905, 909
(D.C. Cir. 1987).
432. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9.

1160

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 121:4

President’s ability to gain additional discretion over spending as a result of
Congress retaining veto power—differs from the enactment of permanent
substantive legislation.433 Further, although appropriations measures can
affect the “legal rights [and] duties” of government officials and other
individuals “outside the legislative branch,” they do not directly regulate
the private rights of individuals the same way that substantive legislation
does.434 Perhaps most importantly, legislative vetoes appear part of the
historical gloss put on appropriations by the practice of both the legislative
and executive branches.435 Congress has long asserted its power to veto
executive branch reprogramming actions through appropriations committee disapproval, including provisions to this effect in appropriations
acts to this day.436 And while the executive branch has publicly disputed
the constitutionality of such measures, for just as long it has largely
conformed to Congress’s direction.437
2. Interpreting Appropriations Legislation. — In the statutory interpretation context, the problem is less appropriations silence than appropriations-speciﬁc interpretive rules that unjustiﬁably prioritize substantive legislation. Taking appropriations seriously would foreclose the exceptionally
high threshold courts currently apply before an appropriations measure is
found to implicitly repeal substantive legislation. The same result should
follow for the requirement that an appropriations act must use particular
words of “futurity” before it is read as permanently altering substantive
statutes. The futurity requirement is a closer case because a core feature
of appropriations acts is their one-year duration. Hence, demanding some
evidence that Congress intends a provision of an appropriations statute to
have a longer effect is justiﬁable, even if speciﬁc to appropriations. But
433. Peter L. Strauss, Was There a Baby in the Bathwater? A Comment on the Supreme
Court’s Legislative Veto Decision, 1983 Duke L.J. 789, 813–14; see also Am. Fed’n of Gov’t
Emps. v. Pierce, 697 F.2d 303, 308–09 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Wald & Mikva, JJ., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc) (urging en banc review of a pre-Chadha legislative veto decision
invalidating a provision that required the House and Senate Appropriations Committees to
approve the use of any funds to reorganize HUD and suggesting that legislative vetoes might
be more acceptable in some contexts).
434. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952; cf. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1552 (2016)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the threshold of injury to sue to enforce a public
right is greater).
435. Trump v. Mazars, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2023 (2020) (“[L]ongstanding practice ‘is a
consideration of great weight’ in cases concerning ‘the allocation of power between the two
elected branches of Government’” (quoting Nat’l Lab. Rels. Bd. v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S.
513, 524–26 (2014))). See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical
Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 411 (2012) (discussing the role of
historical practice in separation of powers analysis).
436. Fisher, Legislative Veto, supra note 225, at 290.
437. See Schick, Federal Budget, supra 44, at 271; Lazarus, supra note 90, at 649–52;
supra text accompanying note 115; see also Bradley & Morrison, supra note 435, at 454
(emphasizing that there is a greater basis on which to infer executive branch acquiescence
from conformity over time).
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requiring that evidence to take a magic-words form seems to go too far, as
Congress could indicate that intent in a variety of ways.438
On the other hand, the appropriations-speciﬁc rule of giving weight
to GAO’s views appears a legitimate reﬂection of the central role Congress
has assigned GAO in appropriations disputes. While the courts’ reluctance
to defer to agency interpretations of appropriations statutes often reﬂects
broader deference doctrines,439 it also accords with core features of appropriations. The general presumption that Congress intends agencies to ﬁll
gaps in the statutes they implement does not ﬁt well with appropriations
realities, given Congress’s use of appropriations to control the executive
branch and close supervision of how appropriated funds are used. The
control that OMB wields on appropriations and budget matters within the
executive branch also weighs against according agencies deference for
their interpretations of appropriations statutes.
Appropriations-speciﬁc interpretive rules also can be an important
means of reinforcing Congress’s constitutional power of the purse. Federalism clear-statement canons are a helpful analogy. Under these canons,
the Court invokes federalism concerns as justiﬁcation for requiring
Congress to make its intention to impose a burden on states plain in a
statute.440 A current example in the appropriations context is the
requirement that appropriations must be express and not implied. This
requirement is statutorily codiﬁed and embodied in GAO precedent, but
its rigorous enforcement also follows from the Appropriations Clause’s
demand that every appropriation must be authorized by law.441 A further
possibility in this vein would be a rule that grants of unilateral
appropriations authority to the executive branch should be narrowly
construed. Under such a rule, ambiguities in statutory provisions
authorizing transfers of appropriated funds or delays in expenditures
would be read to narrow executive authority. As with other forms of
constitutional avoidance, there is a risk that the resulting interpretation
will differ from what Congress intended.442 But that risk is justiﬁed to
438. Cf. McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 287, at 708–14 & n.137 (arguing that
courts should not apply any presumptions and simply analyze congressional intent in the
case at hand).
439. See supra text accompanying notes 263–269.
440. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460–61 (1991) (outlining a federalism
“plain statement rule”); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)
(“[I]f Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so
unambiguously.”); see also Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 Vill. L.
Rev. 1349, 1373–80 (2001) (brieﬂy listing, and then normatively evaluating, these “process
federalism” doctrines).
441. See U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 185 F. Supp. 3d 165, 168–69, 174,
184–85 (D.D.C. 2016), vacated in part sub nom. U.S. House of Representatives v. Azar, No.
14-1967 (RMC), 2018 WL 8576647 (D.D.C. May 18, 2018) (citing 31 U.S.C. § 1301(d)
(2018)).
442. See Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 Sup. Ct. Rev. 71, 74.
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protect congressional control of the purse and guard against the real
danger of de facto presidential spending authority.
A harder issue is whether taking appropriations seriously entails
courts giving legal effect to statements in appropriations committee
reports. Doing so would reﬂect the realities of the appropriations process.
Unlike other committee reports, appropriations reports are drafted by the
same legislative counsel used to draft bills, rather than by committee
staff.443 As noted above and contrary to the Supreme Court’s assertions in
Hill, evidence suggests that even members of Congress who are not on the
Appropriations Committee treat appropriations reports as akin to legislation.444 Indeed, members of Congress would have little understanding of
the import of an appropriations measure without recourse to the report,
given the lack of detail and frequent lump-sum allocations in the appropriations bill itself. Meanwhile, the fact that executive branch officials
generally adhere to the reports in practice gives them de facto binding
effect.445 As a result, the concern that committee reports are not enacted
through bicameralism and presentment is mitigated in the appropriations
context. Put differently, members of Congress and the President understand that they are to some extent enacting the committee reports when
enacting appropriations legislation. Indeed, although committee reports
are not amendable on the ﬂoor, sometimes amendments are offered to an
appropriations bill expressly to counter a provision in the report.446
Militating against making appropriations reports enforceable is the
fact that Congress could include this detail in the text of an appropriations
act if it so chose. Moreover, Congress’s decision to omit these details from
the appropriations act itself likely reﬂects concern that agencies have ﬂexibility to deviate from speciﬁc allocations and other restrictions if the need
arises, without having to obtain additional legislation.447 Combined with
the limited duration of appropriations measures, which means that
Congress will have both a regular opportunity and the potential leverage
of appropriations’ must-pass status to force inclusion of such details in
statutory text, these factors provide a strong basis for not treating

443. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 293, at 980.
444. See supra text accompanying note 293.
445. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 293, at 980–82 (describing how “the purpose of the
committee report in the appropriations context,” unlike in other contexts, “is essentially to
legislate”); see also Jessica Tollestrup, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R44124, Appropriations Report
Language: Overview of Development, Components, and Issues for Congress 1 (2015)
(“Although report language itself is not law and therefore not binding in the same manner
as language in the statute, agencies usually seek to comply with any directives contained
therein.”).
446. Tollestrup, supra note 445, at 4.
447. See Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 192 (1993) (“[T]he very point of a lump-sum
appropriation is to give an agency the capacity to adapt to changing circumstances and meet
its statutory responsibilities in what it sees as the most effective or desirable way.”).
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appropriations reports as directly legally enforceable.448 But these factors
provide much less reason for courts not to give substantial weight to appropriations reports when it comes to interpreting what an appropriation
means. In this context, the reports are not providing new requirements
that Congress declined to include in enacted legislation but are instead
supplying congressionally sanctioned explanations of the meaning of
enacted provisions.449
Finally, what does taking appropriations seriously mean for determining when an appropriations measure amends substantive law? Although it
is unjustiﬁed to impose a particularly high threshold before an appropriations measure is read as implicitly amending substantive law, ﬁnding such
amendment whenever Congress fails to fully fund statutory authorizations
is equally mistaken. Congress regularly appropriates less than is statutorily
authorized and less than the executive branch needs to fully implement
governing statutes. As a result, ordinarily Congress’s decision to provide
less funding than a statute requires in a given year should not be read to
repeal the unfunded aspects. Sometimes, however, congressional funding
decisions should be given substantive signiﬁcance. The saga of the ACA’s
risk corridor funding provides such an instance. There, Congress did not
simply underfund a statutory provision; instead, it expressly refused to
fund a time-limited provision for the entire three-year period the provision
was operative. In short, through the appropriations process Congress
denied the provision any possible direct effect; the provision could only
have an impact as a basis for judgment fund liability. In such a context,
and contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision in Maine Community Health
Options, Congress’s appropriations actions should have been found to
repeal the risk corridor funding requirement.
3. Jurisdiction over Appropriations Challenges. — This leaves the question
of when appropriations challenges should be judicially reviewable. As
noted above, Lincoln’s holding that agency allocation decisions with
respect to a lump-sum appropriation are nonreviewable is another
appropriations-speciﬁc rule.450 Arguably, the Lincoln rule goes too far in
448. See Jesse M. Cross, When Courts Should Ignore Statutory Text, 26 Geo. Mason L.
Rev. 453, 487–91 (2018) (arguing that the Court’s approach to report language is “faithful
to congressional intent” because Congress does not direct report language to the courts for
enforcement).
449. Courts occasionally look to appropriations committee reports in interpreting
appropriations legislation, although they do not suggest that appropriations committee
reports deserve more weight in interpretation than other committee reports. See, e.g., Nat’l
Veterans Legal Servs. Program v. United States, 968 F.3d 1340, 1352–57 (Fed. Cir. 2020)
(invoking appropriations and conference reports); Pontarelli v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury,
285 F.3d 216, 226–29 (3d Cir. 2002) (relying heavily on appropriations reports in
interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) (2000)). Contra Bean v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms, 253 F.3d 234, 237 (5th Cir. 2001) (rejecting reliance on committee reports in
interpreting Section 925(c)), rev’d sub nom. United States v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71 (2002).
450. See supra text accompanying notes 234–241.
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shielding executive action, and a better stance would be to hold that such
decisions are simply presumptively nonreviewable, in line with the
approach courts take to nonenforcement decisions. But unlike
nonenforcement, the decision to provide a lump sum rather than itemized
appropriation lies with Congress, and Congress is frequently consulted on
agency decisions to reprogram lump-sum appropriations. Moreover, the
certainty of the Lincoln rule is particularly helpful in the appropriations
context, given the time-limited window in which appropriated funds can
be obligated and agencies’ needs for ﬂexibility and discretion. Given these
factors, the Lincoln rule appears justiﬁed.451
On the other hand, for these arguments to work, it is also necessary
that the speciﬁc limits Congress includes in appropriations acts be
judicially enforceable. Absent such enforceability, Congress’s ability to
police executive branch funding actions would be compromised; its threat
of punishing agencies who use appropriated funds in ways Congress did
not intend or approve through greater statutory constraints or funding
cut-offs would have no bite. As discussed above, the APA’s cause of action
requires plaintiffs to show that the interests they assert are arguably within
the zone of interests protected by the statute in question. Still, weak as the
test is, it would exclude instances in which individuals are particularly and
concretely harmed by challenged agency appropriations decisions, yet
have no other relationship to the agency or appropriation at issue.452
Moreover, injuries of this sort appear more likely in the appropriations
context, given the fungibility of appropriated funds.
One response would be for courts to apply an even more lenient
version of the zone of interests test in the appropriations context or
exempt suits alleging violation of appropriations statutes from the test
altogether.453 This would be an appropriations-speciﬁc rule keyed to
reinforcing congressional control of appropriations, and to that extent it
resonates with the approach articulated here. But this approach ducks the
question of whether Congress would want to allow third parties to sue in
its stead in this fashion. That is surely at least debatable, given the potential
for delay and loss of ﬂexibility as agency appropriations decisions are
mired in litigation. Moreover, these suits actually could serve to undercut
congressional appropriations controls, if they were to go forward even
when congressional appropriations committees had been consulted and
had informally approved the appropriations change at issue. Allowing
such congressional action to preclude suit, however, would come close to
sanctioning binding legislative action outside the bicameralism and
451. See Pasachoff, Trump Era Budget Powers, supra note 118, at 88–89 (emphasizing
the need for spending discretion and cautioning that courts cannot reliably “police
executive budget decisions”).
452. See supra text accompanying notes 245–250.
453. See supra notes 251–255.
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presentment process, which is what doomed the legislative veto. Another
route would be to allow private suits if Congress provides a private right of
action, thereby signaling its desire for private enforcement in court.454 Yet
this approach would force Congress to the choice of opening up
appropriations actions broadly to suit or leaving some potentially major
violations of appropriations statutes without legal recourse.
An alternative that bypasses these concerns is to allow Congress
itself—either both houses collectively or one house on its own—to sue to
challenge unauthorized uses of appropriated funds. Such a move would
more tightly connect appropriations litigation to the constitutional
appropriations framework. It would also directly enforce Congress’s
political control over appropriations, not simply because Congress could
back up its complaints by suit but also because no suit would be
forthcoming when Congress was consulted and approved the action at
issue. And by thereby reinforcing the executive branch’s incentive to
obtain congressional approval for transfers and reprogramming of
appropriated funds, allowing Congress to sue might actually serve to limit
judicial involvement.455
The problem is that it is far from clear that Congress could have
standing to sue for a violation of an appropriations statute. Recently, the
D.C. Circuit took a capacious view of congressional standing, concluding
that the House of Representatives had standing to challenge the border
wall transfers, as well as that a House committee—and, further, just seven
members of a committee—could sue over the Trump Administration’s
refusal to comply with subpoenas and information requests.456 However,
whether the Supreme Court will follow suit is unclear. Although the Court
has expressly left open the possibility that Congress could sue to vindicate
its institutional interests, it has also signaled some doubt about such
suits.457 Congressional standing is also a topic of much academic debate.
454. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 164 (1997) (ﬁnding that a citizen-suit provision
negates the prudential zone of interests requirement).
455. For an analogous approach that seeks to empower Congress using appropriations
and courts, see Stack & Vandenbergh, supra note 418, at 27, 30 (suggesting congressional
use of oversight riders, which would prohibit use of appropriated funds to resist
congressional subpoenas unless a court determined that the information sought was subject
to executive privilege, as a means of creating ex ante incentives for executive officials to
comply with such subpoenas).
456. Maloney v. Murphy, 984 F.3d 50, 70 (D.C. Cir. 2020); U.S. House of Representatives
v. Mnuchin, 976 F.3d 1, 12–14 (D.C. Cir. 2020); Comm. on the Judiciary v. McGahn, 968
F.3d 755, 764–71 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (en banc).
457. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 823–28 (1997); see also Ariz. State Legislature v.
Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2665 n.12 (2015) (noting that “a suit
between Congress and the President would raise separation-of-powers concerns” that the
Court did not need to address in the case at hand). Compare United States v. Windsor, 570
U.S. 744, 790 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that “Raines did not formally decide
[the] issue . . . [of congressional standing,] but its reasoning” precludes it), with id. at 803–
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Some opponents of congressional standing argue that litigation to enforce
a statute represents an executive function that Congress is constitutionally
prohibited from performing.458 This claim proves too much; it would also
mean that private parties cannot sue to challenge executive branch action
as violating a statutory mandate and might raise questions about whether
Congress can participate in litigation in any form, even as an amicus. To
my mind, the more pressing concern is that allowing Congress to sue for
executive branch failure to enforce statutes would open the courts to
adjudicate a vast array of legislative–executive branch disputes, thereby
elevating judicial power over the political branches and engulﬁng the
courts in political battles.459 One solution might be to distinguish between
Congress suing to enforce the Appropriations Clause and suing to enforce
statutes, a move the district court made in U.S. House of Representatives v.
Burwell.460 Such a distinction is impossible to sustain, however, given that
whether the Clause is violated will turn on whether an obligation of funds
by the government was statutorily authorized.461
This is admittedly a hard question, but ultimately the arguments for
limited congressional standing in the appropriations context are more
persuasive. Accepting that harm to Congress’s appropriations power from
executive branch violation of an appropriations limit is sufficient injury to
allow suit, Congress as a whole could meet the core injury-causationredressability requirements for standing.462 Granted, the assumption that
Congress’s institutional injury can be concrete and particularized enough
to support standing is contentious, and Congress suing in court is surely
not the main mechanism that the Constitution envisions for Congress

07 (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that congressional standing was available and not
precluded by Raines).
458. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 788–91 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Tara Leigh Grove & Neal
Devins, Congress’s (Limited) Power to Represent Itself in Court, 99 Cornell L. Rev. 571,
574–76 (2014) (arguing that litigation to enforce a statute is an executive function that
Congress cannot perform and also violates the constitutional norm of bicameralism).
459. See Comm. on the Judiciary v. McGahn, 951 F.3d 510, 517–19 (D.C. Cir. 2020),
vacated en banc, 968 F.3d 755 (D.C. Cir. 2020); Chafetz, Executive Branch Contempt, supra
note 401, at 1149–51; Pasachoff, Trump Era Budget Powers, supra note 118, at 88–89; see
also Vicki C. Jackson, Congressional Standing to Sue: The Role of Courts and Congress in
U.S. Constitutional Democracy, 93 Ind. L. J. 845, 856–58 (2018) (expressing concern that
having standing to sue may reinforce Congress’s disinclination to take governance and
compromise seriously).
460. 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 69–70, 72–73 (D.D.C. 2015).
461. See U.S. House of Representatives v. Mnuchin, 379 F. Supp. 3d 8, 18–19 (D.D.C.
2019), aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded, 976 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
462. Arizona State Legislature suggests that such an institutional interest is sufficient
injury, even though the Court there noted that separation of powers concerns nonetheless
might forestall congressional standing. Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2663–66 & n.12.
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asserting its interests.463 Still, it is Congress that is constitutionally granted
the power of the purse, providing a basis for claiming particularized harm.
Moreover, despite the Court’s rejection of one-house legislative standing
in some contexts,464 the Appropriations Clause’s requirement that each
appropriation be authorized by statute arguably grants each house a
distinct institutional interest in protecting its ability to block an appropriation.465 And although the distinction between constitutional and statutory
appropriations challenges fails, the critical role of the Appropriations
Clause as a core congressional check on the executive branch can
distinguish the appropriations context from other instances of executive
branch statutory violations.466
In the end, standing rests on separation of powers principles, and
there are strong separation of powers concerns on both sides. Particularly
when a lack of congressional standing would allow the executive branch
to violate an appropriations provision with legal impunity, the separation
of powers may be better served by allowing Congress to sue, especially
since doing so may give the executive branch more reason to negotiate
with Congress in the ﬁrst place.467 It is also worth noting that Congress’s
need to sue to enforce its appropriations power is to some extent a
problem of the Supreme Court’s making, in invalidating the legislative
veto across the board. Indeed, the very political and intragovernmental
character of legislative–executive appropriations disputes that provides
reason to deny Congress standing also supports allowing the legislative
veto for appropriations actions.
B. Incorporating Appropriations in Practice: The Border Wall Litigation
The border wall litigation provides a good illustration of what this
approach to taking appropriations seriously might mean in practice.
463. See Grove, supra note 401, at 615–16 (challenging the idea of institutional injuries
on the ground that government “[i]nstitutions have no greater interest in their constitutional powers and duties than any other member of society”).
464. See Va. House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, 139 S. Ct. 1945, 1953–55 (2019) (“The
Court’s precedent . . . lends no support for the notion that one House of a bicameral
legislature, resting solely on its role in the legislative process, may appeal on its own behalf
a judgment invalidating a state enactment.”).
465. The D.C. Circuit makes an argument along these lines. See U.S. House of
Representatives v. Mnuchin, 976 F.3d 1, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
466. Cf. U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 69–70 (D.D.C.
2015) (ﬁnding standing for statutory violations under the “Non-Appropriation Theory,” a
constitutional argument that alleged the executive branch intruded on Congress’s appropriations power, and denying standing under the “Employer-Mandate Theory,” a statutory
argument that alleged the executive branch was unfaithful to the ACA).
467. See Jonathan Remy Nash, A Functional Theory of Congressional Standing, 114
Mich. L. Rev. 339, 343 (2015) (arguing for standing where “a majority of a house of
Congress . . . challenged executive action that systematically and substantially diminished
the majority’s bargaining power”).
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Although now on hold at the Court while the Biden Administration
reviews the funds transfers at issue and potentially moot,468 the border wall
litigation raised challenging jurisdictional and interpretive issues.
The jurisdictional problem here is not ﬁnding a plaintiff who has
standing; it is instead ﬁnding a plaintiff with standing who has a cause of
action. In the Ninth Circuit, even the government agreed that the
potential environmental effects of the wall meant that states in which the
wall is being built and environmental organizations had standing.469 As
noted above, the problem is that these environmental interests are
marginal to the statutes involved, Section 8005 of the FY2019 DOD
Appropriations Act and 10 U.S.C. §§ 284 and 2808, that govern the zone
of interests inquiry for purposes of suing under the APA.470 Other plaintiffs
come closer, in particular Washington and El Paso County, who claim that
federal funds Congress had appropriated for defense projects in their
jurisdictions were diverted to pay for the wall, resulting in lost economic
activity and tax revenue for their jurisdictions.471 Members of Congress
have long sought to direct appropriations money to beneﬁt their districts
economically—either through earmarks or other means472—so these
interests bear a more plausible relationship to the FY2019 DOD
Appropriations Act and Section 8005. But allowing such incidental
economic effects to suffice for bringing suit under the APA also could
open up appropriations actions broadly to legal challenge. That would also
be the result of the Ninth Circuit’s holding that an equitable action will lie
to challenge an executive branch appropriations action as ultra vires (and
therefore violating the Appropriations Clause).473
On the other hand, the institutional interests that the House of
Representatives is asserting in its lawsuit challenging the border wall funds
transfer lie at the heart of Section 8005. As the Ninth Circuit stated, “In
enacting Section 8005, Congress primarily intended to beneﬁt itself and
its constitutional power to manage appropriations.”474 On its face,
Section 8005 seeks to enforce congressional appropriations decisions,

468. See Howe, supra note 7; supra text accompanying note 119.
469. See Sierra Club v. Trump, 963 F.3d 874, 884 n.9 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. granted, 141
S. Ct. 618 (2020). So did the dissenting judge. Id. at 901–03 (Collins, J., dissenting); see also
California v. Trump, 963 F.3d 926, 935–36 n.10 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. granted sub nom.
Trump v. Sierra Club, 141 S. Ct. 618 (2020); id. at 953–55 (Collins, J., dissenting).
470. See supra text accompanying notes 246–250.
471. Washington v. Trump, 441 F. Supp. 3d 1101, 1113 (W.D. Wash. 2020); El Paso
County v. Trump, 408 F. Supp. 3d 840, 848–52 (W.D. Tex. 2019), aff’d in part, rev’d on
other grounds, 982 F.3d 332 (5th Cir. 2020).
472. See Rebecca M. Kysar, Listening to Congress: Earmark Rules and Statutory
Interpretation, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 519, 534–36 (2009) (describing earmarks and their
prevalence during the George W. Bush Administration).
473. Sierra Club, 963 F.3d at 890.
474. California v. Trump, 963 F.3d at 942.
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prohibiting a transfer of funds that Congress had previously denied. And
Congress has a particular institutional interest in ensuring agencies adhere
to the requirements of a statute that gives an agency discretion to transfer
funds that Congress appropriated for one use to another.475 The fact that
transfer authorizations are at issue is also helpful given that only the House
of Representatives is suing. If the Trump Administration cannot transfer
funds under existing appropriations acts, it would need to obtain a new
statute to do so—a statute that the House on its own could prevent from
being enacted given the requirement of bicameralism. As a result, the
House is asserting its own institutional interests in ensuring that its
approval is needed for any new use of funds, even if it is also asserting
Congress’s collective institutional interest in having its laws enforced.476 In
ﬁnding that the House had standing, the D.C. Circuit made an argument
to just this effect, concluding that “the House is individually and distinctly
injured because the Executive Branch has allegedly cut the House out of
its constitutionally indispensable legislative role . . . . [and] deﬁed an
express constitutional provision that protects each congressional
chamber’s unilateral authority to prevent expenditures.”477
Under the approach advocated here, the best course would be to
allow the House to sue rather than the states and environmental
organizations. The whole point of a transfer provision is to allow the
government ﬂexibility to respond to a new development and to do so
quickly without getting a supplemental appropriations bill passed. As a
result, broadly available third-party litigation could be particularly costly in
this context. But if the House is denied the ability to sue, then—as the
Ninth Circuit argued—separation of powers concerns with protecting
Congress’s power of the purse and preventing de facto independent
presidential spending authority support applying a very lenient zone of
interests inquiry or doing away with it altogether.
On the interpretive front, the question is whether DOD’s transfer of
billions of dollars to DHS to build the wall satisﬁed Section 8005’s
requirement that the “the funds will be used for higher priority items,
based on unforeseen military requirements, than those for which
originally appropriated and in no case where the item for which funds are
requested has been denied by the Congress”?478 The Ninth Circuit held it
475. See 31 U.S.C. § 1532 (2018) (“An amount available under law may be withdrawn
from one appropriation account and credited to another or to a working fund only when
authorized by law.”).
476. U.S. House of Representatives v. Mnuchin, 976 F.3d 1, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2020)
(concluding that the House had standing to challenge transfers under Section 8005 of the
FY2019 DOD Appropriations Act and 10 U.S.C. §§ 284 and 2808).
477. Id. at 13.
478. The additional statutory provisions that the government invoked to authorize the
funds transfer included counterdrug and military construction authorities. See 10 U.S.C.
§§ 284, 2808 (2018); see also John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
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did not, concluding that given the battles over border wall funding that
had led to the thirty-ﬁve-day shutdown, DOD was on notice it might be
asked to provide funds to build the wall. Nor, against this background,
could it be said Congress did not anticipate the claimed need for the wall;
instead, Congress opted repeatedly to deny wall funding, making the
transfer doubly violative of Section 8005’s terms.479 Indeed, the appellate
court also ruled that the border wall did not qualify as a “military
requirement,” noting that the wall was not connected to a military
installation or needed for troops, weapons, or war effort.480 Instead, its
primary purpose was to beneﬁt DHS, a civilian agency.481 GAO, however,
reached the opposite conclusion. It agreed with the government that
“unforeseen” refers to whether DOD was aware of the need to provide
funds for border wall construction at the time DOD submitted its budget
request and when Congress enacted DOD’s appropriations.482 And it
further agreed that Congress did not deny the request by only providing
$1.375 billion in border fencing funds, because that was a denial of DHS’s
request for additional funds, with DOD not making any such funding
request at all.483
As suggested above, in an ordinary appropriations dispute GAO’s
views deserve special weight, given its expertise and Congress’s delegation
to it of an appropriations-policing role. Surprisingly, the Ninth Circuit
never addressed GAO’s contrary view, despite it being relied upon by the
dissenting judge. That was an unjustiﬁed omission; even if a court reaches
a different conclusion, GAO’s views on the meaning of appropriations
statutes deserve serious consideration. The harder question is whether the
Ninth Circuit should have deferred to GAO’s views.
Two factors counsel against such deference here. The ﬁrst is that this
was no ordinary appropriations dispute. Instead, it involves the executive
branch’s unilateral reallocation of billions of dollars in furtherance of a
Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232, § 1001, 132 Stat. 1636, 1945 (2018) (providing authority
similar to Section 8005). Leaving aside whether 10 U.S.C. §§ 284 and 2808 on their own
terms support DOD actions, a question exists as to whether they can operate independently
of permission in an appropriations act such as Section 8005, given that Section 739 of the
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2019 prohibited the administration from
“increas[ing] . . . funding for a[ny] program, project, or activity as proposed in the
President’s budget request for a ﬁscal year until such proposed change is subsequently
enacted in an Appropriations Act,” or is made pursuant to provisions in an appropriations
act. See Washington v. Trump, 441 F. Supp. 3d 1101, 1109, 1116–17 (W.D. Wash. 2020)
(concluding that Section 739 prohibits independent use of Section 2808 authority).
479. California v. Trump, 963 F.3d at 945–46.
480. Id. at 947.
481. Id.
482. Dep’t of Def.—Availability of Appropriations for Border Fence Constr. to Cong.
Requesters, B-330862, 2019 WL 4200949, at *6 (Comp. Gen. Sept. 5, 2019).
483. Id. at *8–9. GAO also concluded that the use of the funds to build border fences
was a permissible use of funds under 10 U.S.C. § 284. Id. at *10–14.
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highly contentious immigration initiative that had just triggered the
longest government shutdown in history. Arguably, therefore, this case
involves the type of major “question of deep ‘economic and political
signiﬁcance’” that the Supreme Court has held is inappropriate for
deference in non-appropriations contexts.484 Taking a standard public law
approach to appropriations, therefore, would support a court deciding
this question using its independent judgment, as the Ninth Circuit did.
The second is that, in authorizing DOD to transfer appropriated funds to
a different use without having to obtain legislation approving the change,
Section 8005 serves to delegate unilateral appropriations authority to the
executive branch. It is therefore the type of provision that, as suggested
above, should be read with an eye to reaffirming congressional control of
the purse. Particularly in light of Congress’s subsequent resolutions
condemning the transfer, the Ninth Circuit’s narrow reading represents
the better account of Section 8005’s scope.485
CONCLUSION
In today’s deeply polarized and politically competitive world, appropriations are a critical means by which both Congress and the President
seek to control policy. This increased dependence on and exploitation of
appropriations has signiﬁcant impact on agencies’ functioning and the
relationship between Congress and the executive branch. It is also leading
to litigation, as a number of high-proﬁle appropriations disputes spill over
into courts. Yet while appropriations are the contemporary linchpin of
government, they are marginalized in public law doctrine. Across several
major domains of public law—constitutional law, administrative law, and
statutory interpretation—a number of doctrines exclude appropriations
disputes from court or minimize the importance of appropriations when
judicial review occurs. Even when appropriations’ signiﬁcance is not
downplayed, they are often either pulled out of standard analytic
frameworks or simply ignored. Appropriations are center stage in the
political branches, however. These two phenomena are closely related;
appropriations’ marginalization in public law doctrine is based in part on

484. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–89 (2015).
485. The argument would also support narrowly reading 10 U.S.C. § 2808, the other
transfer provision relied on by the Trump Administration. Even capaciously read, however,
Section 2808 fails to support the border wall funds transfers. Section 2808 provides that
“[i]n the event of a . . . declaration by the President of a national emergency . . . that
requires use of the armed forces, the Secretary of Defense, without regard to any other provision of law, may undertake military construction projects . . . that are necessary to support
such use of the armed forces,” using funds appropriated for military construction. As the
Ninth Circuit held, the border wall was “intended to beneﬁt DHS and its subagencies, . . .
not the armed forces” and failed to meet the statutory deﬁnition of military construction as
“‘carried out with respect to a military installation.’” Sierra Club v. Trump, 977 F.3d 853,
879–88 (9th Cir. 2020), petition for cert. ﬁled, No. 20-685 (U.S. Nov. 17, 2020) (quoting 10
U.S.C. § 2801(a)).
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the belief that appropriations are inherently matters for the political
branches, not the courts. But appropriations marginalization also rests on
a judicial prioritizing of substantive legislation over appropriations
measures.
Recognizing the doctrinal marginalization of appropriations and the
resultant disconnect with appropriations reality is only the ﬁrst step. The
harder questions are whether this marginalization is nonetheless
justiﬁed—and if not, how appropriations should be better incorporated
into public law. This Article has argued that the current marginalization
of appropriations is at odds with the Constitution. The very centrality of
appropriations to policy disputes today reinforces the conclusion that
prioritizing substantive enactments illegitimately undercuts Congress’s
appropriations power. It also highlights the separation of powers costs of
appropriations marginalization in public law doctrine, with jurisdictional
exclusion in particular serving to expand the President’s de facto
independent spending authority. Yet at the same time, this centrality also
underscores the deeply political nature of appropriations and the dangers
of expanding the judicial role. The challenge is to construct a doctrinal
approach that better accords with the constitutional appropriations framework and gives appropriations measures their due weight in court, while
also reinforcing political branch regulation of appropriations.
This Article has sought to sketch such an approach, identifying how
taking appropriations seriously might alter constitutional analysis, statutory interpretation, and access to judicial review. Although focusing on
appropriations, this approach is animated by two ideas with implications
for separation of powers disputes more broadly, both keyed to the deep
governance challenges posed by partisan polarization and division today.
One is that courts should be sensitive to the branches’ needs to wield their
powers in new ways.486 Both Congress and the executive branch have
turned to appropriations as a means of asserting policy control in the
contemporary polarized environment, and courts should not discourage
such efforts absent a clear constitutional foundation for doing so. The
other is that courts should seek to set separation of powers rules that
encourage interbranch negotiation. Embracing both of these ideas would
not only lead to taking appropriations seriously, it would help to construct
a separation of powers doctrine that would better suit our polarized era.

486. See Leah M. Litman, Debunking Antinovelty, 66 Duke L.J. 1407, 1412, 1423
(2017).

